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There are many different ways to talk about the world. Some ways of talking
are more expressive than others—that is, they enable us to say more things about
the world. But what exactly does this mean? When is one language able to express
more about the world than another? In my dissertation, I systematically investigate
different ways of answering this question and develop a formal theory of expressive
power. In doing so, I show how these investigations help to clarify the role that
expressive power plays within debates in metaphysics, logic, and the philosophy
of language.
When we attempt to describe the world, we are trying to distinguish the way
things are from all the many ways things could have been—in other words, we are
trying to locate ourselves within a region of logical space. According to this picture,
languages can be thought of as ways of carving logical space or, more formally, as
maps from sentences to classes of models. For example, the language of first-order
logic is just a mapping from first-order formulas to model-assignment pairs that
satisfy those formulas. Almost all formal languages discussed in metaphysics and
logic, as well as many of those discussed in natural language semantics, can be
characterized in this way.
Using this picture of language, I analyze two different approaches to defining
expressive power, each of which is motivated by different roles a language can play
in a debate. One role a language can play is to divide and organize a shared concep-
tion of logical space. If two languages share the same conception of logical space
(i.e., are defined over the same class of models), then one can compare the expres-
sive power of these languages by comparing how finely they carve logical space.
This is the approach commonly employed, for instance, in debates over tense and
modality, such as the primitivism-reductionism debate.
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But a second role languages can play in a debate is to advance a conception
or theory of logical space itself. For example, consider the debate between perdu-
rantism, which claims that objects persist through time by having temporal parts
located throughout that time, and endurantism, which claims that objects persist
through time by being wholly present at that time. A natural thought about this de-
bate is that perdurantism and endurantism are simply alternative but equally good
descriptions of the world rather than competing theories. Whenever the enduran-
tist says, for instance, that an object is red at time t, the perdurantist can say that the
object’s temporal part at t is red. On this view, one should conceive of perdurantism
and endurantism not as theories picking out disjoint regions of logical space, but as
theories offering alternative conceptions of logical space: one in which persistence
through time is analogous to location in space and one in which it is not. A similar
distinction applies to other metaphysical debates, such as the mereological debate
between universalism and nihilism.
If two theories propose incommensurable conceptions of logical space, we can
still compare their expressive power utilizing the notion of a translation, which
acts as a correlation between points in logical space that preserves the language’s
inferential connections. I build a formal theory of translation that explores different
ways of making this notion precise. I then apply this theory to two metaphysical
debates, viz., the debate over whether composite objects exist and the debate over
how objects persist through time. This allows us to get a clearer picture of the sense
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There are many different ways one can describe the world. Some are better than
others, but many of them are all equally good. What makes one language better
than another? Usually, a whole host of factors. Maybe one language is better than
another in its simplicity, its efficiency, its flexibility, or its aesthetics. But a funda-
mental way in which some languages can be better than others is in their expressive
capacities—the possibilities they can describe, the distinctions they can draw, the
structures they can represent, and so forth. What does this mean, though? What
exactly constitutes the expressive power of a language? The main project of this
dissertation is to systematize different ways of answering this question.
Expressive power is one of the most fundamental properties of a formal lan-
guage that one can investigate. Indeed, some of the most foundational results
in mathematical logic are results concerning the expressive power of formal lan-
guages. The compactness theorem is a case in point. We often summarize its signif-
icance by saying things like “The compactness theorem shows, among other things,
that first-order logic cannot express the claim that there are infinitely many things.”
Another prime example is the van Benthem characterization theorem in modal
logic. One way to interpret this result is as follows: modal logic is expressively
equivalent to the bisimulation-invariant fragment of first-order logic. Results such
as these are not only practically useful but also give us insight into the strengths
and limitations of a formal system.
In addition, expressive power is philosophically important. A number of dis-
putes in philosophy hinge on whether one side is able to articulate every possibil-
ity the other side can articulate. Sometimes, lack of expressive power is raised as
a criticism. For instance, it is thought to be a problem for primitivist views about
modality that they cannot articulate various quantified modal claims without ap-
pealing to irreducible quantification over possible worlds (e.g., “Everything could
have failed to exist”). Other times, it is too much expressive power that is objec-
tionable. A classic objection to absolutism about space is that it makes distinctions
where none are to be had (e.g., between a universe and its qualitatively identical
counterpart where everything is shifted 3 feet in one direction). Other times still,
the expressive equivalence of the two sides of the dispute is used as a reductio of
the whole dispute. If everything that can be said by the mereological universalist
v
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can also be said by the mereological nihilist, then one might think there is nothing
that really hinges on this dispute (just pick whichever way of talking you prefer!).
Getting clear on what exactly are the expressive limitations of a language is crucial,
then, for understanding the force of some of these objections.
The notion of expressive power employed in results such as the ones mentioned
above can be characterized in the following manner. One language is as expressive
as another if for every sentence of the latter, there is a sentence of the former that
“means the same thing”. To be more precise, think of a language as consisting of
three ingredients: (1) a grammar, i.e., a collection of well-formed sentences of the
language; (2) a conception of logical space, i.e., a collection of models used to assess
the truth of the well-formed sentences; and (3) a semantics, i.e., a function that maps
each well-formed sentence to a region of logical space, or its “semantic value”.1 For
example, the language of first-order logic consists of the well-formed formulas of
the first-order predicate calculus, the class of model-assignment pairs, and the se-
mantics that maps each formula to the class of model-assignments pairs at which
the formula is true. On this picture of a language, “means the same thing” can be
cashed out in terms of their semantic values: two sentences “mean the same thing”
if they pick out the same region of logical space. Thus, two first-order formulas
“mean the same thing” if they are satisfied at exactly the same model-assignment
pairs. Then we can state the relevant notion of expressive power as follows: a lan-
guage L1 is as expressive as another language L2 if every sentence in L2 has the
same semantic value as some sentence in L1. So a consequence of the compactness
theorem can be stated as follows: first-order logic cannot express the claim that
there are infinitely many things, since no first-order formula is true at exactly the
models with an infinite domain.
On this simple definition of expressive power, in order to compare the expres-
sive power of two languages, it must be presupposed that the languages in question
are defined over the same conception of logical space. In order to say that L1 is as
expressive as L2, it must be that every model of L2 is a model of L1. This is a con-
venient assumption. It facilitates answering questions about sameness of meaning
that would otherwise be difficult to address. For instance, in the study of modal
logics, when one wants to show that such-and-such an operator is not expressible
in the basic modal language (say), one does so by showing there are Kripke models
that can be distinguished by the modal language with such-and-such operator that
cannot be distinguished by the basic modal language.2 One uses one-and-the-same
class of models for both languages to determine what can be said in each.
Yet this assumption is not always warranted. In many cases, it is desirable to
compare the expressive power of languages with competing conceptions of logical
space.
1This notion of meaning can be traced back to Wittgenstein [1922, 3.4, 4.022, 4.024]. See also
Stalnaker 1976; Lewis 1986.
2See, e.g., Blackburn et al. 2001, pp. 64–73.
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As a simple example, consider the language of (classical) propositional logic.
One way to develop propositional logic is in terms of valuation functions, i.e., func-
tions from atomic sentences to truth values. Another, apparently equivalent, way to
develop propositional logic is in terms of valuation sets, i.e., sets of atomic sentences
(the ones that are true according to that valuation). Intuitively, there should be no
essential difference between these languages in their expressive capacities: each can
say exactly what the other can say. And yet, according to the simple notion of ex-
pressive power above, these languages are expressively incomparable. Vacuously,
no sentence of one version is true at “the same class of models” as any sentence of
the other. This incomparability of expressivity is, arguably, undesirable. The ex-
pressive power of a language does not crucially depend on purely representational
features of the logical space over which it is defined. Rather, it depends on the kinds
of structures it can articulate on a given logical space.
More serious examples come from the study of nonclassical logics. It is some-
times argued that the double-negation translation from classical logic into intu-
itionistic logic shows that classical logic is really just a fragment of intuitionistic
logic. For instance, Gödel [1933] (reprinted in Gödel [1986, p. 287]) articulates this
viewpoint:
If to the primitive notions of Heyting’s propositional calculus we let cor-
respond those notions of the classical propositional calculus that are de-
noted by the same sign and if to absurdity (¬) we let correspond nega-
tion („), then the intuitionistic propositional calculus H turns out to be
a proper subsystem of the ordinary propositional calculus A. With an-
other correlation (translation) of the notions, however, the classical propo-
sitional calculus is, conversely, a subsystem of the intuitionistic one.
It is natural to conclude from the fact that classical logic can be faithfully trans-
lated into intuitionistic logic that the language of intuitionistic logic has greater
expressive power than the language of classical logic. A common way of thinking
about intuitionistic logic, in light of this result, is that it is essentially an extension
of classical logic with special operators (viz., ‘_’ and ‘Ñ’). But the simple notion
of expressive power does not yield this result, as the class of Kripke models for in-
tuitionistic logic is disjoint from the class of classical valuations (even though the
latter is, in some sense, clearly identifiable as a subclass of the former).
Being able to compare the expressive power of some languages that are defined
over distinct conceptions of logical space is also important for philosophical pur-
poses. In many cases, to assume that each side of a philosophical dispute has the
same conception of logical space would be to prejudge the dispute in question. We
still want to compare the expressive capacities of, say, absolutism and relationalism
even if the latter refuses to recognize distinctions the former recognizes. Similarly,
we want to be able to compare what can be said by the universalist and the nihilist
even if neither leaves open any possibility that the former leaves open.
vii
Introduction
The main project of this dissertation is to explore different measures of expres-
sive power and compare their strengths and weaknesses. It is not to answer the
question of what expressive power truly is. I am not sure there is even an answer to
this question. As we will see, there are many different notions of expressive power,
each with their pros and cons, and there does not seem to be any obvious way of
deciding what the one true notion of expressivity amounts to. But even if there is,
I take it as an important first step to lay out some options and explore their various
properties. That is what I aim to do here.
There are three notable aspects to my approach to this topic. The first is in the
level of abstraction with which notions of expressive power are characterized. This
aspect of my approach can be traced back to Alfred Tarski’s work on logical conse-
quence. While Tarski is known for his conception of logical consequence in terms of
truth relative to all interpretations of the non-logical expressions [Tarski, 1983c], he
was also keenly interested in more general conceptions of logical consequence, fol-
lowing from the work of Jan Łukasieciz and Stanisław Leśniewski. In Tarski 1983b,
p. 30, for instance, logical consequence is thought of as an operator on sentences:
From the sentences of any set X certain other sentences can be obtained
by means of certain operations called rules of inference. These sentences
are called the consequences of the set X. The set of all consequences is
denoted by the symbol ‘Cn(X)’.
He stipulates five axioms that an operator Cn over a set S must satisfy to count as a
consequence operator, presented below in modern notation [Tarski, 1983b, p. 31]:
Axiom 1. |S| ď ℵ0.
Axiom 2. If X Ď S, then X Ď Cn(X) Ď S.
Axiom 3. If X Ď S, then Cn(Cn(X))  Cn(X).
Axiom 4. If X Ď S, then Cn(X) 
Ť
tCn(Y) | Y Ď X & |Y| ă ℵ0 u.
Axiom 5. There exists a sentence x P S such that Cn(txu)  S.
Informally, these axioms state that: (1) there are only countably many formulas in
total;3 (2) consequence is monotonic and reflexive;4 (3) consequence is transitive; (4)
consequence is compact; and (5) there is a falsum sentence that implies everything.5
While it can be shown that any logic satisfying Axioms 2–3 can be character-
ized as the truth-preservation relation of some language (Proposition 1.1.9), this
characterization of logical consequence is more abstract insofar as it makes very few
3Tarski [1983a, p. 63] seems to consider this a simplifying assumption.
4More accurately, that consequence is “monotonically reflexive”. See Proposition 1.1.9.
5This axiom is dropped in Tarski 1983a.
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assumptions about the nature of the syntax, models, or semantics of the language it
is defined over. Tarski’s aim is to “make precise the meaning of a series of important meta-
mathematical concepts which are common to the special metadisciplines, and to estab-
lish the fundamental properties of these concepts.” This abstract approach to logic was
also adopted by Adolf Lindenbaum, Jerzy Łoś, and other members of the Warsaw
School of Logic around the same time. Much of this work was later summarized
(and generalized) by Wójcicki [1988] in an influential introduction to the subject,
as well as those working the tradition of abstract algebraic logic.6 Following in this
tradition, this dissertation can be seen as an attempt to establish the fundamental
properties of just one important metamathematical concept, viz., that of expressive
power, without relying on any (or at least, relying on very few) assumptions about
the underlying constitution of the language in question.
The second aspect of my approach to expressive power is its emphasis on trans-
lations. Given that we are interested in formulating a notion of expressive power
that does not require the languages whose expressivity is being compared have
commensurable conceptions of logical space, a natural question arises: what does
“sameness of meaning” amount to? One promising answer to this question is given
in the notion of a translation. Translations, the thought goes, are supposed to be
maps from sentences to sentences (or expressions to expressions) that “preserve
meaning”. If that is so, then investigating what makes a translation adequate will
help answer the question of what sameness of meaning amounts to in these cases,
thereby giving us a way to measure expressive power.
While translations have always been the subject of much interest for logicians, a
formal definition of a translation was (according to Feitosa and D’Ottaviano [2001])
first articulated by Prawitz and Malmnäs [1968], who did so en route to discussing
the relationship between classical, intuitionistic, and minimal logic. Wójcicki [1988]
and Epstein [1990] are among the first to investigate the notion of a translation more
thoroughly, both as a general method for studying nonclassical logics and as an
independently interesting subject. Much of the work in this dissertation is heavily
influenced by these texts. Since then, there has been a flurry of work on the topic
of translations as a way of characterizing the deductive strength of logical systems
in the literature on abstract logic.7
This dissertation differs from the previous work on the subject of translations,
however, in two respects. First, while previous work on translations has focused
on translations between logics, one focus of this dissertation (especially in Chapters
4–5) is on translations between languages. It turns out that there is a way of moving
back and forth between the two, so previous work on translations between logics
can be easily imported to the study of translations between languages.
6See Font 2016 for a helpful introduction.
7See Carnielli and D’Ottaviano 1997; Carnielli et al. 2009; Feitosa and D’Ottaviano 2001; Pelletier
and Urquhart 2003; Caleiro and Gonçalves 2007; Straßburger 2007; Mossakowski et al. 2009; French
2010; Jeřábek 2012; Wigglesworth 2017; Woods 2018.
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Second, previous work on translations has tended to largely focus on proposi-
tional languages and has thereby ignored languages with quantification.8 This is
entirely reasonable, since the study of translations is already difficult enough with-
out having to worry about the complexities quantifiers introduce. But I think there
is much to be learned from the study of quantificational languages. For example,
a now well-known result due to Jeřábek [2012] (reviewed in Theorem 2.6.8) shows
that a great number of languages can be faithfully translated into classical propo-
sitional logic. In particular, the result shows that first-order logic can be translated
into propositional logic. In fact, it will be shown later in this dissertation (The-
orem 2.6.5 and Corollary 2.6.7) that one can even faithfully translate first-order
logic into propositional logic bijectively. Moreover, the translational relationship
between first-order logic and modal logic has been largely overlooked and so de-
serves attention (Proposition 3.3.16).9
The final notable aspect of my approach is in its application to metaphysics.
In the study of expressive power, it is hard to ignore the overwhelmingly strong
connections to recent discussions in metametaphysics over what makes a dispute
“merely verbal.” Various claims about the relative expressive power of a particular
metaphysical view have been made. As an illustration, consider again the debate
between mereological universalism and mereological nihilism. It is often said that
whatever the universalist says about tables, the nihilist can say about “atoms ar-
ranged table-wise”. For some, this point is convincing enough: if everything the
universalist can say can also be said by the nihilist, albeit in other terms, then in
what sense are the two sides in genuine disagreement? For others, it is hardly per-
suasive: it matters not what each side can say, but what they do say.
Part of the difficult in assessing these “metadisputes” is in the fact that the two
sides are starting out with radically different assumptions about the debate. The
“realist” interpretation of this dispute assumes that we can take for granted that
the universalist and the nihilist mean the same thing by the words ‘part’ and ‘whole’,
and are simply disagreeing over the nature of parthood. The “anti-realist” inter-
pretation, by contrast, does not assume that this can be taken for granted, and it
takes seriously the idea that each side is simply using the words ‘part’ and ‘whole’
differently. And it is difficult to say which interpretation of these sorts of disputes
is the right one to take. One goal of the final chapter of this dissertation is to try to
use the framework of translations and a more general characterization of expres-
sive power to provide common ground for assessing these sorts of metadisputes.
In doing so, I aim to show that even on an anti-realist interpretation, genuine dis-
agreement between the opposing sides in these disputes is still possible.
8Some notable exceptions: Barrett and Halvorson 2016a,b.
9With that said, I have tried to integrate discussion of quantifiers into a more general framework
by thinking of quantifiers are operators, rather than as binding devices. It would be worth investigat-
ing ways of generalizing the simple pictures of language discussed in this dissertation to fit more
neatly with quantificational languages, but the issue is not pursued much here.
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Below is a chapter summary of the dissertation.
Chapter 1: Preliminaries. Before we can measure expressive power, we need to get
clearer on what a language is. The simplest picture of a language is this: a lan-
guage is some syntax (a set of well-formed formulas) together with a class of indices
(points of evaluation) and a satisfaction relation specifying which indices satisfy
which formulas (or, equivalently: an assignment of sentences to semantic values,
i.e., sets of indices). Similarly, a logic can be modeled as a syntax paired with a
consequence relation (a relation between sets of formulas and formulas).
This chapter introduces a number of important concepts relating to languages
and logics that will be used throughout the dissertation. In particular, we define
(1) the notion of a Tarskian logic, showing that they are precisely the logics that
can be the entailment relations of some language, (2) the notion of a fragment of a
language, (3) the notion of a theory, showing that the space of theories in a language
form a complete lattice, and (4) the notion of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. We
also consider two refinements of the simple picture of language: one which views
sentences as composed from atomic sentences together with some operations, and
one which views meaning as context-change potential rather than as satisfaction
conditions.
Chapter 2: Translation. The notion of expressive power is closely tied to the notion
of a translation. Intuitively, one language is as expressive as another just in case the
latter is translatable into the former. And two languages are expressively equiva-
lent just in case they are intertranslatable. But what exactly counts as a “transla-
tion” from one language to another? One natural idea is that a translation from one
language to another must “preserve the meaning” of each sentence of the source
language in the target language. However, it is not obvious how to spell out the no-
tion of meaning preservation. In particular, one cannot spell out the notion simply
by stipulating that sentences from different languages mean the same thing if they
are given the same semantic value. For many languages whose expressive power
seem readily comparable do not share the same conception of logical space. As a
simple illustration, classical logic and intuitionistic logic are not defined relative to
the same class of models. Yet we still want to be able to compare the expressive
power of each language (e.g., many theorists want to say intuitionistic logic is more
expressive than classical logic).
This chapter explores a relatively simple proposal. The simple proposal is mo-
tivated by the idea that at least one necessary criterion for a mapping to count as
a translation is that it faithfully preserve inferential connections between the sen-
tences of the language. Thus, if t is a translation from a language L1 into L2, then
it ought to at least be the case that an argument is valid in L1 iff the translation of
this argument via t is valid in L2. According to the notion of a translation explored
in this chapter, the converse is also true: t is a translation if it faithfully preserves
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the inferential connections between sentences. While this notion of a translation
is fairly minimalistic, it is not uninformative: there are a number of natural and
interesting examples of languages not being translatable into others.
Two more tasks are accomplished in this chapter. First, a distinction is drawn
between different notions of equivalence between languages (intertranslatability,
translational equivalence, and isomorphism). It is argued that the weakest of these
notions (intertranslatability) roughly corresponds to expressive equivalence, whereas
the middle notion (translational equivalence) roughly corresponds to notational
variance. Second, it is shown that this notion of a translation is indeed too weak to
formalize expressive power. This is because it can be shown that many seemingly
powerful languages can be translated into classical propositional logic. In partic-
ular, it is shown that full first-order logic is translationally isomorphic to proposi-
tional logic. This shows that we need to place further constraints on translatability
in order to achieve an adequate formulation of the intuitive notions of “expressiv-
ity” and “notational variance”.
Chapter 3: Compositionality. The results from the previous chapter suggest that we
need more restricted criteria on translations to get adequate precisifications of ex-
pressive power and notational variance. A natural restriction to place on transla-
tions is this: translations need to be compositional, in the sense that they translate
complex formulas as functions of the translations of the parts. This chapter essen-
tially develops different ways of understanding this idea in more detail. Some of
these notions of compositionality are too weak insofar as they still render first-order
logic and propositional logic equivalent. Others are too strong, as they rule out a
number of intuitive examples of expressive equivalence. In between is a notion I
call schematicity: the translation of a complex formula ought to be a fixed schema of
the translation of its parts. This notion of schematicity is refined and systematically
characterized in a number of different ways. It is shown, for instance, that schematic
equivalence can be characterized as another notion sometimes called “definitional
equivalence”. The notion is generalized to cover cases where multiple translations
are recursively defined in terms of others in a schematic way.
Chapter 4: Logical Space. The previous two chapters focused on notions of trans-
lation that were defined in terms of inference-preservation. This chapter looks at
several different notions of translation defined in terms of truth-preservation. The
idea is this: translations need to not only preserve the validity of arguments, but
they must also preserve truth at an index. Of course, if the languages in ques-
tion have different indices relative to which truth is evaluated, then we need to
say more about what preserving truth at an index amounts to. This can be done if
translations translate indices as well as sentences. Richard Epstein calls these trans-
lations “model-preserving”. Model-preserving maps automatically faithfully pre-
serve consequence. Several different characterizations of model-preservation are
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proven. In particular, it is shown that model-preservation is equivalent to inference-
preservation given that the languages involved have a special property (canonically
had by classical languages) that I call “opinionation”, which states (very roughly)
that if a consistent set of formulas fails to imply another formula, then that set
can be expanded to a maximally consistent set while still failing to imply that for-
mula. Thus, for classical languages with boolean negation, the minimalist notion
of a translation is equivalent to the stronger model-preserving notion. The notions
diverge, however, for nonclassical languages.
Chapter 5: Metametaphysics. In this final chapter, the technical apparatus of the
previous chapters is applied to metametaphysics—particularly to the debate over
which metaphysical disputes are “verbal”. A number of metaphysical disputes
seem completely irresolvable in the sense that no side can seem to get any foot-
ing against the other. There are two common attitudes to have towards apparently
irresolvable disputes. On the one hand, there are the realists about a dispute, who
hold that there is an objective fact of the matter as to which side of the dispute
(if any) is correct. According to the realist about a metaphysical dispute, the dis-
putants are in genuine disagreement and the irresolvability of the dispute arises
simply from the fact that the question under discussion is difficult to answer. On
the other hand, there are the anti-realists about a dispute, who hold that there is
no objective fact of the matter as to which side of the dispute is correct. Accord-
ing to the anti-realist about a metaphysical dispute, the disputants are “just talking
past one another” and their theories are “notational variants” of one another.
It is commonly thought that anti-realism entails an end to a dispute. Anti-
realists about a dispute, it is thought, will hold that there simply is no point in
having the dispute in the first place: you can choose to talk however you like. The
goal of this chapter is to show that this need not be the case. Even if we adopt an
anti-realist framework, according to which the disputants in question ought to be
modeled as speaking different languages, there can still be objective disagreements
these disputants can have with one another over which language one ought to be
using for theorizing.
To do this, I apply the formal framework from the previous chapters to two dis-
putes, both of which are classic examples of purportedly verbal disputes. The first
is the dispute in mereology between nihilism (the view that there are no compos-
ite objects) and universalism (the view that composition is unrestricted—any set
of objects compose a composite object). The second is the dispute over persistence
between four-dimensionalism (the view that objects persist through time via tem-
poral parts) and three-dimensionalism (the view that objects persist through time
by being “wholly present”). Using the framework of expressive power discussed
previously, we can see more clearly in what sense, if any, these disputes are verbal.
In the case of mereology, it is shown that the universalism-nihilism dispute is
only verbal if we assume atomism. Otherwise, the universalist has strictly greater
xiii
Introduction
expressive power than nihilism, and so the dispute between them can be seen as
one over whether to recognize certain possibilities that the universalist recognizes
as genuine.
In the case of persistence, while the four-dimensionalist and three-dimensionalist
technically have matching expressive powers when matching mereological princi-
ples are associated with each view, they seem to differ in expressive power when
we assume each view is associated with different mereological principles. In partic-
ular, four-dimensionalism is typically associated with mereological principles that
are diachronic in nature, whereas three-dimensionalism is associated with mere-
ological principles that are synchronic. This is sufficient to separate the views in
their expressivity.
Much can be said about expressive power. But it should be noted that I did not
say everything that could be said. This dissertation leaves out some important as-
pects of the study of expressive power. One lacuna concerns the expressive power
of non-Tarskian languages. The notion of expressive power for languages whose
entailment relation is not monotonic, contractive, commutative, or reflexive has yet
to be investigated. Important examples of such languages include dynamic lan-
guages, which may fail to have all of these properties. Though dynamic languages
are discussed briefly in § 1.4, it is only to lay out special circumstances when the re-
sults of this dissertation can be transferred over to those languages, not to say how
to generalize the framework to these languages entirely. Other important examples
of non-Tarskian languages include nonclassical languages such as relevance logic,
linear logic, and other substructural logics. Much work on the issue of expressive
power for these languages still has yet to be done.
Another important aspect of expressive power not discussed in this disserta-
tion is its relation to computational complexity. It is part of the folklore in logic
that there is a trade-off between expressive power and computational complexity:
in general, the more expressive your language is, the more computationally com-
plex it becomes. It would be interesting to formalize this folklore in a general way.
I suspect the framework developed in this dissertation could shed some light on
this issue; but I leave this task for future work. A few remarks about using compu-
tational complexity in the definition of expressive power are made in § 2.6.3; but
otherwise, the topic is mostly untouched here.
Connections between expressive power and other important metamathematical
concepts are also lacking. For example, nothing is said about Lindström’s theorems,
which states that first-order logic is the most expressive logic with compactness and
downward Löwenheim-Skolem properties. Nor is anything said about interpola-
tion theorems and their relation to definability [Hoogland, 2001]. There is always
a tradeoff between breadth and depth: it is difficult to see what can be said about
such connections at the level of abstraction this dissertation employs. So I have
omitted discussion of them, if only for lack of things to say.
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Finally, the philosophical applications of this framework to metaphysical dis-
putes is far from complete, even on its own terms. The results presented in Chap-
ter 5 are more of a proof of concept rather than a decisive demonstration that the
framework of translations and expressive power can clarify the status of these meta-
physical disputes. While I do think these results help illustrate the ways in which
these disputes can be viewed as substantive, and while I think some initial conclu-
sions can be safely drawn from them, I do not think the project can be thought of
as completed at this point. More must be done before we can say for certain what





Before we can explore how to measure the expressive power of a language, we must
first get clear on what a language is. In this chapter, we lay out a variety of ways
one can go about defining a language in more precise terms.
We begin with a very simple conception of a language—a conception that is
sometimes referred to as “model-theoretic semantics” and goes at least as far back
as Tarski.1 On this conception, a language consists of three parts. First, there is a
syntax, which tells you what the well-formed formulas are in the language. Second,
there is a class of interpretations relative to which these formulas can be evaluated.
And third, there is a semantics, which tells you under what interpretations any
given formula is satisfied.
Here is the intuitive idea behind this picture of language. One starts with a no-
tion of logical space—the space consisting of every possibility, i.e., every way things
could have been. Logical space acts as the object of interpretation or evaluation for
a language. A language uses formulas of a language to “carve” logical space. Each
formula carves logical space into two regions: the region of logical space where the
satisfaction conditions of the formula are met and the region where they are not.
Thus, a language can be thought of as a way of partitioning logical space.
Logical space consists of all the “possibilities”. The flavor of possibility here
is deliberatively left open. Different applications will require different interpreta-
tions. For some purposes (e.g., when engaging in metaphysical theorizing), it will
be natural to interpret logical space as consisting of the metaphysical possibilities.
For other purposes (e.g., when modeling natural language discourse), it will be
natural to interpret logical space as consisting of another kind of possibility (e.g.,
epistemic). Some of these purposes will be our purposes. But at least one of our
purposes is more general. The goal is to characterize different notions of expres-
sive power in abstract terms and to systematically relate them. So for our purposes,
we can often interpret logical space as consisting of the logical or conceptual pos-
1See Tarski 1944, 1983c.
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sibilities. These are the possibilities that are not ruled out solely in virtue of the
conventions governing one’s language. Maybe these possibilities are epistemically
ruled out, or metaphysically impossible, or otherwise unpleasant. But that will not
concern us as long as the possibilities described are logically permissible.
In the chapters to follow, we will often use this simple conception of a language
as a starting point for understanding different notions of expressive power. This is
for two reasons. First, the different metrics of expressive power are easier to intro-
duce using simple languages, and the main ideas motivating these various metrics
can already be stated at the level of simple languages. Second, it is instructive to
see how far we can go without complicating our picture of language. That way,
when we do complicate that picture, we can see exactly what additional benefits
are gained in doing so. So to begin, we will develop this simple conception of a
language in § 1.1.
Nevertheless, language is obviously not so simple. While the simple conception
of language makes stating the different metrics of expressive power easier, there
are a number of respects in which such metrics will be deficient without making
our picture of language more sophisticated. One way in which the picture can be
made more sophisticated is by adding compositional structure. Thus, not only do
we have formulas that carve logical space, but also we have operators that transform
some ways of carving logical space into others. We will develop a compositional
conception of language in § 1.3.
Another way of complicating the picture that has gained traction in the formal
semantics literature is to make languages dynamic rather than static. On static con-
ceptions of a language, the meaning of a formula is given by its satisfaction conditions
(or truth conditions). That is, formulas are interpreted as subregions of logical space.
On a dynamic conception of language, however, the meaning of a sentence is deter-
mined by how it affects the conversational context, i.e., its context change potential.
Formulas, then, are interpreted as functions from contexts to contexts. (The dy-
namic conception of language, of course, can be combined with the compositional
conception.) This idea is developed further in § 1.4.
§ 1.1 Simple Languages
We start by sketching a simple picture of languages. Here is a brief outline of this
section. § 1.1.1 simply defines the notion of a (simple) language and a logic. It
is observed that the logics that are the entailment relation of some language are
exactly those that satisfy some natural constraints and are sometimes referred to as
“Tarskian” logics. § 1.1.2 briefly introduces the notion of a fragment/extension of
a language/logic and draws connections between these notions. § 1.1.3 discusses
the notion of a theory relative to a language or logic. It is shown that the theories
of a language/logic form a nice structure.
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§ 1.1.1 Languages and Logics
The simple picture of language is, again, one on which languages consist of a syn-
tax, a logical space, and a semantics. We make this more precise as follows:
Definition 1.1.1 (Language). A language is triple L  xL ,C,,y, where:
• L is a class (the syntax)
• C is a class (the evaluation space)
• , Ď C ˆ L is a relation (the satisfaction relation).
The members ofL are called the formulas inL or theL-formulas. The mem-
bers of C are called points of evaluation, indices, or states.
Convention: If L is a language, we may use “LL”, “CL”, and “,L” to de-
note respectively its syntax, evaluation space, and satisfaction relation. Often,
we replace a language’s label in subscripts and superscripts with that label’s
salient subscripts or superscripts. For instance, if L1 is a language, we often
replace “LL1” with “L1”, CL1” with “C1”, and “,L1” with “,1”. The same
goes for other notation that is relativized to a language.
A couple of remarks about Definition 1.1.1 are in order. First, I am allowing that
L and C be proper classes, not just sets. Often times, syntaxes are set-sized, but in
some languages (e.g., in infinitary languages), there are class-many formulas. And
almost by default, the evaluation space of a language is a proper class. But for the
sake of readability, the notation I use for classes will be identical to the notation
used for set. Thus, we may write “X  tx P C | . . .u”, even if X is a proper class.
Similarly, I use “Ď” for “subclass”, “P” for membership, “X” for class intersection,
and so forth. The distinction between classes and sets will not be that important
here, so there is no harm in reading this notation ambiguously in this way.
Second, Definition 1.1.1 says nothing yet about the nature of the syntax of a
language. We do not require, from the outset, that the syntax of a language be
generated in some uniquely recursive manner: the syntax of a language can be non-
well-founded, non-recursively defined, non-arithmetical, and so forth. In effect, the
syntax of a language is just a useful way of labeling certain regions of the evaluation
space. While most of our focus will be on languages whose syntax is well-behaved
and cleanly generated, we want to first see how far we can go with just this simple
general characterization of a language.
Third, Definition 1.1.1 says nothing yet about the nature of the evaluation space.
One can interpret the evaluation space either as states in a fixed model or as a space
of models. Points of evaluation can be thought of either representationally or inter-
pretationally, in the sense of Etchemendy [1990]. They could be possible states of
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the world, as in possible world semantics. They could be pairs of models and vari-
able assignments, as in first-order logic. They could be contexts of use in the sense
of Kaplan [1977]. They could be pairs of worlds in a model, as in two-dimensional
modal logic. They could be information states, as in expressivist semantics for epis-
temic modals. What you fill in for the evaluation space is completely flexible.
Finally, Definition 1.1.1 says nothing yet about the nature of the satisfaction
relation. In particular, the satisfaction relation does not have to be defined recur-
sively or compositionally. And even if it is, it does not have to be defined recursively
in terms of truth-at-a-point in the evaluation space. One can, for instance, define
truth-at-a-context in terms truth-at-an-index, and then stipulate that the evalua-
tion space consists only of contexts. Similarly, one might define truth-at-a-pair of
worlds, and then restrict the evaluation space to diagonal pairs of worlds. So we can
still model languages where consequence is meant to be defined as preservation of
truth-at-a-context or at-a-diagonal point.
We said earlier that we can think of the meaning of a formula as a subregion
of logical space. We could have defined languages in these terms from the start;
that is, we could have replaced the satisfaction relation in Definition 1.1.1 with a
semantic value function that maps each formula to a subregion of logical space.
Definition 1.1.2 (Semantic Value). Let L be a language and let ϕ P LL. The
L-semantic value of ϕ (written “⟦ϕ⟧L”) is defined as the class of points of
evaluation x such that x ,L ϕ, i.e., ⟦ϕ⟧L  tx P CL | x ,L ϕu. If Γ Ď LL, the
L-semantic value of Γ is defined as ⟦Γ⟧L 
Ş
ψPΓ ⟦ψ⟧L. Notice that if Γ  H,
then ⟦Γ⟧L  CL.
Notation: Where L  xL ,C,,y is a language, we write “x , Γ” to mean
“x , ψ for all ψ P Γ”. Notice that ⟦Γ⟧  tx P C | x , Γu.
Each language naturally gives rise to a notion of consequence:
Definition 1.1.3 (Entailment). Let L  xL ,C,,y be a language. Then where
Γ Ď L and ϕ, ψ P L, we say that:
• Γ L-entails ϕ (written “Γ (L ϕ”) if for all x P C: if x , Γ, then x , ϕ.
• ϕ is L-valid (written “(L ϕ”) if H (L ϕ.
• ϕ is L-equivalent to ψ (written “ϕ ”L ψ”) if ϕ (L ψ and ψ (L ϕ.
Where Γ,∆ Ď L, we write “Γ (L ∆” to mean “Γ (L ϕ for all ϕ P ∆”. Likewise,
we write “Γ ”L ∆” to mean “Γ (L ∆ and ∆ (L Γ”. We may drop set brackets
for readability (e.g., writing “Γ, ϕ ( ψ” instead of “ΓY tϕu ( ψ”).
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Note that “Γ ( ∆” is interpreted as “if every member of Γ is true, then every member
of ∆ is true”. This is contrary to how it is interpreted in proof theory, where Γ ( ∆
says “if every member of Γ is true, then some member of ∆ is true”. This break from
standard conventions is notationally more convenient for our purposes.
Fact 1.1.4 (Equivalent Definition of Entailment). Let L be a language, let Γ Ď LL,
and let ϕ P LL. Then Γ (L ϕ iff ⟦Γ⟧L Ď ⟦ϕ⟧L.
The notion of entailment from Definition 1.1.3 is the familiar notion of truth-
preservation: Γ entails ϕ if every point that satisfies all of Γ satisfies ϕ. As is well-
known, there notion of entailment has a convenient but equivalent definition. To
explain, we should first define the notion of a logic.
Definition 1.1.5 (Logic). A logic is a pair L  xL ,$y, where:
• L is a class of formulas
• $ Ď ℘ (L) ˆ L (the consequence relation).
If Γ Ď L and ϕ P L, we say Γ L-proves ϕ if Γ $ ϕ. We write “Γ $ ∆” to mean
“Γ $ ϕ for all ϕ P ∆”. We write “ϕ %$ ψ” to mean “ϕ $ ψ and ψ $ ϕ”.
In one sense, this definition of a logic is somewhat restricted. Consequence re-
lations automatically obey a number of structural properties that are rejected by a
variety of logics. For instance, consequence relations are commutative: the order of
premises does not matter. They are also automatically contractive: repetitions of a
premise do not affect the validity of an argument. Many logics rejects one or both
of these features. However, since our focus is not on such logics, we need not be
troubled by the restrictions on consequence relations imposed by Definition 1.1.5.2
In another sense, however, this definition of a logic is quite broad. Consequence
relations, as defined in Definition 1.1.5, need not be reflexive, transitive, or have
many of the other structural properties that most logics are assumed to have. How-
ever, we will be primarily focused on logics that have many of these nice properties.
Definition 1.1.6 (Tarskian Logic). A logic L  xL ,$y is Tarskian if the follow-
ing three conditions hold for all ϕ P L and all Γ, Γ1,∆ Ď L:
(CR1) ϕ $ ϕ (Reflexivity)
(CR2) if Γ Ď Γ1 and Γ $ ∆, then Γ1 $ ∆ (Monotonicity)
(CR3) if Γ $ Γ1 and Γ1 $ ∆, then Γ $ ∆ (Transitivity)
2These restrictions can be avoided if we treat L not as a class of formulas but rather as a class of
formula-structures [Font, 2016, pp. 14–15].
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Tarskian logics have some nice properties. Chief among them is the following:
Fact 1.1.7 (Replacement of Equivalents). Let L  xL ,$y be a Tarskian logic, let
Γ Ď L and let ϕ, ψ, θ P L.
(a) If ϕ %$ ψ, then Γ, ϕ $ θ iff Γ, ψ $ θ. (Replacement of
Equivalent Premises)
(b) If ϕ %$ ψ, then Γ $ ϕ iff Γ $ ψ. (Replacement of
Equivalent Conclusions)
The name “Tarskian” is in deference to Tarski [1983b,a]. However, Tarski [1983b,
p. 31] defines a logic as a pair of a set of formulas L together with a consequence
operator, which is interdefinable with Tarskian consequence relations.3
Definition 1.1.8 (Consequence Operator). Let L be some class of formulas. A
consequence operator for L is a function Cn : ℘ (L) Ñ ℘ (L) such that the
following three conditions hold for all Γ,∆ Ď L:
(CO1) Γ Ď Cn(Γ) (Reflexivity)
(CO2) If Γ Ď ∆, then Cn(Γ) Ď Cn(∆) (Monotonicity)
(CO3) Cn(Γ)  Cn(Cn(Γ)) (Transitivity)
We write “Cn(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)” in place of “Cn(tϕ1, . . . , ϕnu)”.
Proposition 1.1.9 (Alternative Definitions of Tarskian Logic). Let L be a class of
formulas, let $ Ď ℘ (L) ˆL, and let Cn(Γ) B tϕ P L |Γ $ ϕu. The following
are equivalent:
(a) L is Tarskian.
(b) The following two properties hold for all Γ, Γ1,∆ Ď L:
(CR4) Γ $ Γ (Monotonic Reflexivity)
(CR3) if Γ $ Γ1 and Γ1 $ ∆, then Γ $ ∆ (Transitivity)
(c) Cn is a consequence operator for L.
(d) There is a language L with syntax L such that $  (L.
3The axioms (CO1)–(CO3) are not the only axioms that he required consequence operators to
satisfy. In particular, he also includes (CO4) below as well as an axiom stating that |L| ď ℵ0.
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Proof:
(a) ñ (b). (CR4) follows from (CR1) and (CR2).
(b) ñ (c). (CO1) follows from (CR4). For (CO2), if Γ Ď ∆, then ∆ $ Γ by
(CR4). Hence, if Γ $ Σ, then ∆ $ Σ by (CR3). Finally, for (CO3),
it suffices to show the right-to-left direction since the left-to-right
direction follows from (CO1) and (CO2). Suppose ϕ P Cn(Cn(Γ)).
That means Cn(Γ) $ ϕ. But Γ $ Cn(Γ) by definition. So Γ $ ϕ by
(CR3), i.e., ϕ P Cn(Γ).
(c) ñ (d). Let C  tCn(Γ) | Γ Ď L u. Define , Ď C ˆ L so that Cn(Γ) , ϕ iff
ϕ P Cn(Γ). We show that L  xL ,C,,y is such that $  (L, i.e.,
that ϕ P Cn(Γ) iff for all ∆ Ď L, if Cn(∆) , Γ, then Cn(∆) , ϕ.
First, suppose ϕ P Cn(Γ). Let ∆ Ď L be such that Cn(∆) ,
Γ. Thus, Γ Ď Cn(∆). By (CO2) and (CO3), Cn(Γ) Ď Cn(Cn(∆)) 
Cn(∆). So ϕ P Cn(∆), and thus Cn(∆) , ϕ.
Next, suppose ϕ < Cn(Γ). By (CO1), Γ Ď Cn(Γ), and so Cn(Γ) ,
Γ. But since ϕ < Cn(Γ), we have Cn(Γ) . ϕ, which completes the
proof.
(d) ñ (a). Trivial, since any entailment relation satisfies (CR1)–(CR3). ∎
The construction used in proving the implication from (c) to (d) will be discussed
in more detail in § 1.1.3.
Tarski [1983b, p. 31] also required consequence operators to satisfy the follow-
ing additional axiom:
(CO4) There is an L-formula K such that Cn(K)  L (Absurdity)
Although we often do have such a formula present in our languages, we would
prefer to frame our results concerning expressive power so as to cover languages
without such a formula. Indeed, this axiom is later dropped from the definition
of consequence operators in Tarski [1983a]. Even so, the entailment relation for a
language does satisfy explosion in the following sense:
Fact 1.1.10 (Explosion). Let L be a language and let Γ Ď LL. If there is no
x P CL such that x ,L Γ, then Γ (L LL.
It should be noted that satisfying “explosion” in this sense is much weaker than
obeying ex contradictione quodlibet, i.e., ϕ,¬ϕ ( ψ for all ϕ and ψ. Many paracon-
sistent logics are explosive in the sense of Fact 1.1.10, even if only trivially as no set
of formulas is unsatisfiable (e.g., see Example 2.1.12 for an example of a Tarskian
paraconsistent logic).
7
Chapter 1. Language § 1.1. Simple Languages
As noted above, a fair number of interesting logics are not Tarskian. But in
the present context, Tarskian logics have a number of nice properties (especially
Fact 1.1.7) that make them easier to work with than their non-Tarskian counterparts.
So for now, we adopt the following convention:
Convention: Henceforth, when I say “logic”, I mean “Tarskian logic” unless
stated otherwise.
By Proposition 1.1.9, every language L determines a unique (Tarskian) logic
xL ,(Ly. Hence, we introduce the following notation:
Convention: Where X is a language, we write “LX” or just “X” for the logic
xLX,(Xy. We write “CnL” for the consequence operator for the language L
and “CnL” for the consequence operator for the logic L.
§ 1.1.2 Fragments
Often enough, we will be interested in exploring the expressive power of various
fragments of the languages we are interested in. This requires a more precise defi-
nition of a fragment.
Convention: In general, “æX” is used to mean “restricted to X.” So for in-
stance, “,æC1ˆL1” denotes the relation , X (C1 ˆL1). We also more compactly
write “,æC1” for ,æC1ˆL and “,æL1” for ,æCˆL1 (likewise for “(” and other
notation).
Definition 1.1.11 (Expansions and Restrictions). Let L1 and L2 be languages.
We say that L1 is a restriction of L2 or that L2 is an expansion of L1 (written
“L1 Ť L2”), if:
(i) L1 Ď L2
(ii) C1 Ď C2
(iii) ,1 ,2æC1ˆL1—that is, for all ϕ P L1, ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦ϕ⟧2 X C1.
We say that L1 is a conservative restriction of L2 or that L2 is a preservative
expansion of L1 (written “L1 F L2”), if L1 is a restriction of L2 and in addition:
(iv) (1 (2æL1—that is, for all Γ Ď L1 and ϕ P L1, Γ (1 ϕ iff Γ (2 ϕ.
To restrict a language, one removes either points of evaluations from the evalua-
tion space or formulas from the syntax (or both) while keeping the semantic val-
ues for the remaining formulas relative to the remaining evaluation space fixed.
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To conservatively restrict a language, one must also take care not to remove every
counterexample to any particular inference over the restricted syntax.
Fact 1.1.12 (Expansion is a Partial Order). The relations Ť and F are partial
orders, i.e., reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.
Fact 1.1.13 (Expansions Reflect Entailment). Let L1 Ť L2. Then (1 Ě (2æL1 , i.e.,
for all Γ Ď L1 and ϕ P L1, if Γ (2 ϕ, then Γ (1 ϕ.
Fact 1.1.13 is prone to lead to confusion. The logic of an expansion of L is not an
“expansion” of the logic of L. Rather, when one expands a language, one usually
weakens the logic (at least over the original syntax). To avoid confusion, we adopt
different vocabulary for talking about “expansions” of logics:
Definition 1.1.14 (Sublogic). Let L1 and L2 be logics. We say that L1 is a sublogic
of L2 (written “L1 Ď L2”) if L1 Ď L2 and $1 Ď $2æL1 .
This definition of a sublogic is consistent with its usage in the literature. For in-
stance, some logicians talk as though intuitionistic logic is a sublogic of classical
logic, or as propositional logic as a sublogic of full first-order logic. But from a
model-theoretic perspective, the classical propositional language can be viewed
as a restriction of the intuitionistic language (to the class of single-pointed Kripke
models) or of the first-order language (to the quantifier-free formulas).
Not every restriction is conservative. This is simply because expansions can
contain counterexamples to inferences not present in their restrictions. However,
in some special circumstances, conservativity can be guaranteed.
Definition 1.1.15 (Extensions and Fragments). Let L1 and L2 be some languages.
We say that L2 is an extension of L1, or that L1 is a fragment of L2 (written
“L1 Ď L2”), if L1 Ť L2 and C1  C2. We say that L2 is a proper extension of
L1, or that L1 is a proper fragment of L2 (written “L1 Ă L2”), if L1 Ď L2 but
L1 , L2. Where L1 Ď L2, we write “L2 æL1” for the fragment of L2 obtained
by restricting the syntax to L1.
Similarly, let L1 and L2 be logics. We say that L1 is a fragment of L2 (written
“L1 Ď L2”) if L1 Ď L2 and $1 $2æL1 . We denote the fragment of L2 obtained
by restricting the syntax to L1 as “L2 æL1”.
This terminology is again consistent with how many logicians use the term “frag-
ment” and “extension” in the literature. For instance, it is often said that modal
logic is (equivalent to) a fragment of first-order logic, viz., the bisimulation-invariant
fragment. By “the bisimulation-invariant fragment”, they usually mean the lan-
guage of first-order logic but restricted to the bisimulation-invariant first-order for-
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mulas. Similarly, it is often said that classical logic is the fragment of intuitionistic
logic with just negation and conjunction.
Fact 1.1.16 (Fragments are Conservative Restrictions). If L1 Ď L2, then L1 F L2.
Fact 1.1.17 (The Logic of a Restriction Contains a Fragment of the Logic). If L1 Ť L2,
then L2 æL1Ď L1.
Fact 1.1.18 (The Logic of a Conservative Restriction is a Fragment of the Logic). If
L1 F L2, then L1  L2 æL1 .
Put in other terms: Fact 1.1.17 says that the logic of an expansion is an extension
of a sublogic. And Fact 1.1.18 says that the logic of a preservative expansion is an
extension of the logic.
The converse of Fact 1.1.17 generally does not hold: an extension of a sublogic
need not be the logic of an expansion. A simple way to see this is to note that even
if L2 æL1Ď L1, it need not be the case that L2 Ě L1, as would be required to be the
logic of an expansion of L1. However, we do get a limited version of the converse
of Fact 1.1.17: all sublogics are fragments of the logic of an expansion.
Proposition 1.1.19 (A Sublogic is a Fragment of the Logic of an Expansion). Let
L1 be a language and let L2 Ď L1. Then there is a L2 such that L1 Ť L2 and
L2  LL2 æL2 .
Proof: Let Th(L2)  tCn2(Γ) |Γ Ď L2 u (for the class of “L2-theories”; this no-
tation will be introduced in § 1.1.3). Without loss of generality, assume that
C X Th(L2)  H. Let L2  xL1,C Y Th(L2),,2y where ,2æC,1 and where
Cn2(Γ) ,2 ϕ iff ϕ P Cn2(Γ). Clearly L1 Ť L2. So we just need to show that
L2  LL2 æL2 .
Let Γ Y tϕu Ď L2. Suppose Γ $2 ϕ. Then Γ $1 ϕ, so for all x P C, if
x ,2 Γ, then x ,2 ϕ. Moreover, ϕ P Cn2(Γ), so if Cn2(∆) ,2 Γ, that means
Cn2(∆) Ě Cn2(Γ) Q ϕ. Hence, Γ (L2 ϕ. Conversely, suppose Γ &2 ϕ. Then
Cn2(Γ) ,2 Γ even though Cn2(Γ) .2 ϕ. So Γ *L2 ϕ. ∎
The converse of Fact 1.1.18 also holds. One should take care, however, as there
are two things that one could state the converse of Fact 1.1.18 (one in terms of frag-
ments and the other in terms of extensions). One way would be this: a fragment of
the logic of a language L is the logic of some conservative restriction of L. In fact,
we can even show that it is the logic of a fragment of L:
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Proposition 1.1.20 (A Fragment of the Logic is the Logic of a Fragment). Let L1 be
a language and let L0 Ď L1. Then there is a L0 Ď L1 such that L0  LL0 .
Proof: Let L0 Ď L1. Let L0  L1 æL0 . It is easy to check that L0  LL0 . ∎
Another way to state the converse of Fact 1.1.18 is this: an extension of the logic is
the logic of some preservative expansion. However, we cannot generally take this to
be the logic of some extension, since extending the logic may require adding more
points of evaluation.
Example 1.1.21 (An Extension of a Logic that is Not the Logic of Any Extension).
Let L1  xtpu , txu ,,1y where x ,1 p. Note that if L Ě L1, then $1 ϕ for
any ϕ P LL. But clearly there are preservative expansions of L1 that do not
validate every formula. For instance, let L2  tp , qu and let L2 be so that $2 p
and &2 q. Then L2 Ě L1.
Proposition 1.1.22 (An Extension of the Logic is the Logic of a Preservative Expan-
sion). Let L1 be a language and let L2 Ě L1. Then there is an L2 FL1 such that
L2  LL2 .
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume that CXTh(L2)  H. Let Diag1(x) B
tϕ P L1 | x ,1 ϕu and let L2  xL2,C Y Th(L2),,2y where:
(i) if x P C and ϕ P L1, then x ,2 ϕ iff x ,1 ϕ
(ii) if x P C and ϕ P L2 ´ L1, then x ,2 ϕ iff Diag1(x) $2 ϕ
(iii) if x P Th(L2) and ϕ P L2, then x ,2 ϕ iff ϕ P x.
Clearly, L1 Ť L2. We show two things: that L2 is preservative over L1 and that
L2  LL2 .
First, let Γ Y tϕu Ď L1. By Fact 1.1.13, we just need to show that L2 pre-
serves L1-entailments. Suppose Γ (1 ϕ. Then every x P C is such that x ,2 Γ
only if x ,2 ϕ. So every x P C is such that x ,2 Γ only if x ,2 ϕ by (i). In
addition, if x P Th(L2) and x ,2 Γ, then Γ Ď x. But since L2 Ě L1, ϕ P x, so
x ,2 ϕ. Hence, Γ (2 ϕ.
Next, let Γ Y tϕu Ď L2. Suppose that Γ $2 ϕ. Let x P C be such that
x ,2 Γ. By (ii), Diag1(x) $2 Γ. Hence, Diag1(x) $2 ϕ. If ϕ P L1, then x ,2 ϕ
by (i). If ϕ P L2 ´ L1, then x ,2 ϕ by (ii). So either way, x ,2 ϕ. Now let
x P Th(L2) be such that x ,2 Γ. Thus, Γ Ď x. But since Γ $2 ϕ, ϕ P x, in
11
Chapter 1. Language § 1.1. Simple Languages
which case x ,2 ϕ by (iii). Hence, Γ (L2 ϕ. Conversely, suppose Γ &2 ϕ.
Then ϕ < Cn2(Γ). Hence, Cn2(Γ) .2 ϕ, and thus Γ *L2 ϕ. ∎
A particularly important kind of fragment of a language is the kind obtained
under the image of a mapping from another language.
Definition 1.1.23 (Image Language). Let L1 and L2 be some languages and let
t : L1 Ñ L2. The t-image language with respect to L2 is defined to be trL1s B
xtrL1s,C2,,tr1sy, where ,tr1s ,2ætrL1s. Image logics are likewise defined.
Fact 1.1.24 (Image Languages are Fragments). Let L1 and L2 be languages and
let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then trL1s Ď L2.
An alternative way to guarantee conservativity would be to require that every
new point in C2 be “closed” under (1. This can be made more precise using the
notion of a diagram.
Definition 1.1.25 (Diagram). Let L be a language. The L-diagram of x P CL
is defined as DiagL(x) B tϕ P LL | x ,L ϕu. We write “x ”L y” to mean
“Diag1(x)  Diag1(y)”.
Proposition 1.1.26 (Alternative Characterization of Preservative Expansions). Let
L1 and L2 be languages where L2 is an expansion of L1. Then L1 F L2 iff for
all y P C2, Diag2(y) X L1  Cn1(Diag2(y) X L1).
Proof:
(ñ) Suppose that L1 F L2. Let y P C2. Since Cn1 is a consequence op-
erator, Diag2(y) X L1 Ď Cn1(Diag2(y) X L1). Conversely, suppose
ϕ P Cn1(Diag2(y) X L1). That means Diag2(y) X L1 (1 ϕ. But since
L1 F L2, Diag2(y) XL1 (2 ϕ. And since y ,2 Diag2(y) XL1 by defini-
tion, we have y ,2 ϕ. So ϕ P Diag2(y) X L1.
(ð) Suppose for all y P C2, Diag2(y) XL1  Cn1(Diag2(y) XL1). Let Γ Ď L1
and ϕ P L1. We want to show that Γ (1 ϕ iff Γ (2 ϕ. For the left-
to-right direction, suppose Γ (1 ϕ. Let y P C2 where y ,2 Γ. Thus,
Γ Ď Diag2(y) XL1  Cn1(Diag2(y) XL1). So ϕ P Cn1(Diag2(y) XL1) 
Diag2(y) X L1. Hence, y ,2 ϕ. Since y was arbitrary, Γ (2 ϕ. For the
right-to-left direction, suppose Γ *1 ϕ. That means for some x P C1,
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x ,1 Γ but x .1 ϕ. Now, since ,1 ,2 X(C1 ˆ L1), x ,2 Γ and x .2 ϕ.
Hence, Γ *2 ϕ. ∎
§ 1.1.3 Theories
While we are primarily focused on language, we could use this framework as a way
of modeling theories more generally. Often, theories are defined to be sets of sen-
tences. But this way of enumerating theories is well-known to be problematic. On
the one hand, it seems plausible that two sets of sentences can be used to represent
the same theory. On the other hand, one and the same set of sentences can be used
to represent different theories depending on how those sentences are interpreted.
We could avoid both of these problems by thinking of a theory as a kind of language
that is obtained by restricting the evaluation space via some class of sentences.
Definition 1.1.27 (Theory). Let L  xL ,C,,y be a language. An L-theory is
a Γ Ď L such that Γ  CnL(Γ). We let Th(L) be the class of all L-theories.
Similarly, where L  xL ,$y is a logic, an L-theory is a Γ Ď L such that Γ 
CnL(Γ). We let Th(L) be the class of all L-theories.
Fact 1.1.28 (The Theories of a Language are the Theories of its Logic). Let L be a
language. Then Th(L)  Th(LL).




Thus, two sets of sentences can represent the same theory in a language as long as
they are semantically equivalent; and a single set of sentences can represent multi-
ple theories relative to different languages.
Theories induce restrictions on languages. To adopt a theory is, in a sense, to
restrict one’s language so that the statements of the theory are valid. This idea is
formalized by the notion of a reduction, which will be useful in later chapters.
Definition 1.1.30 (Reduction). Let L  xL ,C,,y be a language and let Γ Ď L.
The Γ-reduction of L is the language LΓ  xL , ⟦Γ⟧ ,,æ⟦Γ⟧ˆLy. We write “,Γ”
in place of “,LΓ” (likewise for the other parameters of a language). Similarly,
the Γ-reduction of L is the logic LΓ  xL ,$Γy where ∆ $Γ ϕ iff Γ,∆ $ ϕ.
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Fact 1.1.31 (The Logic of a Reduction is the Reduction of the Logic). Let L  xL ,C,,y
be a language and let Γ Ď L. Then LLΓ  LΓ.
Reductions are kinds of restrictions to a language, whereby we reduce the space
of possibilities to those left open by the theory. Except in the trivial case, such
reductions will not be conservative restrictions of the language.
Fact 1.1.32 (Reductions are Almost Never Conservative Restrictions). Let L be a
language and let Γ Ď L. Then LΓ F L iff LΓ  L.
This is just to say that a conservative theory is uninformative: one only genuinely
reduces logical space by being non-conservative with respect to what is valid in
one’s original language.
The class of theories relative to a single language has a nice well-behaved struc-
ture when ordered by entailment.
Definition 1.1.33 (Theory Space). Let L  xL ,$y be a logic. The theory space
of L is the pair L B xTh(L),$y. Similarly, let L be a language. The theory
space of L is defined as L B LL .
Proposition 1.1.34 (Structure of Theory Spaces). Let L be a logic. Then L is a
complete lattice.















Σ are greatest lower bound and
least upper bound of Σ respectively. ∎
Notation: Let L  xL ,$y be a logic. Where L is a theory space for L and
whereΣ Ď Th(L), the greatest lower bound and least upper bound ofΣ inL,











Every complete lattice is bounded. In the case of theory spaces, the top element is
CnL(H) while the bottom element is L. If we reversed the direction of the order,
of course,
Ź
would correspond to intersection and
Ž
would correspond to the
closure of the union.
One may wonder whether we can say more about the algebraic structure of a
theory space in general. The answer is negative:
Proposition 1.1.35 (Every Complete Lattice is a Theory Space). Let xL,ďy be a
complete lattice. Then there is a logic L such that L is lattice-isomorphic to
xL,ďy.
Proof: Define L B xL,$y, where for all Γ Ď L and ϕ P L, Γ $ ϕ iff
Ź
Γ ď ϕ.
(Note that L is Tarskian.) Let f : L Ñ Th(L) be such that f (ϕ)  CnL(ϕ). We
show that f is a lattice-isomorphism.
First, bijectivity. f is injective: If f (ϕ)  f (ψ), then ϕ %$ ψ. By definition,
ϕ ď ψ ď ϕ, so ϕ  ψ. f is surjective: Let Γ P Th(L). Since xL,ďy is complete,
Ź
Γ is defined. Hence, Γ %$
Ź
Γ, and so Γ  CnL(
Ź
Γ)  f (
Ź
Γ).
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 tϕ P L |
ł
Γ ď ϕu















This completes the proof. ∎
The proof of Proposition 1.1.35 shows a stronger result: every complete lattice is
isomorphic to the theory space of some completely conjunctive logic (in the sense of
Definition 1.2.24 below).
We can use the lattice-theoretic properties of a theory space to determine what
the conservative restrictions of a language are.
Proposition 1.1.36 (Expansions and Theory Spaces). Let L1 and L2 be languages
such that L1 Ť L2. Then L1 F L2 iff 1 is (meet-)semilattice-embeddable in
2 via the map f : Cn1(Γ) ÞÑ Cn2(Γ).
Proof:
(ñ) Suppose L1 F L2. f is a well-defined injective function: Cn1(Γ)  Cn1(∆)
iff Γ ”1 ∆ iff Γ ”2 ∆ iff Cn2(Γ)  Cn2(∆) iff f (Cn1(Γ))  f (Cn1(∆)).
Now we show it is a semilattice-embedding. Let Σ Ď Th(L1). Then
f (
Ź







(ð) Suppose f is a semilattice-embedding of(L1) into(L2). Then Γ (1 ϕ
iff Cn1(Γ)  Cn1(Γ Y tϕu)  Cn1(Cn1(Γ) Y Cn1(ϕ))  Cn1(Γ) ^ Cn1(ϕ) iff
Cn2(Γ)  f (Cn1(Γ))  f (Cn1(Γ) ^ Cn1(ϕ))  f (Cn1(Γ)) ^ f (Cn1(ϕ)) 
Cn2(Γ) ^ Cn2(ϕ)  Cn2(Cn2(Γ) Y Cn2(ϕ))  Cn2(ΓY tϕu) iff Γ (2 ϕ. ∎
Note that (L1) need not be a full sublattice of (L2) via f if L1 F L2. In partic-
ular, the image of a join under f need not be the join of the images under f .
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Example 1.1.37 (The Theory Space of a Conservative Restriction Need not be a Sub-
lattice). Define L1 and L2 as follows:
• L1  tp , qu and L2  tp , q , ru
• C1  tp , qu and C2  tp , q ,Ju
• for all x P C1 and ϕ P L1, x ,1 ϕ iff x  ϕ
• for all x P C2 and ϕ P L2, x ,2 ϕ iff x , J and either ϕ  x or ϕ  r.
Notice that Cn1(Γ)  Γ for Γ Ď L1, that Cn2(H)  H, and that Cn2(Γ) 






tp , q , ru




Thus, f (tpu _ tqu)  f (H)  H, while f (tpu) _ f (tqu)  tp , ru _ tq , ru  tru.
So f does not preserve joins.
An important substructure of the theory space of a logic is its Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebra. This substructure encodes the entailments between formulas-up-
to-equivalence (Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras will play a central role in § 2.6.1).
Definition 1.1.38 (Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebra). Let L be a logic. We define the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of L to be the pair L B xL{%$,ďy, where:
• rϕsL B tψ P L |ϕ %$ ψu
• L{%$ B trϕsL |ϕ P L u
• rϕsL ď rψsL iff ϕ $ ψ.
The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of a language L is defined as L B LL .
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Fact 1.1.39 (Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebras are Partial Orders). L is a partial order
for any logic L.
Unlike theory spaces, Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras can have significantly less
structure than that of a lattice.
Proposition 1.1.40 (Every Partial Order is a Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebra). Let 
xP,ďy be a partial order. Then there is a logic L such thatL is order-isomorphic
to .
Proof: Define L B xP,$y, where for all Γ Ď P and ϕ P P, Γ $ ϕ iff there is a
ψ P Γ such that ψ ď ϕ. (Note that L is Tarskian.) Then it is easy check that
the map f : ϕ ÞÑ tϕu is an isomorphism from  to L. ∎
We can think of Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras as substructures of a theory space,
viz., the ones consisting of only the principal theories.
Definition 1.1.41 (Principal Theory). Let L be a logic. An L-theory Γ P Th(L) is
principal if there is a ϕ P L such that Γ  CnL(ϕ). We let PTh(L) be the class of
all principal L-theories. The principal substructure of the theory space Th(L)
of L is the pair xPTh(L),$y.
Proposition 1.1.42 (Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebras are Isomorphic to the Principal
Substructure of Theory Spaces). Let L be a logic. Then L is isomorphic to the
principal substructure of L.
Proof: It is easily verified that f : rϕsL ÞÑ CnL(ϕ) is an order-isomorphism
from L to xPTh(L),$y. ∎
We briefly introduce one more concept that will be helpful later on. Recall that
Proposition 1.1.9 states that a logic is Tarskian just in case it is the logic of some
language with the same syntax. In showing the implication from (c) to (d) of Propo-
sition 1.1.9, we appealed to a structure that essentially used the class of theories as
the evaluation space. This will be a useful construction later on:
Definition 1.1.43 (Canonical Languages). Let L  xL ,$y be a logic. We define
the canonical language for L to be the language Can(L)  xL , Th(L), Qy—that
is, Γ ,Can(L) ϕ iff ϕ P Γ.
18
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The canonical language is, in a sense, the most compact language a logic can
have. For one thing, the logic of the canonical language of L is just L.
Fact 1.1.44 (Logics are the Logics of Their Canonical Language). Let L  xL ,$y.
Then LCan(L)  L.
Moreover, any language whose logic is L is isomorphic (in the sense of Defini-
tion 2.3.1, introduced in the next chapter) to a preservative expansion of Can(L).
Fact 1.1.45 (Canonical Languages are Isomorphic to Conservative Restrictions). Let
L  xL ,C,,y be a language. Then there is a language L˚  xL ,C˚,,˚y such
that:
(i) Can(L) F L˚
(ii) there is a bijective map f : C Ñ C˚ where for all x P C and all ϕ P L,
x , ϕ iff f (x) ,˚ ϕ.
This is easy to establish, since each point x P C can be replaced with CnL(DiagL(x))
without loss.
§ 1.2 Properties of Languages
In this section, we review some properties of a language that are of philosophical
and theoretical interest. We will refer back to these properties throughout the rest of
the dissertation, but for the purposes of this chapter, this section may be skimmed
or skipped and returned to when necessary.
§ 1.2.1 Opinionated Languages
In defining different measures of expressive power, it turns out we can often sim-
plify the measure when our languages have the following special property:
Definition 1.2.1 (Maximal States and Opinionated Languages). A maximal state
in a language L is an x P CL such that for no x1 P CL is DiagL(x) Ă DiagL(x1).
A language L is opinionated if all of its states are maximal.
Opinionated languages are those in which the points of evaluation are “maximally
opinionated”. In an opinionated language, each state can be thought of as a max-
imal consistent subclass of formulas. We now characterize exactly when a logic is
the logic of an opinionated language. First, a definition:
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Definition 1.2.2 (Absurd State). An absurd state in a language L is an x P CL
such that x ,L ϕ for all ϕ P LL.
Absurd states never affect a consequence relation, since they are never counterex-
amples to an inference.
Fact 1.2.3 (Absurd States Never Affect Entailment). Let L  xL ,C,,y and let
C` Ě C. Let L`  xL ,C`,,`y be the expansion of L such that if x P C` ´ C,
then x ,` L. Then L F L`.
A simple but important observation about absurd states is this: in non-trivial opin-
ionated languages, absurd states are not possible.
Lemma 1.2.4 (Opinionated Languages and Absurd States). If L is opinionated,
then either every x P CL is an absurd state in L or none is.
Proof: Let L be opinionated and let x P CL be absurd in L. Then for any x1 P CL,
DiagL(x1) 1 DiagL(x). But DiagL(x1) Ď LL  DiagL(x), so DiagL(x1)  LL,
i.e., x1 is absurd too. ∎
The opposite of an absurd state is an “empty” state, i.e., one that satisfies no
formula:
Definition 1.2.5 (Empty State). An empty state in a language L is an x P CL
such that x .L ϕ for all ϕ P LL.
Unlike absurd states, empty states can affect the logic of a language, albeit in only
one respect, viz., they eliminate validities. But like absurd states, only trivial opin-
ionated languages have them:
Fact 1.2.6 (Opinionated Logics and Empty States). If L is opinionated, then either
every x P CL is an empty state in L or none is.
Classical languages are generally opinionated. Nonclassical languages (e.g.,
IPL, K3, LP, etc.) are generally not opinionated. In terms of logics, almost any logic
can be viewed as the logic of some non-opinionated language, while only very spe-
cial logics can be viewed as the logic of an opinionated language. To clarify, we
introduce the following definition:
20
Chapter 1. Language § 1.2. Properties of Languages
Definition 1.2.7 (Symmetric Logic). A logic L  xL ,$y is symmetric if its con-
sequence relation is symmetric—that is, for all Γ,∆ Ď L, if Γ $ ∆, then∆ $ Γ.
Proposition 1.2.8 (Almost All Logics are the Logic of a Non-Opinionated Language).
Let L  xL ,$y be a logic. Then L is the logic of a non-opinionated language
iff L is not symmetric.
Proof: Suppose L  LL where L is not opinionated. Let DiagL(x) Ă DiagL(y).
Then DiagL(x) & DiagL(y), even though clearly DiagL(y) $ DiagL(x). So
L is not symmetric. Conversely, suppose L is not symmetric. Consider the
canonical language Can(L) of L. Let Γ $ ∆while ∆ & Γ. Then Cn(∆) Ă Cn(Γ),
in which case DiagCan(L) (Cn(∆)) Ă DiagCan(L) (Cn(Γ)). Therefore, Can(L) is
not opinionated. ∎
Thus, almost any interesting logic will be the logic of some non-opinionated
language. This applies even to classical languages.4 On the other hand, as we now
show, only very special logics are the logics of an opinionated language.
Definition 1.2.9 (Consistent, Maximal, and Maximal Consistent Theories). Let
L  xL ,$y be a logic. Where Γ P Th(L), we say Γ is L-consistent if Γ & L; oth-
erwise, we say Γ is L-inconsistent. We say L is trivial if H is L-inconsistent. Γ
is L-maximal if for all∆ P Th(L), if Γ Ă ∆, then∆  L (i.e.,∆ is L-inconsistent).
Γ is L-maximally consistent if Γ is L-maximal and L-consistent. Where L is a
logic, we let Con(L) be the class of L-consistent theories, Max(L) be the class
of L-maximal theories, and MaxCon(L) be the class of L-maximally consistent
theories. These notions lift to the corresponding notions for languages in the
obvious way.
In short, the result we show below roughly states that the logics that are the logic of
some opinionated language are exactly those where every consistent theory can be
extended to a maximally consistent theory. This is reminiscent of the Lindenbaum
construction used to prove the completeness of classical logic.
Definition 1.2.10 (Lindenbaum Logic). A logic L  xL ,$y is Lindenbaum if for
all Γ P Th(L) and ϕ P L such that ϕ < Γ, there is a L-maximally consistent
theory ∆ Ě Γ such that ϕ < ∆.
4See, e.g., Humberstone [1981]; Holliday [2014, 2018] for work on possibility semantics (a non-
opinionated language for classical propositional modal logic).
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Proposition 1.2.11 (Only Lindenbaum Logics are the Logic of an Opinionated Lan-
guage). A logic L is the logic of an opinionated language iff it is Lindenbaum.
Proof:
(ñ) Suppose L  LL where L is opinionated. If L contains absurd states,
then (L L, and so Th(L)  Th(L)  tLu, i.e., Con(L)  H. In that case,
L is trivially Lindenbaum. So suppose L contains no absurd states. Let
Γ P Th(L) and ϕ < Γ. Then Γ & ϕ, since Γ is a theory. So there is a x P CL
such that Γ Ď DiagL(x) but ϕ < DiagL(x). Since L has no absurd states,
DiagL(x) is L-consistent. Let ∆ P Th(L) be such that DiagL(x) Ă ∆. If
ψ < ∆, then ∆ & ψ, so there is a y P CL such that ∆ Ď DiagL(y) but
ψ < DiagL(y). But then DiagL(x) Ă ∆ Ď DiagL(y), ☇. Hence, ∆  L,
i.e., DiagL(x) is L-maximal.
(ð) If Con(L)  H, let L  xL , txu ,,y where x , L. Then trivially L
is opinionated and also LL  L. So suppose Con(L) , H. Let L 
xL , MaxCon(L), Qy. Clearly, L is opinionated. We now show that LL  L.
Suppose Γ $ ϕ. If Γ is L-inconsistent, then no ∆ P MaxCon(L) con-
tains Γ. Thus, vacuously Γ (L ϕ. If Γ is L-consistent, then for any
∆ P MaxCon(L) such that Γ Ď ∆, ϕ P CnL(Γ) Ď ∆. Hence, Γ (L ϕ.
Suppose instead that Γ & ϕ. Then ϕ < CnL(Γ). By supposition, there is
a ∆ P MaxCon(L) such that ∆ Ě CnL(Γ) and ϕ < ∆. Hence, Γ *L ϕ. ∎
§ 1.2.2 Compactness
Recall that first-order predicate logic is compact, meaning that if a set of formulas is
finitely satisfiable, then so is the whole set. It is a standard exercise to show how,
for first-order logic, this is equivalent to the claim that if a set of formulas Γ implies
some formula ϕ, then already some finite subset of Γ implies ϕ. But in a more
general setting, these two notions can come apart.
Definition 1.2.12 (Compactness). A logic L is compact if whenever Γ $ ϕ,
there is some finite Γ0 Ď Γ such that Γ0 $ ϕ. A language L is compact if LL is.
Definition 1.2.13 ((Finite) Satisfiability). Let L be a language and let Γ Ď L. Γ
is L-satisfiable if there is a non-absurd x P C such that x , Γ. Otherwise, Γ is
L-unsatisfiable. Γ is finitely L-satisfiable if for each finite Γ0 Ď Γ, there is a
non-absurd x P C such that x , Γ0. Otherwise, Γ is finitely L-unsatisfiable.
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Definition 1.2.14 (Finitarity). A language L is finitary if for all Γ Ď L, if Γ is
finitely L-satisfiable, then Γ is L-satisfiable.
Proposition 1.2.15 (Compactness Implies Finitarity). If L is compact, then it is
finitary.
Proof: Suppose Γ is not L-satisfiable. Thus, Γ ( L. Hence, by compactness,
there is a finite Γ0 Ď Γ such that Γ0 ( L, in which case Γ0 is not L-satisfiable.
So Γ is not finitely L-satisfiable. ∎
The converse does not hold, however.
Example 1.2.16 (Finitarity Without Compactness). Define L as follows:
• L  tp1, p2, p3, . . . , q , ru
• C  tX | X Ď tp1, p2, p3, . . .u and |X| ă ℵ0 u Y ttq , p1, p2, p3, . . .uu
• , Q.
If Γ Ď L is finitely L-satisfiable, that means r < Γ, so tq , p1, p2, p3, . . .u ,
Γ. Hence, L is finitary. But p1, p2, p3, . . . (L q, while for no i1, . . . , im does
pi1 , . . . , pim (L q.
The reason that these two formulations of compactness are equivalent in the clas-
sical setting is that classical languages have negation. In the standard proof that
finitarity implies compactness, one moves from the fact that Γ ( ϕ to the conclu-
sion that Γ Y t¬ϕu is not satisfiable, which is only possible if each formula of the
language has a negation. We can simulate this idea by generalizing the notion of
(finite) satisfiability as follows:
Definition 1.2.17 ((Finite) Satisfiability with Omission). Let L be a language and
let Γ,∆ Ď L. Γ is L-satisfiable while omitting ∆ if there is a non-absurd
x P C such that x , Γ while x . ϕ for all ϕ P ∆. Γ is finitely L-satisfiable
while omitting ∆ if for each finite Γ0 Ď Γ, there is a non-absurd x P C such
that x , Γ0 while x . ϕ for all ϕ P ∆. When ∆  tϕ1, . . . , ϕnu is finite,
we may drop set brackets around ϕ1, . . . , ϕn and say “omitting ϕ1, . . . , ϕn”
rather than “omitting tϕ1, . . . , ϕnu”.
Thus, to say Γ is (finitely) L-satisfiable is to say Γ is (finitely) L-satisfiable while
omitting H.
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Fact 1.2.18 (Relation Between Consequence and Unsatisfiability). Let L be a lan-
guage and let Γ Ď L and ϕ P L. Then Γ ( ϕ iff Γ is not L-satisfiable while
omitting ϕ.
Corollary 1.2.19 (Alternative Formulation of Compactness). Let L be a language.
Then L is compact iff for all Γ Ď L and ϕ P L, if Γ is finitely L-satisfiable
while omitting ϕ, then Γ is L-satisfiable while omitting ϕ.
One might ask whether there is anything we can infer about the structure of
a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra if L is compact. The answer is negative. Recall that
every partial order is isomorphic to the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of some logic
(Proposition 1.1.40). That construction yielded not just any logic, but a compact
logic. Hence:
Corollary 1.2.20 (Every Partial Order is a Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebra for a Com-
pact Logic). Let   xP,ďy be a partial order. Then there is a compact logic L
such that L is order-isomorphic to .
So compactness does not, by itself, place any constraints on the structure of the
partial order obtained via the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction. However, when
combined with other properties (such as the one discussed next), compactness can
be quite informative.
§ 1.2.3 Conjunctivity
Almost all of the major connectives are subject to philosophical controversy. In-
tuitionists disagree with classical logicians over whether double negation elimi-
nation is valid; relevant logicians disagree with classical logicians over whether
disjunctive syllogism is valid; many nonclassical logics reject one or more of the
standard rules for the connectives. But arguably the least controversial connective
is conjunction. Although relevant logics sometimes abandon conjunction introduc-
tion, since adding conjunction introduction allows one to derive irrelevant conse-
quences,5 very few logics abandon conjunction elimination. So while we will return
to the topic of connectives in § 1.3.4, it is natural to inquire into logics which have
a conjunction for any two formulas (or any set of formulas). These concepts will be
useful in proving the main triviality results of § 2.6.1.
5For instance, if p , q ( p ^ q, then p , q ( p by conjunction elimination and transitivity of (.
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Definition 1.2.21 (Semiconjunction). Let L be a logic and let Γ Ď L and θ P L.
We say that θ is a semiconjunction of Γ in L if rθsL 
Ź
ϕPΓ rϕsL. We write
“
Ź




ϕPΓ rϕsL. If Γ  tϕ, ψu, we
write “ϕ ^ ψ” instead of “
Ź
tϕ, ψu”. L is semiconjunctive if any ϕ, ψ P L
have a semiconjunction. (We could equivalently state this in terms of finitely
many ϕ1, . . . , ϕn P L.) L is completely semiconjunctive if any Γ Ď L has a
conjunction.
Fact 1.2.22 (Semiconjunctivity and Semilattices). A logic L is (completely) semi-
conjunctive iff L is a (complete) meet-semilattice.
Semiconjunctions automatically validate conjunction elimination. But even when
defined, semiconjunctions need not validate conjunction introduction—that is, even
if
Ź
Γ is defined, we are not automatically guaranteed that Γ $
Ź
Γ.
Example 1.2.23 (Semiconjunctive Logics without Conjunction Introduction). Let
L  xL ,$y where L  tp , q , p ^ qu and where Γ $ ϕ iff ϕ P Γ or p ^ q P Γ.
(Note L is Tarskian.) Then L is semiconjunctive (if ϕ , ψ, then ϕ^ψ  p ^ q).
But L does not obey conjunction introduction since p , q & p ^ q.
This justifies the prefix ‘semi’ in ‘semiconjunctive’: such logics are only guaranteed
to have half of a usual conjunction. Still, almost all semiconjunctive logics of interest
do obey conjunction introduction. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 1.2.24 (Adjunctive Logic). A logic L is adjunctive if for any Γ Ď L
and any semiconjunction θ P L of Γ in L, then Γ $ θ. We say L is (completely)
conjunctive if it is (completely) semiconjunctive and adjunctive.
Unlike semiconjunctivity, adjunctivity does not correspond exactly to any con-
dition on Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras, since we can make a non-adjunctive logic
adjunctive (even conjunctive) without any changes to the Lindenbaum-Tarski al-
gebra (e.g., Example 1.2.23). We can say something of interest, however, viz., that
conjunctive logics are logics where finitary consequence reduces to the order rela-
tion in Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras. That is:
Fact 1.2.25 (Reducing (Finite) Consequence to the Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebra). Let
L be a logic. Then L is (completely) conjunctive iff for all finite (and all infinite)
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Γ Ď L,
Ź
ϕPΓ rϕsL is defined and for all ψ P L:
Γ $ ψ ô
ľ
ϕPΓ
rϕsL ď rψsL .
Corollary 1.2.26 (Reducing Compact Consequence to the Lindenbaum-Tarski Alge-
bra). Let L be a conjunctive logic. Then L is compact iff for all Γ Ď L and
ψ P L:
Γ $ ψ ô DΓ0 Ď Γ : |Γ0| ă ℵ0 and
ľ
ϕPΓ0
rϕsL ď rψsL .
In sum: conjunctivity says that all finite-premise inferences can be reduced to single-
premise inferences; complete conjunctivity says that all inferences can be reduced
to single-premise inferences; and compactness says that all inferences can be re-
duced to finite-premise inferences. The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra is a summary
of a logic’s single-premise inferences. Thus, a compact conjunctive logic can be
completely summarized by its Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra.
§ 1.3 Compositional Languages
The simple picture of a language discussed in the previous section will be a useful
starting point for our investigations into different measures of expressive power.
Nevertheless, for many purposes, it is too spartan. For in defining the expressive
power of a language, we are not simply interested in whether everything that one
language can say can be said in another language. We are also interested in whether
the latter can interpret the former in a more-or-less uniform way. That is, we are
interested in whether languages can interpret other languages in a way that more-
or-less preserves their underlying syntactic structure. To determine whether this is
the case, we need to be more explicit about what a language’s underlying syntactic
structure consists in. Making this precise is the aim of this section.
§ 1.3.1 Signatures and Subformulas
To start, we will lay out the syntactic foundations for compositional languages. The
primary difference between compositional languages and simple languages is that
the formulas of a compositional language are “built up” in a fairly systematic way.
To make this precise, we introduce the notion of a “signature”, which is essentially
a kind of lexicon for formal languages.
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Definition 1.3.1 (Signature). A signature is a pair Σ  xAt, Opy, where At is a
class, and Op is a class (disjoint from At) of functions△ of any arity. Where γ is
an ordinal, we let Opγ denote the class of γ-ary functions in Op. The members
of At are called the atomic Σ-formulas and the members of Op are called the
Σ-operators.
Definition 1.3.2 (Generated Syntax). Where Σ  xAt, Opy is a signature, the
Σ-syntax is the smallest class LΣ such that:
(i) At Ď LΣ
(ii) for all△ P Opγ and all ρ P LγΣ, if△(ρ) is defined, then△(ρ) P LΣ.
The members of LΣ are called the Σ-formulas or the LΣ-formulas. A Σ-
formula ϕ is complex if ϕ  △(ρ) for some △ P Opγ and some ρ P LγΣ;
otherwise, it is simple.
Definition 1.3.3 (Languages and Logics with Signatures). A Σ-language is an
ordered tuple of the form L  xΣ,C,,y where xLΣ,C,,y is a language in
the sense of Definition 1.1.1. A Σ-logic is an ordered pair L  xΣ,$y where
xLΣ,$y is a logic in the sense of Definition 1.1.5.
As it stands, the definition of a language with signature is still quite minimal.
For instance, formulas in a signatureΣmay not uniquely decompose, i.e., we might
have△1(ρ1)  △2(ρ2) even if△1 , △2. Formulas might even contain themselves
as proper Σ-subformulas; for example, nothing in Definition 1.3.2 rules out there
being a△ P Op and a ϕ such that△(ϕ)  ϕ. Likewise, our definition does not yet
rule out the possibility that an atomic Σ-formula is also complex. But generally, we
will focus on signatures that do not have these strange properties. More precisely,
our focus is on languages where formulas are syntactically unambiguous.
Definition 1.3.4 (Unambiguity). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be a signature. A Σ-formula
ϕ is unambiguous in Σ if either:
(i) ϕ P At and for no△ P Opγ and no ρ P LγΣ is ϕ △(ρ), or
(ii) ϕ < At and for all△1 P Opγ1 , all△2 P Opγ2 , all ρ1 P L
γ1
Σ
, and all ρ P Lγ2
Σ
,
if△1(ρ1)  ϕ △2(ρ2), then△1 △2 and ρ1  ρ2.
We sayΣ is unambiguous if every ϕ P LΣ is unambiguous inΣ. AΣ-language
is unambiguous if Σ is unambiguous.
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To say that a language is unambiguous is to say that one cannot “construct” the
same formula via two distinct methods. That is, one can decompose each formula
uniquely in the following sense:
Fact 1.3.5 (Unique Decomposition). If Σ  xAt, Opy is unambiguous, then for all
ϕ P LΣ, either:
(i) ϕ P At and for no△ P Opγ and no ρ P LγΣ is ϕ △(ρ), or
(ii) ϕ < At and there are unique△ P Opγ and ρ P LγΣ such that ϕ △(ρ).
Part (ii) in Fact 1.3.5 applies equally to 0-ary operators. Thus, if△0 P Op0, then for
no distinct△1 P Opγ and ρ P L
γ
Σ
is△0()  △1(ρ). In unambiguous signatures, 0-
ary operators behave like atomic formulas in that they have no constituents. With
this in mind, if△0 is 0-ary, we often write “△0” in place of “△0()” for brevity.
Unambiguous signatures have the nice feature that we can build the entire sig-
nature from the bottom up by applying the operators to the atomic formulas a finite
number of times. To make this more precise, we need to define the notion of a sub-
formula.
Definition 1.3.6 (Subformula). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be a signature and let ϕ, ψ P
LΣ where ϕ  △(ρ) for some γ , 0, some△ P Opγ, and some ρ P LγΣ. We
say ψ is a Σ-constituent of ϕ if for some β ă γ, ρ(β)  ψ. We say ψ is a
properΣ-subformula of ϕ if there are some θ0, . . . , θn P LΣ such that ψ  θ0,
ϕ  θn , and for i ă n, θi is a constituent of θi`1. We say ψ is anΣ-subformula
of ϕ if either ψ  ϕ or ψ is a proper subformula of ϕ. We define:
SubΣ(ϕ)  tψ |ψ is a Σ-subformula of ϕu
PSubΣ(ϕ)  tψ |ψ is a proper Σ-subformula of ϕu .
We generally drop mention of Σwhen the Σ in question is obvious.
Definition 1.3.7 (Well-Founded). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be a signature. A Σ-formula
ϕ P LΣ is well-founded in Σ if there are no ψ1, ψ2, ψ3, . . . P LΣ such that:
Sub(ϕ) Ą Sub(ψ1) Ą Sub(ψ2) Ą Sub(ψ3) Ą ¨ ¨ ¨ .
We say Σ is well-founded if every Σ-formula is well-founded in Σ.
The appendix to this chapter (§ 1.5) contains a proof that unambiguous signa-
tures are well-founded. What this means is that, for unambiguous signatures, the
relation Ď defined by ϕ Ď ψ B ϕ P Sub(ψ) is a weak well-founded partial order
(i.e., there are no infinite Ď-descending chains). And given that each formula is
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uniquely decomposable in such languages, we can think of a formula as a tree of
formulas whose root is the formula itself and each node branches into that node’s
constituents. We will be primarily focused on such signatures throughout, since
otherwise we would lose the ability to talk coherently about a “schema”, which
will be important in what follows.
Convention: Henceforth, when I say “signature”, I mean “unambiguous
signature” unless otherwise specified.
Furthermore, as we have defined things, operators need not be defined on every
sequence of formulas. But for our purposes, this level of generality is not entirely
necessary, and it is a hassle to have to worry about whether or not△(ρ) is defined
all the time. Hence, we introduce the following definition and convention for con-
venience:
Definition 1.3.8 (Partial Operators). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be some signature. A
Σ-operator △ P Opγ is partial if for some ρ P LγΣ, △(ρ) is undefined (i.e.,
Lγ
Σ
Ę dom (△)). Otherwise, it is total. We say Σ is total if each△ P Opγ is
total.
Convention: Henceforth, when I say “signature”, I mean “total signature”
unless otherwise specified.
The definitions in what follows could be modified in straightforward ways to allow
for partial signatures.
A word of caution before moving on. These conventions to take “signature” to
mean “total unambiguous signature” should not hide the fact that when we define
a new language from an old one, we must be careful to check that the new language
is total and unambiguous. This is not something that is automatically given to us,
and so we cannot be complacent: we will need to generally check that the newly
constructed language has an unambiguous and total signature before applying any
of results to it (just as we need to check that a logic is Tarskian when we construct
it from some other mathematical object).
§ 1.3.2 Schemas and Substitutions
We now move on to defining the notion of a schema, which is crucial for many of
the compositional approaches to defining expressive power in later chapters. In-
tuitively, a schema is a method for constructing a formula from basic constituents.
One can “fill in” this construction with arbitrary formulas to construct a new for-
mula. Or, more briefly, it is a syntax tree with placeholders for arbitrary formulas.
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Definition 1.3.9 (Schema). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be a signature. Let Π be a class
disjoint from LΣ and Op. The notion of a Σ-schema with parameters in Π is
defined recursively as follows:
• Each ϕ P LL is a Σ-schema with parameters in Π
• Each ξ P Π is a Σ-schema with parameters in Π
• If△ P Opγ and if σ is a γ-sequence of Σ-schemas with parameters inΠ,
then x△, σy is a Σ-schema with parameters in Π
• Nothing else is a Σ-schema with parameters in Π.
We let SchΣ(Π) be the class ofΣ-schemas with parametersΠ. IfΘ P SchΣ(Π),
the members ofΠ that occur somewhere inΘ are called the parameters ofΘ.
Where π is a sequence listing the members ofΠ exactly once, we write “Θ(π)”
to indicate that the parameters of Θ are all among the members of π. We
usually use “π” for a sequence of parameters and “ξ” for a single parameter.
We may write “SchΣ(π)” for “SchΣ(Π)” and “SchΣ(ξ)” for “SchΣ(tξu)”.
Let ι : ΠÑ LΣ. The instantiation of aΣ-schemaΘwith ι is theΣ-formula
Θrιs defined recursively as follows:
• If Θ  ϕ P LΣ, then Θrιs  ϕ.
• If Θ  ξ P Π, then Θrιs  ι(ξ).
• IfΘ  x△, σy where σ is a γ-sequence of Σ-schemas with parameters in
Π, then Θrιs △(σrιs), where σrιs(β)  σ(β)rιs for β ă γ.
If Θ(π) is a Σ-schema where π is a γ-sequence of distinct parameters and if
ρ P Lγ
Σ
, we write “Θ(ρ)” for the instantiation of Θwith ι : π(β) ÞÑ ρ(β).
If we think of a Σ-syntax as an algebra of formulas with operators OpΣ, then a
schema is just a polynomial (or rather, a polynomial “symbol”6) over that alge-
bra. The concept of a schema will be crucial in defining an adequate notion of a
translation in later chapters.
The last syntactic concept we introduce is that of a substitution, which (in unam-
biguous signatures) can be used to provide an alternative definition of the concept
of a subformula.
Definition 1.3.10 (Substitution). Where Σ  xAt, Opy is a signature, a map
σ : LΣ Ñ LΣ is a Σ-substitution if for all△ P Opγ and all ρ P LγΣ:
σ(△(ρ)) △(σ ˝ ρ).
6Grätzer [2008, p. 39].
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Fact 1.3.11 (Substitutions are Determined by What They Do to Atomics). Let σ1
and σ2 be substitutions for a Σ-language L such that for each ϕ P At, σ1(ϕ) 
σ2(ϕ). Then σ1  σ2.
Substitutions in a signature Σ  xAt, Opy are essentially just endomorphisms on the
language algebra xLΣ, Opy.
In what follows, we adopt the following notation:
Notation: Let Σ  xAt, Opy, let π P Atγ where π(β)  π(β1) implies β  β1,
and let ρ P Lγ
Σ
. We write “rπ{ρs” (in postfix notation) for the substitution σ
such that σ(π(β))  ρ(β) for all β ă γ and σ(χ)  χ for all χ P At that do
not occur in π. If γ  n ` 1 P N, we may write “rπ(0){ρ(0), . . . , π(n){ρ(n)s”
instead of rπ{ρs.
So for instance, (p ^ q)rp{(q ^ r)s  ((q ^ r) ^ q). As usual with such notation,
one should be warned that simultaneous substitution is not the same as iterated
substitution—that is, in general, rπ1{ϕ1, . . . , πn{ϕns , rπ1{ϕ1s ˝ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˝ rπn{ϕns. For
instance, prp{q , q{rs  q whereas prp{qsrq{rs  r.
Using substitutions, we can actually introduce an alternative definition of the
notion of a subformula as follows:7
Fact 1.3.12 (Alternative Definition of Subformula). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be a signa-
ture, let ϕ, ψ P LΣ, and let χ P At.
(a) χ P Sub(ϕ) iff for every Σ-substitution σ, if σ(ϕ)  ϕ, then σ(χ)  χ.
(b) If χ < Sub(ϕ), then ψ P Sub(ϕ) iff there is a formula ϕ1 and a Σ-
substitution σ where σ(χ)  ψ such that σ(ϕ1)  ϕ.
(c) If χ < Sub(ϕ), then ψ P PSub(ϕ) iff there is a formula ϕ1 , χ and a
Σ-substitution σ where σ(χ)  ψ such that σ(ϕ1)  ϕ.
7This way of defining subformulas comes from Wójcicki [1988, pp. 17–18]. Actually, Wójcicki
defines ψ to be a subformula of ϕ just in case there is a formula ϕ1 and an atomic ξ such that
ϕ  ϕ1rξ{ψs. This works fine for languages where each subformula has finitely many subformulas,
and where one has an infinite supply of atomic formulas. Wójcicki was primarily working with such
languages, so the definition was fitting for those purposes. But such a definition is inadequate for
languages with formulas containing every atomic formula. For instance, consider the propositional
formula ϕ  (p ^ q) ^ (p ^ p) ^ (q ^ q). Clearly, p ^ q is a subformula of ϕ. But there is no
formula ϕ1 in a propositional logic whose only atomics are p and q such that ϕ  ϕ1rp{(p ^ q)s or
ϕ1rq{(p ^ q)s, as both of these substitutions contain unwanted substitutions. Thus, only the more
general definition of subformulas given in Definition 1.3.6 works for these languages as well.
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§ 1.3.3 Intensionality
Now that we have the notion of a compositional syntax, we can address the question
of what it takes for the semantics of a language to be compositional. Intuitively, a
semantics for a language is compositional if the meaning of a complex formula
is completely determined by the meaning of its immediate constituents together
with its syntactic structure. This can be precisified in a number of ways, but the
standard way of articulating this idea is to invoke meaning algebras. Here, our
meaning algebra is the collection of subclasses of our evaluation space. Thus, we
can present a simplified notion of compositionality as follows:
Notation: Where L is a Σ-language, and where ρ P Lγ
Σ
, we define ⟦ρ⟧ B
⟦¨⟧ ˝ ρ, i.e., ⟦ρ⟧ (β)  ⟦ρ(β)⟧ for β ă γ. In the finite case, we define:
⟦ϕ1, . . . , ϕn⟧ B x⟦ϕ1⟧ , . . . , ⟦ϕn⟧y .
In addition, where ρ1, ρ2 P LγΣ, we write “ρ1 ”L ρ2” in place of “ρ1(β) ”L
ρ2(β) for all β ă γ”.
Definition 1.3.13 (Intensionality). Let L  xΣ,C,,y be a Σ-language. We say
that△ P Opγ is L-intensional if there is a function ⟦△⟧ : Cγ Ñ C such that
for all ρ P Lγ
Σ
, if△(ρ) is defined, then:
⟦△(ρ)⟧  ⟦△⟧ (⟦ρ⟧).
Otherwise,△ is L-hyperintensional. If△ is L-intensional, then ⟦△⟧ is called
the L-intension of △. We say that L is intensional if each Σ-operator is L-
intensional. Otherwise, L is hyperintensional.
We can lift intensions up to schemas by induction:
Fact 1.3.14 (Lifting Intensionality to Schemas). Let L be a intensionalΣ-language.
Then for any Σ-schema Θ(π), there is a function ⟦Θ⟧ such that whenever
Θ(ρ) is defined, ⟦Θ(ρ)⟧  ⟦Θ⟧ (⟦ρ⟧).
Proposition 1.3.15 (Intensionality Validates Substitution). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be a
signature and let L be a Σ-language. Then△ is L-intensional iff△ obeys the
substitution of logical equivalents, i.e., for all ρ1, ρ2 P LγΣ, if ρ1 ” ρ2, then
△(ρ1) ”△(ρ2).
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Proof: The left-to-right direction is easy, given that ρ1 ” ρ2 iff ⟦ρ1⟧  ⟦ρ2⟧.
For the right-to-left direction, it suffices to show that the definition of ⟦△⟧
from Definition 1.3.13 is a function (at least for definable members of Cγ; it
does not matter what△does to a member of Cγ that is not picked out by some
ρ P Lγ
Σ
). But the functionality of ⟦△⟧ obviously follows by the substitution
of equivalents. ∎
Hence, we can say an operator in a logic is intensional just in case it validates the
substitution of logical equivalents. Likewise, we can say a logic is intensional if
each of its operators are intensional.
Hyperintensional logics are gaining much attention at the moment.8 A num-
ber of philosophers have argued that a variety of natural language operators—in
particular, attitude verbs and counterfactuals—are hyperintensional. Most of the
languages we will be focusing on here are intensional. But that does not mean that
this framework does not have anything to say about hyperintensional languages.
Often, fans of hyperintensionality face some difficulty in specifying how hyper-
intensional an operator can get. The issue is that many of the standard reasons for
accepting that an operator is hyperintensional threaten to undermine almost any
non-trivial inference involving that operator: if you cannot even substitute logical
equivalents in the scope of the operator, what other substitution principle could
possibly survive? One way to resolve this problem is to revise one’s language by
allowing for more fine-grained states in the evaluation space. By doing so, one can
weaken the logic and thereby convert the hyperintensional operator into an inten-
sional one. While this may be undesirable, the effects can be mitigated by showing
how the old notion of consequence can be interpreted in the new logic. So even if
a logic is hyperintensional, one might find suitable intensional logics in the near
vicinity. For the most part, this dissertation focuses on intensional languages.
§ 1.3.4 Connectives
We will generally be interested not just in charting the landscape of notions of ex-
pressive power from an abstract perspective but also in saying what follows for
particular philosophically important languages. Many of these languages have fa-
miliar kinds of operators, such as negation, conjunction, and so forth. Since these
connectives will be discussed later on, it will be useful to tabulate some of the more
common connectives and note their properties.
There are broadly two ways to define the connectives. On the one hand, we can
define them proof-theoretically in terms of how they interact with the underlying
logic of a language. On the other hand, we can define them semantically in terms of
how their semantic values are defined.
8See Mares 1997; Nolan 1997; Restall 1997; Vander Laan 1997; Brogaard and Salerno 2013; Jago
2014; Kment 2014; Priest 2016; Berto et al. 2017.
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Proof-Theoretic Connectives
Definition 1.3.16 (Proof-Theoretic Operators). Let L  xL ,$y be a logic and let
θ P L. We say θ is a proof-theoretic. . .
• . . . falsum if θ $ L.
• . . .verum if $ θ.
• . . .negation of ϕ P L if for all Γ Ď L: Γ $ θ iff Γ, ϕ $ L.
• . . . (finitary) conjunction of ϕ, ψ P L if for all Γ Ď L: Γ $ θ iff Γ $ ϕ
and Γ $ ψ.
• . . . (finitary) disjunction of ϕ, ψ P L if for all Γ Ď L and all χ P L:
Γ, θ $ χ iff Γ, ϕ $ χ and Γ, ψ $ χ.
• . . . infinitary conjunction of ∆ Ď L if for all Γ Ď L: Γ $ θ iff Γ $ ϕ for
all ϕ P ∆.
• . . . infinitary disjunction of ∆ Ď L if for all Γ Ď L and all ψ P L:
Γ, θ $ ψ iff Γ, ϕ $ ψ for all ϕ P ∆.
• . . .conditional of ϕ, ψ P L if for all Γ Ď L: Γ $ θ iff Γ, ϕ $ ψ.
• . . .biconditional of ϕ, ψ P L if for all Γ Ď L: Γ $ θ iff Γ, ϕ $ ψ and
Γ, ψ $ ϕ.
We will talk of L as having a proof-theoretic operator simpliciter if it has that
proof-theoretic operator for all formulas. For example, L has proof-theoretic
conjunction if for each ϕ, ψ P L, there is a proof-theoretic conjunction of ϕ
and ψ in L.
Let L now be a Σ-logic where Σ  xAt, Opy. We say an operator △ P Op
is a proof-theoretic operator if it always outputs a particular proof-theoretic
operator for some formulas. For example, △ is a proof-theoretic (finitary)
conjunction if for all ϕ, ψ P L, △(ϕ, ψ) is a proof-theoretic (finitary) con-
junction of ϕ and ψ.
All of these notions lift to languages in the usual way.
Notation: We denote proof-theoretic operators as follows:
• K for falsum
• J for verum
• ¬ for negation
• ^ for finitary conjunction







• Ñ for conditional
• Ø for biconditional
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As usual, we write the binary operators using infix notation. Note that we
are not assuming ‘¬’, ‘^’, etc. pick out some operators in a signature—even
though when our logic has proof-theoretic negation, conjunction, etc., it will
usually have them as operators. Context should make clear when ‘¬’ is used
to pick out an operator in a signature and when it is simply used as a conve-
nient shorthand in the metalanguage.
It is easy to check that any two proof-theoretic operators under the same classi-
fication are equivalent. That is:
Fact 1.3.17 (Uniqueness of Proof-Theoretic Operators). Let L be a logic and let
θ1, θ2 P L.
(a) If there is a ϕ P L such that θ1 and θ2 are both proof-theoretic negations
of ϕ, then θ1 %$ θ2.
(b) If there are some ϕ, ψ P L such that θ1 and θ2 are both proof-theoretic
conjunctions (disjunctions, etc.) of ϕ and ψ, then θ1 %$ θ2.
(c) If there is a Γ Ď L such that θ1 and θ2 are both proof-theoretic infinite
conjunctions (disjunctions) of Γ, then θ1 %$ θ2.
Thus, if △1,△2 P Op are both proof-theoretic negations (conjunctions, etc.), then
they are provably equivalent. For instance, if ¬1,¬2 P OpL are both proof-theoretic
negations for a logic L, then ¬1 ϕ %$ ¬2 ϕ. So we can write “¬” ambiguously for
any proof-theoretic negation without confusion. An interesting corollary of this is
the following:
Corollary 1.3.18 (Intuitionistic Logic and Classical Negation). There is no exten-
sion of intuitionistic logic that has a “classical negation”, i.e., a proof-theoretic
negation satisfying double negation elimination.
Proof (Sketch): If we add a classical negation ¬c to intuitionistic logic, then
where ¬i is the original intuitionistic negation, we have ¬c ϕ %$ ¬i ϕ by
Fact 1.3.17. But since ¬c ¬c ϕ %$ ϕ, it follows that ¬i ¬i ϕ %$ ϕ. ∎
Corollary 1.3.18 deserves some comment. The result does not state that one
could not have a language containing two non-equivalent negations when one has
an intuitionistic semantics and the other has a classical semantics. Indeed, that is
entirely possible. What the result entails about such a language is that one of those
negations would not be a proof-theoretic negation in the sense of Definition 1.3.16.
As an illustration, suppose we add a classical negation to the standard Kripke se-
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mantics for intuitionistic logic, i.e., an operator ¬c such that for all pointed Kripke
models xM , xy and all ϕ:
M , x , ¬cϕ ô M , x . ϕ.
Then the intuitionistic negation ¬i is no longer proof-theoretic: while Γ $ ¬i ϕ
implies Γ, ϕ $ K, the converse is not true (e.g., ¬c p , p $ K but ¬c p & ¬i p). By
contrast, the classical negation ¬c is a proof-theoretic negation here.
Since proof-theoretic connectives are completely decomposable into implica-
tions without mention of connectives, it immediately follows by Fact 1.1.7 that:
Fact 1.3.19 (Intensionality of Proof-Theoretic Operators). Each proof-theoretic op-
erator is intensional.
Finally, the following are easy to verify:
Fact 1.3.20 (Derived Proof-Theoretic Inferences). Assuming L has the appropri-
ate proof-theoretic operators:
(i) ϕ,¬ϕ $ L.
(ii) If ϕ $ ψ, then ¬ψ $ ¬ϕ.
(iii) ϕ $ ¬¬ϕ.
(iv) ϕ, ψ $ ϕ ^ ψ.
(v) ϕ ^ ψ $ ϕ, and ϕ ^ ψ $ ψ.
(vi) ϕ $ ϕ _ ψ and ψ $ ϕ _ ψ.
(vii) ϕ _ ψ,¬ϕ $ ψ and ϕ _ ψ,¬ψ $ ϕ.
(viii) ¬(ϕ _ ψ) %$ ¬ϕ ^ ¬ψ.
(ix) ¬ϕ _ ¬ψ $ ¬(ϕ ^ ψ).
(x) $ ϕ Ñ ϕ.
(xi) ϕ Ñ ψ, ϕ $ ψ and ϕ Ñ ψ,¬ψ $ ¬ϕ.
(xii) ϕ Ñ ψ $ ¬ψ Ñ ¬ϕ.
(xiii) ϕ Ñ ψ, ψ Ñ θ $ ϕ Ñ θ.
(xiv) ϕ Ñ ψ, ψ Ñ ϕ $ ϕ Ø ψ.
(xv) ϕ Ø ψ $ ϕ Ñ ψ and ϕ Ø ψ $ ψ Ñ ϕ.
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Observe that Fact 1.3.20(iv) implies that L is adjunctive. Thus, if L contains a proof-
theoretic conjunction, then L is conjunctive.9 Observe also that we do not have any
of the following inferences in general:
• ¬¬ϕ $ ϕ
• $ ϕ _ ¬ϕ
• ¬(ϕ ^ ψ) $ ¬ϕ _ ¬ψ.
Indeed, the reader might have observed that this list of derived proof-theoretic
inferences include valid inferences from propositional intuitionistic logic and ex-
clude classically valid but intuitionistically invalid inferences. That is because these
proof-theoretic operators are all exactly how the rules governing the connectives
are defined in intuitionistic logic. Thus, one can use intuitionistic logic to reason
with proof-theoretic connectives.
Semantic Connectives
Definition 1.3.21 (Truth-Functional Operators). Let L  xL ,C,,y be a language
and let θ P L. We say θ is a truth-functional. . .
• . . . falsum if ⟦θ⟧  H.
• . . .verum if ⟦θ⟧  C.
• . . .negation of ϕ P L if ⟦θ⟧  C ´ ⟦ϕ⟧.
• . . . (finitary) conjunction of ϕ, ψ P L if ⟦θ⟧  ⟦ϕ⟧ X ⟦ψ⟧.
• . . . (finitary) disjunction of ϕ, ψ P L if ⟦θ⟧  ⟦ϕ⟧ Y ⟦ψ⟧.
• . . . infinite conjunction of ∆ Ď L if ⟦θ⟧  ⟦∆⟧.
• . . . infinite disjunction of ∆ Ď L if ⟦θ⟧ 
Ť
ϕP∆ ⟦ϕ⟧.
As in Definition 1.3.16, we will talk of L having a certain truth-functional
operator, or of an operator in a signature being a certain truth-functional op-
erator, in the same way as before.
Fact 1.3.22 (Truth-Functional Operators are Proof-Theoretic). Any truth-functional
negation (conjunction, etc.) of some formula(s) is also a proof-theoretic nega-
tion (conjunction, etc.) of the same formula(s).
In some cases, we have the converse:
9For L to be semiconjunctive, one would need to add a semiconjunction, where a semiconjunction
of ϕ, ψ P L is a θ P L such that for all η P L: η $ θ iff η $ ϕ and η $ ψ. The difference between
semiconjunctions and conjunctions, then, is whether we are allowed to appeal to multiple premises
in proving ϕ and ψ.
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Fact 1.3.23 (Some Proof-Theoretic Operators are Truth-Functional). Any proof-
theoretic verum is a truth-functional verum. Likewise, any proof-theoretic
(infinitary) conjunction is a truth-functional (infinitary) conjunction.
But not always. In particular, proof-theoretic negation need not be a truth-functional
negation. Likewise for disjunction. For example, the possibility semantics for clas-
sical propositional logic developed by Humberstone [1981] has a proof-theoretic
disjunction and negation (since it preserves classical logic) but neither of their truth-
functional versions.
We now record some simple but useful facts about truth-functional negation
and how they relate to the properties of languages discussed in § 1.2.
Fact 1.3.24 (Negation Implies Opinionation). Suppose L has truth-functional nega-
tion. Then L is opinionated.
Fact 1.3.25 (Negation Collapses Finitarity and Compactness). Suppose L is fini-
tary and has truth-functional negation. Then L is compact.
§ 1.4 Dynamic Languages
In the previous sections, we laid the foundations for thinking about language in a
rather static way. A language, on this picture, is just a way of carving logical space.
But while this may be adequate for thinking about theoretical or formal languages,
many linguists and philosophers of language have argued that natural languages
need a more dynamic picture.10 According to dynamic semantics, the meaning of a
sentence is not, in general, the class of possibilities in logical space where it is satis-
fied, but rather the dynamic effect that sentence has on a conversational context, i.e.,
its context-change potential. In this section, we lay out this alternative picture of
language and explain its connection with the picture sketched in previous sections.
Definition 1.4.1 (Dynamic Language). A dynamic language is a triple of the
form L  xL ,C, r¨sy, where:
• L is a class (of formulas)
• C is a class (of contexts)
• r¨s : L Ñ (C Ñ C) is a map (the context change potential).
10See Karttunen 1976; Kamp 1981; Heim 1983; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991; Groenendijk et al.
1996; Stalnaker 1999. For an overview, see Rothschild and Yalcin 2015.
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Notation: Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a dynamic language. We write r¨s in postfix
notation. Thus, where s P C and ϕ P L, we write “s rϕs” in place of “rϕs (s)”.
Where ρ P Lăω and |ρ|  n, we write “s rρs” for “s rρ(0)s ¨ ¨ ¨ rρ(n ´ 1)s”. (In
the special case where |ρ|  0, we set s rρs B s.)
Moreover, we write “s , ϕ1, . . . , ϕn” in place of “s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s”. As
before, we write “s , Γ” in place of “s , ϕ for all ϕ P Γ”.
Consequence for dynamic languages can be defined in multiple ways. One way
to define consequence is in terms of the ordinary Tarksian notion of consequence
articulated in Definition 1.1.3.
Definition 1.4.2 (Static Entailment). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a dynamic language
and let ρ, σ P Lăω. We say that ρ statically L-entails σ (written “ρ (L σ”)
if for all s P C, if s , ρ(i) for each i ă |ρ|, then s , σ( j) for each j ă |σ|. The
usual definitions and abbreviations for entailment apply.
Obviously, no confusion should arise from using “(L” here for static entailment,
since this corresponds to the ordinary notion of entailment for “static” languages
(Definition 1.1.1). It is easy to check that static entailment is Tarskian.
There are also more dynamic ways of defining consequence. These definitions
take a little more effort to articulate, however. If we are only dealing with a finite
number of premises, it is fairly easy.
Definition 1.4.3 (Dynamic Entailment). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a dynamic lan-
guage and let ρ, σ P Lăω. We say that ρ dynamically L-entails σ (written
“ρ |⇛ L σ”) if for all s P C, s rρs , σ—that is:
s rρs rσs  s rρs .
Defining this notion of entailment when there are infinite sequences of premises,
however, is a bit more complex. Suppose we want to articulate something like the
thought that ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, . . . dynamically entail ψ. We are not always guaranteed,
however, that something like “s rϕ1s rϕ2s rϕ3s ¨ ¨ ¨ ” is going to be well-defined (e.g.,
what happens if s rϕ2i`1s , s but s rϕ2i`1s rϕ2i`2s  s for i ě 0?). What is more, it
seems we do want something like infinite-premise inferences for modeling natural
language inferences. Let Ln be a sentence saying “there are at least n-many things”,
and let Inf be a sentence saying “there are infinitely many things”. Then arguably,
we want to capture the fact the L1, L2, L3, . . . entails Inf.11 For our purposes, though,
11There are several ways this might be done. One way is to define the result of an infinite sequence
of updates as a class of contexts that recur infinitely often along the update. Thus, where ρ P Lω,
we would say s1 P s rρs if there are infinitely many n P N such that s rρ(0), . . . , ρ(n)s  s1. A more
generalizable method might be obtained if we place a metric space on the class of contexts (which
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we do not need to explore such generalizations of the dynamic framework, since
finite-premise arguments will be the main focus.
Unlike static entailment, dynamic entailment is far from Tarskian. The only
property it has reminiscent of Tarskian logics is transitivity:
Fact 1.4.4 (Dynamic Entailment is Transitive). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a dynamic
language. Then for all ρ, σ, τ P Lăω, if ρ |⇛ σ |⇛ τ, then ρ |⇛ τ.
Dynamic entailment is not generally reflexive, commutative, contractive, or (reflex-
ively) monotonic.
There is also a kind of “mixed” notion of entailment, which combines static and
dynamic elements.
Definition 1.4.5 (Kinematic Entailment). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a dynamic lan-
guage and let ρ, σ P Lăω. We say that ρ kinematically L-entails σ (written
“ρ |ñ L σ”) if for all s P C, if s , ρ, then s , σ—that is:
s rρs  s ñ s rσs  s
Kinematic entailment, like dynamic entailment, is not Tarskian. But it is more
Tarskian than dynamic entailment in that kinematic entailment is also reflexive.
Fact 1.4.6 (Kinematic Entailment is Reflexive and Transitive). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy
be a dynamic language. Then for all ρ, σ, τ P Lăω:
(i) ρ |ñ ρ
(ii) if ρ |ñ σ |ñ τ, then ρ |ñ τ.
Again, however, kinematic entailment in general lacks commutativity, contraction,
and (reflexive) monotonicity.
Dynamic entailment is more strict than kinematic entailment, which in turn is
more strict than static entailment.
Example 1.4.7 (Kinematic Entailment without Dynamic Entailment). Let L 
t`u, let C  N, and let n` B n r`s  n ` 1 (see diagram below). Then
for no n do we have that n ` `  n. So vacuously, `,` |ñ `. But ` |̸⇛ `,
since for no n do we have that n ` `  n`.
would informally represent information-theoretic distances amongst the contexts). Then we could
take s rρs to be the limit set of s for ρ—that is, s1 P s rρs if, roughly, as we apply more and more of
the sequence of updates in ρ, we approach s1 “in the limit”.
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0 1 2 3 ¨ ¨ ¨
` ` ` `
For a more natural example, see Example 1.4.12 below.
Example 1.4.8 (Static Entailment without Kinematic Entailment). LetL  t˚u, let
C  t0, 1u, and let n˚ B n r˚s  1´ n (see diagram below). Vacuously, ˚, ˚ ( ˚,




Proposition 1.4.9 (Hierarchy of Entailments for Dynamic Languages). Let L be a
dynamic language, let ρ, σ P Lăω, and let ψ P L.
(a) If ρ |⇛ L σ, then ρ |ñ L σ.
(b) If ρ |ñ L ψ, then tρ(k) | k ă |ρ|u (L ψ.
Proof:
(a) Suppose ρ |⇛ σ. Let s rρs  s. Then:
s rσs  s rρs rσs
 s rρs
 s .
(b) Suppose ρ |ñ ψ. Without loss of generality, let ρ  xϕ1, . . . , ϕny. Let
s rϕis  s for each i ď n. Then:
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s rϕ2s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns
 s rϕ3s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns
...
 s .
Hence, s rψs  s. ∎
Note that we cannot generalize part (b) of Proposition 1.4.9 to allow for sequences
of formulas in the conclusion of an entailment. That is, we cannot say in general
that if ρ |ñ L σ, then tρ(k) | k ă |ρ|u (L tσ(k) | k ă |σ|u.
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Example 1.4.10 (Kinematic Entailment without Static Entailment). LetL  xp , qy,
let C  t0, 1u, and let r¨s be defined as follows:
• 0 rps  1 rps  1
• 0 rqs  1 rqs  0.
Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy (see diagram below). Then p |ñ q , p, since s rps  s implies





These different notions of entailment do coincide under special circumstances.
We now characterize exactly when such collapses will occur. We start with the
collapse of kinematic and dynamic entailments to static entailment.
Definition 1.4.11 (Monotonicity). A dynamic language L  xL ,C, r¨sy is called
kinematically monotonic if for all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn P L, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |ñ ϕi—that is,
for all s P C and 1 ď i ď n:
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s ñ s rϕis  s .
L is dynamically monotonic if for all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn P L, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |⇛ ϕi—that
is, for all s P C and 1 ď i ď n:
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns rϕis  s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns .
Example 1.4.12 (Domain Semantics). Yalcin [2007, 2012] put forward the fol-
lowing semantics (the “domain semantics”) for the epistemic modal ‘might’
(we ignore expanding the language with attitude verbs for simplicity). Let
Prop  tp1, p2, p3, . . .u and let LD be recursively defined as follows:
ϕ F p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | ◇ϕ.
An information model is a pairM  xW,Vy where W is a nonempty set and
V : PropÑ ℘ (W ). Let D be the class of pairs of the form xM , sy where s Ď W .
Let D B tLD,D, r¨su, where (writing “s rϕs” instead of “xM , sy rϕs”):
s rps  tw P s | w P V (p) u
s r¬ϕs  s ´ s rϕs
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s rϕ ^ ψs  s rϕs rψs
s r◇ϕs  tw P s | s rϕs ,Hu .
D is not dynamically monotonic. For example, s r◇ps r¬ ps r◇ps  H, while
s r◇ps r¬ ps does not have to be empty. But it is kinematically monotonic.
Note first that (by an easy induction) s rϕs Ď s for all ϕ P LD and all s. So if
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s, then:
s  s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns Ď s rϕ1s Ď s .
Hence, s rϕ1s  s. By induction, then s rϕis  s.
These versions of monotonicity are quite strong. They already suffice to restore
the normal Tarskian properties (e.g., contraction, commutativity, etc.). But rather
than verify these properties by hand, one can establish them all at once with the
following result:
Proposition 1.4.13 (Collapsing to Static Entailment). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a
dynamic language.
(a) L is kinematically monotonic iff static entailment implies kinematic en-
tailment, i.e., for all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn , ψ1, . . . , ψm P L:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ( ψ1, . . . , ψm ñ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |ñ ψ1, . . . , ψm .
(b) L is dynamically monotonic iff static entailment implies dynamic entail-
ment, i.e., for all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn , ψ1, . . . , ψm P L:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ( ψ1, . . . , ψm ñ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |⇛ ψ1, . . . , ψm .
Proof:
(a) The right-to-left direction is immediate given that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ( ϕi . For
the left-to-right direction, let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ( ψ1, . . . , ψm and suppose that
s P C is such that s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s. By kinematic monotonicity, s rϕis 
s for 1 ď i ď n. So by static entailment, s rψ js  s for 1 ď j ď m.
But then by repeated application, it follows that s rψ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rψms  s. So
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |ñ ψ1, . . . , ψm .
(b) Again, the right-to-left direction is immediate. For the left-to-right di-
rection, let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ( ψ1, . . . , ψm and let s P C. By dynamic mono-
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tonicity, we know that s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns , ϕi where 1 ď i ď n. Hence,
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns , ψ j where 1 ď j ď m. But then by repeated functional
application, we obtain s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns rψ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rψms  s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns. So
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |⇛ ψ1, . . . , ψm . ∎
Very roughly, Proposition 1.4.13 states that the difference between kinematic/dy-
namic entailment and static entailment is that static entailment is reflexively mono-
tonic while the former notions of entailment are not.
It turns out the kinematic monotonicity is equivalent to another important prop-
erty, viz., what Rothschild and Yalcin [2015, p. 13] call “antisymmetry”:
Definition 1.4.14 (Antisymmetry). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a dynamic language.
We say L is antisymmetric if for all s , s1 P C and all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn , ψ1, . . . , ψm P
L, if s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s1 and s1 rψ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rψms  s, then s  s1.
Proposition 1.4.15 (Antisymmetry is Kinematic Monotonicity). A dynamic lan-
guage is antisymmetric iff it is kinematically monotonic.
Proof:
(ð) Suppose s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s1 and s1 rψ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rψms  s. Then we have:
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns rψ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rψms  s .
Hence, s rϕis  s for 1 ď i ď n (and also s rψ js  s for 1 ď j ď m). So by
repeated functional application, s1  s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s.
(ñ) Suppose s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s. Let s0  s and let si`1  si rϕis. Suppose
for induction that s  si . Then s rϕis  si`1 and si`1 rϕi`1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s.
Hence, s  si`1. Since s  s0 by definition, we have s  si where 1 ď i ď
n. So s rϕis  si rϕis  si`1  s. ∎
Rothschild and Yalcin [2015] show that a conversational system is isomorphic to a
“weakly static” system just in case it is antisymmetric. Putting these together, we
now have further characterizations of the notion of weakly static system in terms
of the collapse of static and kinematic entailment.
This exactly characterizes when the less static notions of entailment collapse to
static entailment. But what about kinematic and dynamic entailment? When do
they collapse? The answer can be given with the following definition:
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Definition 1.4.16 (Strong Idempotence). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy. We say L is strongly
idempotent if for all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn P L, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |⇛ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn—that is, for
all s P C:
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns .
We say L is (simply) idempotent if for all ϕ P L, ϕ |⇛ ϕ—that is, for all s P C:
s rϕs rϕs  s rϕs .
Proposition 1.4.17 (Collapsing to Kinematic Entailment). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be
a dynamic language. Then L is strongly idempotent iff kinematic entailment
implies dynamic entailment, i.e., for all ϕ1, . . . , ϕn , ψ1, . . . , ψm P L:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |ñ ψ1, . . . , ψm ñ ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |⇛ ψ1, . . . , ψm .
Proof: The right-to-left direction is immediate from Fact 1.4.6. For the con-
verse, suppose ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |ñ ψ1, . . . , ψm . Let s P C and let t B s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns.
By strong idempotence, t rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns  t. Hence, t rψ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rψms  t, which
means:
s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns rψ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rψms  s rϕ1s ¨ ¨ ¨ rϕns .
Thus, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |⇛ ψ1, . . . , ψm . ∎
Another important property of dynamic languages is commutativity of context shift:
Definition 1.4.18 (Commutativity). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a dynamic language.
We say L is commutative if for all ϕ, ψ P L and for all s P C:
s rϕs rψs  s rψs rϕs .
Fact 1.4.19 (Commutativity of Premises). Let L  xL ,C, r¨sy be a commutative
language. Then the order of premises in dynamic entailment does not matter,
i.e., for any ϕ1, . . . , ϕn , ψ1, . . . , ψm P L and any permutations π : n Ñ n and
σ : m Ñ m:
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn |⇛ ψ1, . . . , ψm ô ϕπ(1) , . . . , ϕπ(n) |⇛ ψσ(1) , . . . , ψσ(m) .
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By themselves, commutativity and idempotence seem to place relatively weak
constraints on a dynamic language. For instance, a commutative language need not
be idempotent (see Example 1.4.7 for an example). Nor must a commutative lan-
guage be kinematically monotonic (see Example 1.4.8 for an example). Likewise,
idempotent languages need not be commutative or kinematically monotonic. Com-
mutativity simply says that the order of premises does not matter for dynamic en-
tailment, and idempotence simply says that dynamic entailment is reflexive. Nev-
ertheless, these two properties taken together place a relatively strong constraint on
a dynamic language:
Fact 1.4.20 (Commutativity and Idempotence). If L is commutative and idempo-
tent, then it is dynamically monotonic.
Thus, commutative and idempotent languages collapse the distinctions between
the different notions of entailment for dynamic languages. What is more, the com-
bination of commutativity and idempotence is of philosophical significance, as it
is exactly what characterizes isomorphism to what Rothschild and Yalcin [2015, p.
10] call “strongly static” conversational systems.
Thus, it is worth inquiring into what exactly these combination of properties say
about a dynamic language’s entailment relation. As noted above, commutative and
idempotent languages are dynamically monotonic. Moreover, dynamically mono-
tonic languages are strongly idempotent by Propositions 1.4.9, 1.4.13 and 1.4.17.
However, dynamic monotonicity does not imply commutativity, as a simple exam-
ple illustrates:
Example 1.4.21 (Non-Commutative Dynamically Non-Monotonic Language). Let
L  tϕ, ψu, let C  ℘ (tw , vu) ´ tHu, and define r¨s as follows:
• tw , vu rϕs  twu, tw , vu rψs  tvu




ϕ, ψ ϕ, ψ
Observe that tw , vu rϕs rψs  twu while tw , vu rψs rϕs  tvu. So L is not com-
mutative. But static entailment does imply dynamic entailment. No formula
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(or sequence of formulas) is statically valid or dynamically valid. And ϕ and
ψ are both statically and dynamically equivalent to one another.
There is, however, a necessary and sufficient condition for r¨s to be commutative
and idempotent in terms of collapse of entailments plus one further constraint.
Definition 1.4.22 (Dynamic Replacement). Let L be a dynamic language. We
say L obeys dynamic replacement if for all ρ, σ P Lăω:
ρ ⇚||⇛ σ ñ rρs  rσs .
Dynamic replacement means that any two sequences of formulas that accept one
another will generate the same update. Example 1.4.21 is an example of a language
where dynamic replacement fails. Another example where dynamic replacement
fails comes from update semantics.
Example 1.4.23 (Simple Language with ‘Must’). Let L  xtp ,◻pu , ℘ (tw , vu) , r¨sy,
where:
• tw , vu rps  twu rps  twu, tvu rps  H rps  H









Here, p ⇚||⇛ ◻p, but rps , r◻ps.
Lemma 1.4.24 (Commutativity Implies Dynamic Replacement). If L is a commu-
tative dynamic language, then L obeys dynamic replacement.
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Proof: Suppose ρ ⇚||⇛ σ. Thus, for all s P C, we have:
s rρs  s rρs rσs
 s rσs rρs
 s rσs .
The second step follows by repeated applications of commutativity. ∎
Example 1.4.25 (Dynamic Replacement Does Not Imply Commutativity). Let B 
xtL, Ru , 2ăω , r¨sy, where for all s P 2ăω:
s rLs  s " x0y
s rRs  s " x1y .
In other words, the states in B are nodes in an infinite binary tree, and L says
“go left” and R says “go right”.
Vacuously, B satisfies dynamic replacement. First, notice that for no nonempty
ρ, σ P tL, Ruăω is ρ ⇚||⇛ σ, since nonempty sequences necessarily shift to
states further up the tree. Moreover, ρ ⇚||⇛ x y only if ρ  x y. So dynamic
replacement holds in B. But r¨s is not commutative: rL, Rs , rR, Ls.
While idempotence is not equivalent to dynamic monotonicity, and while com-
mutativity is not equivalent to dynamic replacement, the conjunction of the former
is equivalent to the conjunction of the latter.
Proposition 1.4.26 (Characterizing Commutativity and Idempotence). A dynamic
language is commutative and idempotent iff it is dynamically monotonic and
obeys dynamic replacement.
Proof: The left-to-right direction has already been shown. For the right-to-
left direction, we just need to show that our dynamic language L is commuta-
tive, since idempotence is guaranteed by dynamic monotonicity and Propo-
sition 1.4.13. First, observe that for any s P C and any ϕ, ψ P L:
s rϕs rψs rψs rϕs  s rϕs rψs rϕs
 s rϕs rψs .
Both steps follow from dynamic monotonicity. Likewise, s rψs rϕs rϕs rψs 
s rψs rϕs. Hence, ϕ, ψ ⇚||⇛ ψ, ϕ. By dynamic replacement, it follows that
rϕs rψs  rψs rϕs. ∎
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Thus, we have another characterization of “strongly static” conversational systems:
a strongly static conversational system is one where the dynamic entailment rela-
tion is dynamically monotonic and obeys dynamic replacement.
§ 1.5 Appendix
We now provide the proof that unambiguous signatures are well-founded. First,
the following properties of Sub are easy to verify.
Fact 1.5.1 (Properties of Subformulas). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be a signature.
(a) Sub(ϕ)  tϕu Y PSub(ϕ).
(b) ϕ P PSub(ψ) iff Sub(ϕ) Ď PSub(ψ).
(c) ϕ P Sub(ψ) iff Sub(ϕ) Ď Sub(ψ).
(d) If ϕ P Sub(ψ) and ψ P Sub(θ), then ϕ P Sub(θ).
(e) ϕ P PSub(ψ) and ψ P PSub(θ), then ϕ P PSub(θ).
This next fact follows from the definition of a Σ-constituent (Definition 1.3.6):
Fact 1.5.2 (Unambiguous Atomics Have No Proper Subformulas). LetΣ  xAt, Opy
be unambiguous, and let ϕ P At or ϕ △0. Then PSub(ϕ)  H.
Corollary 1.5.3 (Nothing is a Proper Subformula of Itself). Suppose Σ  xAt, Opy
is unambiguous. Then ϕ < PSub(ϕ) for all ϕ P LΣ.
Proof: Let L1 B LΣ ´ tψ |ψ P PSub(ψ) u. We will show that L1  LΣ by
showing it contains At and is closed under Op. We proceed by induction.
The base case is covered by Fact 1.5.2. Suppose now that ϕ  △(ρ) P LΣ
where △ P Opγ and for each β ă γ, ρ(β) P L1. Suppose for reductio that
ϕ < L1. That means that ϕ P PSub(ϕ). So there must be some θ0, . . . , θn
such that ϕ  θ0  θn and for each i ă n, θi is a Σ-constituent of θi`1.
Since θn  ϕ, and since θn´1 must be a Σ-constituent of θn , it follows that
for some β ă γ, θn´1  ρ(β). But then ρ(β), ϕ  θ0, θ1, . . . , θn´1  ρ(β) is
a chain of Σ-constituents. So ρ(β) P PSub(ρ(β)), contrary to the assumption
that ρ(β) P L1, ☇. Thus, ϕ △(ρ) P L1. Therefore, L1  L. ∎
This feature of unambiguous signatures crucially assumes that the syntax of a
signature is the smallest class containing the atomic formulas that is closed under
the operators. We could revise Definition 1.3.2 so that Σ-syntaxes need not be the
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smallest class as long as it is closed under the Σ-operators. In that case, we could
have unambiguous languages containing formulas that were proper subformulas
of themselves. But we do not study such languages here.
Lemma 1.5.4 (Uniqueness of Subformulas). Let Σ  xAt, Opy be unambiguous.
Then for all ϕ, ψ P LΣ, if Sub(ϕ)  Sub(ψ), then ϕ  ψ.
Proof: By induction on ϕ. The base case is immediate by Fact 1.5.2. Now,
let ϕ  △(ρ) where △ P Opγ and ρ P LγΣ. Suppose that Sub(ϕ)  Sub(ψ)
and (for our inductive hypothesis) that for each β ă γ, Sub(ρ(β))  Sub(ψ)
implies ρ(β)  ψ. Observe that PSub(ϕ) 
Ť
βăγ Sub(ρ(β)). If ψ < PSub(ϕ),
then ϕ  ψ. If ψ P PSub(ϕ), then ψ P Sub(ρ(β)) for some β ă γ. Hence,
Sub(ρ(β)) Ě Sub(ψ)  Sub(ϕ) Ě Sub(ρ(β)). Thus, Sub(ρ(β))  Sub(ψ) 
Sub(ϕ). So by inductive hypothesis, ρ(β)  ψ  ϕ,a and thus ϕ  ψ. ∎
aThis actually entails a contradiction, since ψ P PSub(ϕ) but ϕ < PSub(ϕ). Hence, we
cannot have ψ P PSub(ϕ), which suffices to reach our conclusion anyway.
Corollary 1.5.5 (Unambiguity Implies Well-Foundedness). Every unambiguous
signature is well-founded.




One of the key methods for making precise the claim that one language is as expres-
sive as another is to provide a translation between them. Informally, a translation
maps sentences of one language to “equivalent” sentences—sentences with “the
same meaning”—in another language. If everything that can be said by one lan-
guage can be said by another, one should in principle be able to specify a translation
from the former to the latter that preserves meaning.
Spelling out what “equivalent” means in this context is not entirely straightfor-
ward. If two languages share the same conception of logical space, then we can
spell out the notion in terms of semantic value: each sentence of the weaker lan-
guage must be mapped to a sentence of the stronger language that has the same
semantic value. But when languages fail to share a common conception of logical
space, they will generally assign different types of semantic values to their sen-
tences. Thus, this simple characterization of equivalence will make it impossible
for there ever to be translations between such languages.
To illustrate, suppose we take two versions of the language of classical proposi-
tional logic. In the first, our points of evaluation are valuation functions, i.e., func-
tions from atomic formulas to t0, 1u. In the second, our points of evaluation are
just sets of atomic formulas. Intuitively, these two languages are just notational
variants. But for no sentence in one language is there a sentence of the other lan-
guage with the same semantic value because semantic values in the two languages
are different types of objects.
In such cases, we need an alternative characterization of what “equivalence”
means. There are several ways one could go at this point. But it is usually agreed
that if a translation preserves the meaning of a sentence, it ought to preserve its
inferential role. If the translation of a valid argument in the source language is
not a valid argument in the target language, then this is a sign that something has
gone wrong with the translation. Thus, one necessary condition on a translation is
that it faithfully embeds the logic of the source language in the logic of the target
language.
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Of course, unless the meaning of a sentence is identified by its inferential role, as
in inferentialism, preservation of valid inference patterns is not in general sufficient
for a mapping to count as an adequate translation between languages. It is easy
to preserve the valid inference patterns in a translation without preserving mean-
ing. Still, since preservation of inference patterns seems to be at least a necessary
condition for a translation to be adequate, it is worth investigating when inference-
preserving translations from one language to another exist and what we can infer
about the expressive power of a language from the existence of such translations.
In this chapter, we focus on translations that preserve exactly the valid infer-
ence patterns of a language. We begin in § 2.1 by providing a minimal definition of
a such a translation and some examples illustrating the concept. Alternative formu-
lations of translatability are also explored. Then in § 2.2–2.4, we explain the differ-
ent notions of equivalence from the perspective of translatability, remarking on the
philosophical difference between expressive equivalence and notational variance
in § 2.5. However, it turns out that mere preservation of valid inference patterns is
a relatively weak constraint. We show in § 2.6 that a great number of languages are
translatable into classical propositional logic, including classical first-order logic. To
avoid such consequences, we will move to a compositional setting and explore the
varieties of translations in that framework in Chapter 3.
§ 2.1 Definition
To begin, we start with the definition of a translation between logics as well as some
simple examples illustrating the concept. We will then examine alternative equiv-
alent definitions of the concept.
Definition 2.1.1 (Translation). Let L1 and L2 be some logics and let Λ Ď L2.
We say that a function t : L1 Ñ L2 is a quasitranslation from L1 into L2 if for
all Γ Ď L1 and all ϕ P L1:
Γ $1 ϕ ñ trΓs $2 t(ϕ).
We say that t is a translation (written “t : L1⇝L2”) if the converse is also the
case, i.e., for all Γ Ď L1 and all ϕ P L1:
Γ $1 ϕ ô trΓs $2 t(ϕ).
We call a pair of translations t : L1⇝L2 and s : L2⇝L1 is a translation scheme
(written “t, s : L1 ⇝⇝ L2”). We say L1 is translatable into L2 (written “L1⇝L2”)
if t : L1⇝L2 for some t. We say L1 and L2 are intertranslatable (written
“L1 ⇝⇝ L2”) if t, s : L1 ⇝⇝ L2 for some t and s. These notions are lifted from
logics to languages in the obvious way.
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Translations have been studied in a variety of places.1 Essentially, a quasitranslation
is a logic-homomorphism and a translation is a logic-embedding.
Right away, it is worth observing the following obvious facts about translations
(which we often invoke without mention):
Fact 2.1.2 (Simple Observations about Interpretations and Translations).
(a) If t : L1⇝L2 and s : L2⇝L3, then s ˝ t : L1⇝L3.
(b) If L1 Ď L2, then id1 : L1⇝L2, where id1 is the identity map on L1.
(c) ⇝ is a preorder, i.e., it is reflexive and transitive (by (a) and (b)).
(d) ⇝⇝ is a congruence relation for⇝, i.e., it is an equivalence relation (re-
flexive, symmetric, transitive) and if L1 ⇝⇝ L11 and L2




(e) Translations faithfully preserve equivalence, i.e., if t : L1⇝L2, then for
all ϕ, ψ P L1, ϕ %$1 ψ iff t(ϕ) %$2 t(ψ).
(f) Translations faithfully preserve validities, i.e., if t : L1⇝L2, then for all
ϕ P L1, $1 ϕ iff $2 t(ϕ).
(g) If L1⇝L2, then L2 is compact only if L1 is compact.
The existence of quasitranslations is generally not very informative. Almost any
logic can be quasitranslated into almost any other logic.
Proposition 2.1.3 (Quasitranslatability is Trivial). L1 is quasitranslatable into L2
iff it is not the case that L1 has validities while L2 does not.
Proof: Suppose first that L1 has validities and L2 does not. Let ϕ P L1 be such
that $1 ϕ. Then if there were a quasitranslation t from L1 to L2, then $2 t(ϕ),
☇. So L1 is not quasitranslatable into L2.
Next, suppose it is not the case that L1 has validities while L2 does not.
1See, e.g., Epstein 1990; Carnielli and D’Ottaviano 1997; Feitosa and D’Ottaviano 2001; Pelletier
and Urquhart 2003; Humberstone 2005; Caleiro and Gonçalves 2007; Straßburger 2007; Carnielli
et al. 2009; Mossakowski et al. 2009; French 2010; Turner 2011b,a; Jeřábek 2012; Barrett and Halvor-
son 2016a,b; Wigglesworth 2017; Woods 2018. Our terminology here parts ways from the standard
conventions: many authors use the term ‘translation’ for what we call quasitranslations, and use
the term ‘conservative translation’ for what we call translations. Some authors, e.g., Humberstone
[2005] and French [2010, Chp. 2] use the term “faithful” instead. Pelletier and Urquhart [2003, p.
266] use “exact” for “conservative”, referring to all translations (conservative or not) as “sound”
translation schemes.
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That is, either there is no ϕ P L1 such that $1 ϕ or there is a ψ P L2 such that
$2 ψ. There are two cases to consider:
(i) L2 has some validities. Let ψ P L2 be such that $2 ψ. Define t : L1 Ñ
L2 such that t(ϕ)  ψ for any ϕ P L1. Then since $2 t(ϕ) for any ϕ P
L1, trΓs $2 t(ϕ) for any Γ Ď L1. So t is a quasi-translation vacuously.
(ii) L1 and L2 have no validities. Pick an arbitrary ψ P L2 and set t(ϕ)  ψ
for all ϕ P L1. Then if Γ $1 ϕ, then Γ , H, so trΓs  tψu. So trivially,
trΓs $2 t(ϕ)  ψ. Hence, t is a quasitranslation. ∎
Hence, quasitranslatability is an uninformative notion. As a result, only very occa-
sionally will we discuss quasitranslations.
Sometimes, logicians focus on validity-preserving maps, rather than full trans-
lations.
Definition 2.1.4 (Validity-Preserving Map). Let L1 and L2 be some logics and
let t : L1 Ñ L2. We say t is a validity-preserving map if for all ϕ P L1:
$1 ϕ ô $2 t(ϕ).
The existence of validity-preserving maps, however, is also uninformative. Gener-
ally, one can get a validity-preserving map just by mapping all validities to a single
validity and all non-validities to a single non-validity.
Fact 2.1.5 (Triviality of Validity-Preservation). Let L1 and L2 be logics.
(a) If there are ψ1, ψ2 P L2 such that $2 ψ1 but &2 ψ2, then there is a
validity-preserving map from L1 to L2.
(b) If $2 ψ for all ψ P L2, then there is a validity-preserving map from L1
to L2 iff $1 ϕ for all ϕ P L1.
(c) If &2 ψ for all ψ P L2, then there is a validity-preserving map from L1
to L2 iff &2 ϕ for all ϕ P L1.
Of course, validity-preservation becomes more interesting when we place syntactic
constraints on the map in question. For instance, it is non-trivial to show that there
exists a validity-preserving map from, say, ZFC into ZF that commutes with the
booleans and maps quantifiers to bounded quantifiers. But since our focus at the
moment is on languages without a specified syntactic structure, we set aside mere
validity-preservation for now.
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§ 2.1.1 Examples
We now examine some classic examples of translations to illustrate its ubiquity.
These examples should be quite familiar, but we lay them out in full in order to
introduce notation we use throughout.
Example 2.1.6 (Sheffer Stroke). Let Prop  tp1, p2, p3, . . .u be a set of atom-
ics. We define CPL, i.e., the language of classical propositional logic, thereby
defining its corresponding logic CPL. First, let LProp be the set of formulas
defined recursively as follows (where p P Prop):
ϕ F p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ).
Next, let V B CCPL be the set of valuation functions v : Prop Ñ t0, 1u. Last,
define , recursively as follows:
v , p ô v(p)  1
v , ¬ϕ ô v . ϕ
v , ϕ ^ ψ ô v , ϕ and v , ψ.
Then CPL B xLProp,V,,y.
Now define CPLÒ, i.e., (the language of) classical propositional logic with
the Sheffer stroke analogously. That is,LÒProp is recursively defined as follows:
ϕ F p | (ϕ Ò ϕ).
The evaluation space is still V. The satisfaction relation ,Ò is defined so that:
v ,Ò p ô v(p)  1





. It is easy to show CPL and CPLÒ are inter-
translatable. First, define t : LÒProp Ñ LProp so that t(p)  p and t(ϕ Ò
ψ)  ¬(t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)). Second, define s : LProp Ñ LÒProp so that s(p)  p,
s(¬ϕ)  (s(ϕ) Ò s(ϕ)), and s(ϕ ^ ψ)  ((s(ϕ) Ò s(ψ)) Ò (s(ϕ) Ò s(ψ))).
Then t, s : CPLÒ ⇝⇝ CPL (in fact, t, s : CPLÒ↭CPL; see Definition 2.2.1).
Example 2.1.7 (The Standard Translation for Modal Logic). We define K, i.e., (the
language of) minimal normal modal logic, as follows. The syntax LProp(◻)
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is defined recursively as follows (where again p P Prop):
ϕ F p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | ◻ϕ.
A modal model is a triple M  xW,_,Vy such that W is a nonempty set,_ Ď W ˆ W , and V : Prop Ñ ℘ (W ). The evaluation space CK will be the
class of pairs xM , wy such thatM  xW,_,Vy is a modal model and w P W .
We define ,K as follows:
M , w ,K p ô w P V (p)
M , w ,K ¬ϕ ô M , w .K ϕ
M , w ,K ϕ ^ ψ ô M , w , ϕ andM , w , ψ
M , w ,K ◻ϕ ô for all v P W such that w _ v:M , v , ϕ.
Next, we define FOL, i.e., the language of classical first-order logic (FOL).








n . (We single out _ P Pred2 as a special binary predicate.)
The syntax LPred is defined recursively as follows (where Pni P Predn and
x , y , y1, . . . , yn P Var):
ϕ F Pni (y1, . . . , yn) | (x _ y) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | @x ϕ.
A (first-order) model is a pair M  xD , Iy where D is a nonempty set and
I : Predn Ñ ℘ (Dn) for each n P N. A variable assignment onM is a map
g : VarÑ D. The evaluation space CFOL will be the class of pairs of the form
xM , gy whereM is a model and g is a variable assignment onM. We define
,FOL as follows:
M , g ,FOL Pn (y1, . . . , yn) ô xg(y1), . . . , g(yn)y P I(Pn)
M , g ,FOL ¬ϕ ô M , g .FOL ϕ
M , g ,FOL ϕ ^ ψ ô M , g ,FOL ϕ andM , g ,FOL ψ
M , g ,FOL @x ϕ ô for all a P D:M , gxa ,FOL ϕ,
where gxa (x)  a and gxa (y)  g(y) for y , x. We can define a series of
translations STx from K to FOL for each x P Var as follows:
STx (pi)  P
1
i (x)
STx (¬ϕ)  ¬ STx (ϕ)
STx (ϕ ^ ψ)  (STx (ϕ) ^ STx (ψ))
STx (◻ϕ)  @y ((x _ y) Ñ STy (ϕ))
where y , x. Such a translation is often called the standard translation (see,
e.g., Blackburn et al. 2001, p. 84).
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Example 2.1.8 (Intuitionistic Logic). Let IPL be (the language of) intuitionistic
propositional logic (IPL) whose syntax is LProp(_,Ñ), defined as follows:
ϕ F p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | (ϕ _ ψ) | (ϕ Ñ ϕ).
The famous double-negation translation N from CPL(_,Ñ) (i.e., CPL ex-
panded with syntax LProp(_,Ñ) in the obvious way) into IPL (also known
as the Gödel-Gentzen translation) is defined as follows:
N(p)  ¬¬ p
N(¬ϕ)  ¬ N(ϕ)
N(ϕ ^ ψ)  (N(ϕ) ^ N(ψ))
N(ϕ _ ψ)  ¬(¬ N(ϕ) ^ ¬ N(ψ))
N(ϕ Ñ ψ)  (N(ϕ) Ñ N(ψ)).
Let S4 be the restriction of K to the class of pointed models xM , wy where_ is reflexive and transitive. The Gödel translation G from IPL into S4 (also
known as the Gödel-McKinsey-Tarski translation) is defined as follows:
G(p)  ◻p
G(¬ϕ)  ◻¬ G(ϕ)
G(ϕ ^ ψ)  (G(ϕ) ^ G(ψ))
G(ϕ _ ψ)  (G(ϕ) _ G(ψ))
G(ϕ Ñ ψ)  ◻(G(ϕ) Ñ G(ψ)).
This is sometimes presented just as a validity-preserving map; but by the T-
axiom and necessitation, it is also a translation in the sense of Definition 2.1.1.
The notion of a translation is fairly minimal. One might worry that without
imposing any extra constraints, any logic can be translated into any other logic.
As we will see, this worry is completely legitimate (Theorem 2.6.8). However, not
everything goes: as these next examples show, there are non-trivial cases of failure
of translatability.
Example 2.1.9 (Propositional Logic with Finitely Many Atomics). Where A Ď
At, let CPLA be the fragment of CPL obtained by restricting to the LProp-
formulas whose atomics are all among A. There is no translation from CPL
into CPLtp1 ,...,pnu. It is well-known that CPL is locally finite, meaning there
are only finitely many (22n ) Ltp1 ,...,pnuProp -formulas up to equivalence. But there
are infinitely many LProp-formulas up to equivalence. So any mapping from
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LProp into Ltp1 ,...,pnuProp must eventually map some non-equivalent formulas in
LProp to equivalent formulas in Ltp1 ,...,pnuProp . Hence, CPL |⇝CPLtp1 ,...,pnu.
Example 2.1.10 (Infinitary Propositional Logic). Let CPL(
Ź
) be the extension
of CPL containing countably infinite conjunctions, so that for any v P V and





Φ ô for all ϕ P Φ: v , ϕ.





) has 22ℵ0 -many formulas up to equivalence, whereas CPL only
has ℵ0-many-formulas in total.
Example 2.1.11 (S5). Let S5 be the restriction of K to modal modelsM where_ is an equivalence relation. Where A Ď At, define S5A analogously to how
CPLA was defined.





k )  222
n`n´1
Ltp1 ,...,pnuProp (◻)-formulas up to equivalence in S5tp1 ,...,pnu. This is much larger
than the number of formulas up to equivalence in CPLtp1 ,...,pnu (viz., 22n ).
Hence, S5tp1 ,...,pnu |⇝CPLtp1 ,...,pnu.
Similarly, let S5(
Ź





), since there are 222
ℵ0
-many formulas up to equiva-
lence in S5(
Ź




However, it is possible to strike a balance. Given that m ě 2n ` n ´1, there
will be a translation of S5tp1 ,...,pnu into CPLtp1 ,...,pmu, and in the case where
m  2n ` n ´ 1, the translation will go in the other direction too. Moreover,
as we explain below in Theorems 2.6.5 and 2.6.8, there is also a translation
from S5 into CPL.
Examples 2.1.9–2.1.11 result from a more general counting observation about
translations, viz., the translation of a logic must always contain at least as many
formulas up to equivalence as the logic itself (see Corollary 2.6.2). The next exam-
ples illustrate alternative ways of proving the non-existence of translations.
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Example 2.1.12 (Logic of Paradox). We define LP, i.e., the logic of paradox, as
follows. The syntax is just LProp. The evaluation space is the set GV (“glutty”
evaluations) of all functions v : Prop Ñ t0, 12 , 1u. We define the relations ,
and - as follows:
v , p ô v(p) ě
1
2 v - p ô v(p) ď
1
2
v , ¬ϕ ô v - ϕ v - ¬ϕ ô v , ϕ
v , ϕ ^ ψ ô v , ϕ and v , ψ v - ϕ ^ ψ ô v - ϕ or v - ψ.
Then LP B xLProp,GV,,y.
Jeřábek [2012, p. 672] showed that there is no translation from CPL to LP.
The proof is as follows. Suppose for reductio that t : CPL⇝LP. Let v1, . . . , vn
be all the glutty evaluations such that v(t(K))  0 and v(p)  12 for any atomic
p not in t(K). Let ϕi  pi for 1 ď i ď n, and let ϕ0  ¬
Źn
i1 pi . Clearly,
ϕ0, . . . , ϕn (CPL K. So t(ϕ0), . . . , t(ϕn) (LP t(K). Thus, for each vi , there
must be a 0 ď ji ď n such that vi (ϕ ji )  0. But then tt(ϕ ji ) | 1 ď i ď n u (CPL
t(K), since v1, . . . , vn are all the potential counterexamples (up to equiva-
lence on the atomics in t(K)) to this inference and each assigns 0 one of the
premises. Hence, tϕ ji | 1 ď i ď n u (CPL K already; but this cannot be since
there must be at least one ϕk missing from tϕ ji | 1 ď i ď n u, and we need all
ϕ0, . . . , ϕn to derive a contradiction, ☇. So CPL |⇝ LP. We do, however, have
LP⇝CPL (Theorem 2.6.8).
Example 2.1.13 (Second-Order Logic). We define SOL, i.e., classical second-
order logic, over the set of formulas generated recursively as follows:
ϕ F Pni (y1, . . . , yn) | X
n (y1, . . . , yn) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | @x ϕ | @Xn ϕ.
The standard semantics for SOL can be defined over first-order models but
variable assignments onM  xD , Iy now also map g(Xn) Ď Dn . We now just
add the following semantic clauses:
M , g ,SOL Xn (y1, . . . , yn) ô xg(y1), . . . , g(yn)y P g(Xn)
M , g ,SOL @Xn ϕ ô for all An Ď Dn :M , gX
n
An ,SOL ϕ.
Since SOL is not compact while FOL is compact, SOL |⇝ FOL (Fact 2.1.2).
Epstein [1990, p. 388] asked whether there was an example of two logics such
that neither is translatable into the other. The answer is affirmative. We can generate
a whole host of counterexamples instantly using the following method. Let xP1,ď1y
and xP2,ď2y be any partial orders such that neither is order-embeddable into the
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other. Then we can define a logic whose formulas are members of Pi and where
Γ (i ϕ just in case there is a ψ P Γ such that ψ ďi ϕ (recall that this is the strategy
used to prove Proposition 1.1.40). Call the resulting logics L1 and L2. It is easy to
check that L1 |⇝ L2 and L2 |⇝ L1. There are, however, more natural examples, if we
charitably interpret Epstein as seeking a natural pair of logics.
Example 2.1.14 (Kleene Logic). We define K3, i.e., the language of (strong)
Kleene 3-valued logic, as follows. The syntax is just LProp. The evaluation
space is the set PV of partial functions v : Prop Ñ t0, 1u. We define the rela-
tions , and - as follows:
v , p ô v(p)  1 v - p ô v(p)  0
v , ¬ϕ ô v - ϕ v - ¬ϕ ô v , ϕ
v , ϕ ^ ψ ô v , ϕ and v , ψ v - ϕ ^ ψ ô v - ϕ or v - ψ.
Then K3 B xLProp,PV,,y.
Observe first that there is no ϕ such that (K3 ϕ, since if v  H, then
v . ϕ. So CPL |⇝K3 and CPLtp1 ,...,pnu |⇝K3tp1 ,...,pnu. Conversely, observe
that if ϕ ”K3 ψ, then ϕ ”CPL ψ. Hence, there are at least as many for-
mulas up to equivalence in K3tp1 ,...,pnu as there are in CPLtp1 ,...,pnu. In fact,
there are strictly more. Consider p ^ ¬(q ^ ¬ q) where p , q. Since p ”CPL
p ^ ¬(q ^ ¬ q), rpsCPL  rp ^ ¬(q ^ ¬ q)sCPL. But p ıK3 p ^ ¬(q ^ ¬ q), so
rpsK3 , rp ^ ¬(q ^ ¬ q)sK3. So there are more formulas up to equivalence in
K3tp1 ,...,pnu than CPLtp1 ,...,pnu. Hence, K3tp1 ,...,pnu |⇝CPLtp1 ,...,pnu. However,
we do have K3⇝CPL (see Theorems 2.6.5 and 2.6.8). What is more, Jeřábek
[2012, Example 3.3] showed that if we add a verum operator J such that v , J
and v / J for all v P PV, then CPL⇝K3; likewise, we can show in that case
that CPLn⇝K3n for all n.
Similar results show that neither LP nor K3 are translatable into one an-
other. Since LP has validities, LP |⇝K3. Moreover, the argument in Exam-
ple 2.1.12 showing CPL |⇝ LP straightforwardly generalizes to a proof that
K3 |⇝ LP. However, there is a sense in which K3 and LP are “duals” of one
another. More precisely, one can show that ϕ (K3 ψ iff ¬ψ (LP ¬ϕ.
§ 2.1.2 Theoretic Formulation
We can define translatability in terms of theory spaces (recall the definition of a
theory space, Definition 1.1.33).
Notation: Where t : L1 Ñ L2, we define the map tTh : ℘ (L1) Ñ ℘ (L2) so
that tTh(Γ)  Cn2(trΓs).
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Note that this notation is consistent with the special case where Σ Ď Th(L).
Lemma 2.1.15 (Theory Maps Lifted from Translations Preserve Meets). Let L1 and
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Proposition 2.1.16 (Theoretic Formulation of Translation). Let L1 and L2 be logics
and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1⇝L2 iff tTh is an order-embedding from 1 to




tThrΣs for all Σ Ď ℘ (L1).
Proof: The left-to-right direction follows from Lemma 2.1.15 (verifying that
tTh is an order-embedding on theory spaces is straightforward). For the right-





tThrΣs for all Σ Ď ℘ (L1). So:
Cn2(trΓs)  tTh(Γ)
 tTh(Γ^ Cn1(Γ))
 tTh(Γ) ^ tTh(Cn1(Γ))
 Cn2(Cn2(trΓs) Y Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s))
 Cn2(trΓs Y trCn1(Γ)s)
 Cn2(trCn1(Γ)).
Thus, trΓs %$2 trCn1(Γ)s. Likewise, t(ϕ) %$2 trCn1(ϕ)s. Hence:
Γ $1 ϕ ô Cn1(ϕ) Ď Cn1(Γ)
ô tTh(Cn1(ϕ)) Ď tTh(Cn1(Γ))
ô Cn2(trCn1(ϕ)s) Ď Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s)
ô trCn1(Γ)s $2 trCn1(ϕ)s
ô trΓs $2 t(ϕ).
∎
Cn2(trΓs)  Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s) is equivalent to the condition that t is a quasitransla-
tion. If this holds, and if Γ $1 ϕ, then ϕ P Cn1(Γ), and so t(ϕ) P trCn1(Γ)s. But then
t(ϕ) P Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s)  Cn2(trΓs), i.e., trΓs $2 t(ϕ). Conversely, if t is a quasitrans-
lation, then since Γ $1 Cn1(Γ), trΓs $1 trCn1(Γ)s, so Cn2(trΓs)  Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s). A
brief examination of Lemma 2.1.15 reveals that this condition is equivalent to tTh
preserving meets.2 However, this property alone does not guarantee that t is a
full translation; to carry out the above reasoning backwards, we would need to
infer from the fact that t(ϕ) P Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s) to the claim that t(ϕ) P trCn1(Γ)s,
which is not valid if t is a merely quasitranslation. So the fact that tTh preserves
meets is what guarantees that t is a quasitranslation and the fact that it is an order-
embedding on theory spaces is what guarantees that it is a full translation.
2Note that by “preserving meets”, we do not mean just preserving meets over the theory space.
Rather, we mean the more general property of preserving meets over sets of formulas generally.
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§ 2.2 Translational Equivalence
Intertranslatable languages are only equivalent in a fairly weak sense. Imagine two
speakers a1 and a2 of some intertranslatable languages L1 and L2 respectively. Let
t1 be a translation from L1 to L2 and let t2 be a translation from L2 to L1. Suppose a1
asserts ϕ and a2 uses the translation t1 to infer that whatever a1 asserted is equiva-
lent to t1(ϕ). If a2 then wants to assert what a1 said in his own language, it seems
natural for him to assert t1(ϕ). If a1 hears a2 assert t1(ϕ), then using t2, she will
infer that what a2 said is equivalent to t2(t1(ϕ)).
But the mere fact that t1 and t2 are translations between L1 and L2 is not enough
to guarantee that a1 and a2 can successfully understand each other since t2(t1(ϕ))
might not be equivalent to what a1 asserted in the first place, viz., ϕ. From a1’s
perspective, if t2(t1(ϕ)) is not equivalent to ϕ, then a1 could interpret a2 as having
misunderstood her, or possibly of having made some logical misstep. Intertrans-
latability is not, by itself, strong enough to ensure that this does not happen.
What this simple thought experiment illustrates is that the existence of transla-
tions that are individually adequate is not sufficient to call two languages or logics
“equivalent”. Rather, we also need these translations to “agree” with each other.
This motivates the following definition:3
Definition 2.2.1 (Translational Equivalence). Let L1 and L2 be logics. A transla-
tion scheme t1, t2 : L1 ⇝⇝ L2 is reversible (written “t1, t2 : L1↭ L2”) if:
(a) for all ϕ P L1: ϕ %$1 t2(t1(ϕ))
(b) for all ψ P L2: ψ %$2 t1(t2(ψ)).
We say L1 is translationally equivalent to L2 (written “L1↭ L2”) if there is a
reversible translation scheme t1, t2 : L1↭ L2. Similarly, we say L1 and L2 are
quasitranslationally equivalent if there are quasitranslations t and s from
one to the other satisfying (a) and (b) above. These notions are lifted from
logics to languages in the obvious way.
Lemma 2.2.2 (Translational Equivalence is an Equivalence Relation).↭ is reflex-
ive, symmetric, and transitive.
Proof: Reflexivity and symmetry are obvious. For transitivity, suppose that
t, s : L1↭ L2 and t1, s1 : L2↭ L3. Then t1 ˝ t, s ˝ s1 : L1↭ L3. ∎
3This notion is discussed in Pelletier and Urquhart 2003; Caleiro and Gonçalves 2007; Straßburger
2007; French 2010; Turner 2011b,a; Woods 2018. Caleiro and Gonçalves [2007] use the term “equipol-
lent” instead of “translationally equivalent”, while Turner [2011b, p. 437] uses the term “recoverable
translation” instead of “reversible translation scheme”.
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While quasitranslatability is relatively uninformative, one might wonder whether
quasitranslational equivalence is more informative. The answer is affirmative.
Proposition 2.2.3 (Quasitranslational Equivalence Implies Translational Equiva-
lence). If L1 and L2 are quasitranslationally equivalent, then L1 and L2 are
translationally equivalent.
Proof: Let t : L1 Ñ L2 be a quasitranslation from L1 to L2, and s : L2 Ñ L1 a
quasitranslation from L2 to L1 such that ϕ %$1 s(t(ϕ)) for ϕ P L1 and ψ %$2
t(s(ψ)) for ψ P L2. Suppose trΓs $2 t(ϕ). Since s is a quasitranslation,
srtrΓss $1 s(t(ϕ)). Hence, Γ $1 ϕ. Likewise, if sr∆s $1 s(ψ), then ∆ $2 ψ. ∎
Thus, to establish the translational equivalence between two logics, it suffices to
establish quasitranslational equivalence.
There is yet another apparently weaker condition that suffices to establish trans-
lational equivalence: we do not even need to require s to be a quasitranslation!
Proposition 2.2.4 (Simpler Definition of Translational Equivalence). Let L1 and
L2 be logics such that L1⇝L2. Let t : L1⇝L2 and let s : L2 Ñ L1. Suppose
ψ %$2 t(s(ψ)) for all ψ P L2. Then t, s : L1↭ L2.
Proof: First, observe that s is a translation. For let ∆ Ď L2 and ψ P L2. Then
∆ $2 ψ iff trsr∆ss $2 t(s(ψ)) iff sr∆s $1 s(ψ).
Next, observe that t(s(t(ϕ))) %$2 t(ϕ) by the given constraint. Hence,
since t is a translation, s(t(ϕ)) %$1 ϕ. ∎
Translational equivalence can also be useful as a way of measuring whether one
logic really contains another as a fragment. Intuitively, one logic is as expressively
powerful as another just in case the latter is equivalent to a fragment of the former.
The following result is a way of codifying this intuition.
Proposition 2.2.5 (Translatability is Translational Equivalence to Image). Let L1
and L2 be logics and let t : L1 Ñ L2. The following are equivalent:
(a) t : L1⇝L2.
(b) L1 ⇝⇝ trL1s.
(c) L1↭ trL1s.
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Proof: Obviously (c) implies (b), which implies (a) by Facts 1.1.24 and 2.1.2.
So it suffices to show that (a) implies (c). Now, t´1 may not be a function from
trL1s to L1, since t might not be injective. But since t´1 is total on trL1s, we
can always find a function t˚ Ď t´1 (using the axiom of choice) by selecting
a ψ P ∆ϕ  tψ1 P L1 | t(ψ1)  ϕu arbitrarily for each ϕ P trL1s and setting
t˚(ϕ)  ψ. (If t(ψ)  t(ψ1)  ϕ, then ψ %$1 ψ1.) Clearly t˚ : trL1s⇝L1.
Observe now that t˚ is a right-inverse of t, i.e., for all ϕ P trL1s, t(t˚(ϕ))  ϕ.
So clearly, for all ϕ P trL1s, ϕ %$tr1s t(t˚(ϕ)). Conversely, for all ψ P L1,
ψ %$1 t˚(t(ψ)) iff t(ψ) %$tr1s t(t˚(t(ψ)))  t(ψ), which obviously holds.
So t, t˚ : L1↭ trL1s. ∎
Corollary 2.2.6 (Translatability and Equivalence to Fragments). Let L1 and L2 be
logics. The following are equivalent:
(a) L1⇝L2.
(b) There is a L12 Ď L2 such that L1↭ L12.
Corollary 2.2.7 (Logics are Translationally Equivalent to Images Under Transla-
tion). Let L1 and L2 be logics and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1⇝L2 iff L1↭ trL1s.
Hence, if s : L2 Ñ L1 is such that t, s : L1↭ L2, then trL1s↭ srL2s.
While translational equivalence implies intertranslatability, the converse does
not hold. The following example will be discussed more in § 2.5.
Example 2.2.8 (Intertranslatability without Translational Equivalence). Recall from
Example 2.1.8 that CPL⇝IPL. We will see in Theorems 2.6.5 and 2.6.8 that
IPL⇝CPL too. Thus, CPL ⇝⇝ IPL.
Claim: CPL |↭ IPL.
Proof: Suppose for reductio that t, s : CPL↭ IPL. First, observe that:
t(K) (IPL K ô s(t(K)) (CPL s(K)
ô K (CPL s(K).
But trivially, K (CPL s(K). Thus, t(K) ”IPL K. Likewise, s(K) ”CPL K.
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Next, note that:
s(ϕ), s(¬ϕ) (CPL s(K) ”CPL K.
So s(¬ϕ) (CPL ¬ s(ϕ). Conversely, since s(ϕ),¬ s(ϕ) (CPL K:
t(s(ϕ)), t(¬ s(ϕ)) (IPL t(K) (IPL K.
And since t(s(ϕ)) ”IPL ϕ by translational equivalence, it follows that
ϕ, t(¬ s(ϕ)) (IPL K. So t(¬ s(ϕ)) (IPL ¬ϕ. Hence:
s(t(¬ s(ϕ))) ”CPL ¬ s(ϕ) (CPL s(¬ϕ).
Combining these together, we obtain that¬ s(ϕ) ”CPL s(¬ϕ). But now
we are in trouble. Since¬¬ p *IPL p, it follows that s(¬¬ p) *CPL s(p).
But as shown above, ¬¬ s(p) ”CPL s(¬¬ p), so ¬¬ s(p) *CPL s(p), ☇.
Therefore, CPL |↭ IPL. ∎
This result generalizes to intermediate logics, i.e., any logic L closed under
modus ponens and uniform substitution such that IPL Ď L Ď CPL.
Claim: Let L1 and L2 be distinct intermediate logics. Then L1 |↭ L2.
Proof: Suppose t, s : L1↭ L2. By Lemma 3.2.2 (discussed in the next
chapter), t(¬ϕ) ”2 ¬ t(ϕ) and t(ϕ ‹ ψ) ”2 t(ϕ) ‹ t(ψ), where ‹ P
t^,_,Ñu (and similarly for s). It follows that if Θ(π1, . . . , πn) is a
propositional schema, then t(Θ(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) %$2 Θ(t(ϕ1), . . . , t(ϕn))
(and similarly for s). Thus, suppose Γ $1 ϕ. Let p1, . . . , pn enumerate
all the atomics in Γ and ϕ, and let Γs and ϕs be the result of replacing
each instance of pi with s(pi). Since L1 is closed under uniform substi-
tution, Γs $1 ϕs. So trΓss $2 t(ϕs). Pushing t in, we get Γt˝s $2 ϕt˝s.
And since pi ”2 t(s(pi)), we have Γ $2 ϕ. Likewise for the converse.
Hence, Γ $1 ϕ iff Γ $2 ϕ, i.e., L1  L2. ∎
While it is natural to conjecture that two logics are notational variants just in
case they are translationally equivalent,4 we will see in § 2.6 that this proposal has
its flaws. Still, it is plausible to propose that translational equivalence be at least a
necessary condition for some logics to count as genuine notational variants.
4Indeed, Straßburger [2007, p. 139] makes this claim. Mossakowski et al. [2009, p. 7] and French
[2010, p. 134] claim translational equivalence is sufficient for notational variance.
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Just as for ordinary translations, there is a nice alternative but equivalent defi-
nition of translational equivalence in terms of theory spaces.5
Lemma 2.2.9 (Removing an Interior Consequence Operator). Let L1 and L2 be log-
ics. If t : L1⇝L2, then for all Γ Ď L1:
Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s)  Cn2(trΓs).
Proof: The Ě-case follows from (CO2) in Definition 1.1.8. For the Ď-case,
suppose ψ P Cn2(trCn1(Γ)s). Thus, trCn1(Γ)s (2 ψ. But since Γ (1 Cn1(Γ), we
have trΓs (2 trCn1(Γ)s. Hence, trΓs (2 ψ, and so ψ P Cn2(trΓs). ∎
Proposition 2.2.10 (Theoretic Formulation of Translational Equivalence). Let L1
and L2 be logics and let t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1. Then t, s : L1↭ L2 iff
tTh : 1  2 where tTh  sTh











(ñ) Suppose t, s : L1↭ L2. By Proposition 2.1.16, tTh and sTh are order-
embeddings on1 and2 that preserve meets, so it suffices to show that
they are inverses, i.e., sTh(tTh(Γ))  Γ for all Γ P Th(L1) and tTh(sTh(∆)) 
∆ for all ∆ P Th(L2). But for instance, if Γ P Th(L1), then sTh(tTh(Γ)) 
sTh(Cn2(trΓs))  Cn1(srCn2(trΓs)s)  Cn1(srtrΓss)  Cn1(Γ)  Γ.
(ð) Suppose tTh : 1  2 where sTh  tTh
´1 and that tTh and sTh pre-
serve meets. Then t and s are translations, so it suffices to show that
s(t(ϕ)) %$1 ϕ for ϕ P L1 and t(s(ψ)) %$2 ψ for ψ P L2. But
Cn1(ϕ)  sTh(tTh(Cn1(ϕ)))  Cn1(srCn2(trCn1(ϕ)s)s)  Cn1(s(t(ϕ))).
So this completes the proof. ∎
Note that the fact that tTh : 1  2 does not guarantee that it preserves meets on
arbitraryΣ Ď ℘ (L1), though it does guarantee preservation of meets onΣ Ď Th(L1)
since order-isomorphisms guarantee the preservation of meets in general.
5Caleiro and Gonçalves [2007, pp. 106–107] prove a slightly modified form of Proposition 2.2.10.
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§ 2.3 Isomorphism
It is worth briefly mentioning an even stronger notion of equivalence between logics
that has been occasionally discussed in the literature, viz., that of an isomorphism.6
Definition 2.3.1 (Isomorphism). Let L1 and L2 be logics. We will say a map
t : L1 Ñ L2 is an isomorphism between L1 and L2 (written “t : L1  L2”)
if t : L1⇝L2 and t is bijective. We will say L1 is isomorphic to L2 (written
“L1  L2”) if there is an isomorphism between them.
The following are easily established via previous results:
Fact 2.3.2 (Injective Translatability Implies Isomorphism with Image). If t : L1⇝L2
is injective, then t : L1  trL1s and t´1 : trL1s  L1.
Corollary 2.3.3 (Isomorphism Implies Translational Equivalence). If t : L1  L2,
then t, t´1 : L1↭ L2.
While isomorphism implies translational equivalence, the converse does not
generally hold for very simple cardinality reasons.
Example 2.3.4 (Translational Equivalence Does Not Imply Isomorphism). Where
LProp is the standard propositional language, Let LProp(@r )rPR be the result
of adding a unary operator @r to LProp for each r P R. Let CPL(@) be the
extension of CPL with LProp(@r )rPR where the semantic clause for each @r is
as follows:
v ,@ @rϕ ô v ,@ ϕ.
Clearly, CPL(@)↭CPL. But CPL(@) fl CPL, since there are uncountably
many LProp(@r )rPR-formulas.
The above example illustrates that isomorphism is too strong of a constraint for
notational variance. CPL(@), after all, seems to be a (albeit rather silly) notational
variant of CPL, as each operator @r is straightforwardly definable in CPL. So it
would be too demanding to require logics be isomorphic for them to be deemed
notational variants. As far as I can tell, no one in the literature has argued that
isomorphism is a necessary condition for notational variance. Moreover, in § 2.6,
we will see that it is generally not even sufficient—logics that do not appear to be
notational variants may nevertheless be isomorphic in the sense of Definition 2.3.1.
6See, e.g., Wójcicki 1988; Caleiro and Gonçalves 2007; Straßburger 2007.
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The theoretic formulation of isomorphism is fairly easy to derive from the core-
sponding formulation of translatability (Propositions 2.1.16, 4.2.11 and 4.2.15).
Proposition 2.3.5 (Theoretic Formulation of Isomorphism). Let L1 and L2 be log-




tThrΣs for all Σ Ď ℘ (L1).
§ 2.4 Auxiliary Assumptions
Sometimes, the notion of a translation is relativized to some class of auxiliary hy-
potheses. For instance, recall from Example 2.1.7 the standard translation STn from
the modal logic S4 (= KT4) into FOL:
STx (pi)  P
1
i (x)
STx (¬ϕ)  ¬ STx (ϕ)
STx (ϕ ^ ψ)  (STx (ϕ) ^ STx (ψ))
STx (◻ϕ)  @y ((x _ y) Ñ STy (ϕ))
This mapping is not quite a translation from S4 into FOL. To illustrate, consider
the T-axiom (◻p Ñ p). The standard translation of the T-axiom is of the form:
@y ((x _ y) Ñ P(y)) Ñ P(x).
As a first-order formula, however, this sentence is not FOL-valid, since _ need not
be reflexive. Likewise, the standard translation of the 4-axiom (◻◻p Ñ ◻p) is not
FOL-valid:
@y ((x _ y) Ñ @z ((y _ z) Ñ P(z))) Ñ @y ((x _ y) Ñ P(y))
There are two ways to repair the translation. One is to systematically revise
the compositional clauses in the definition of STn and conjoin the original standard
translation with these axioms to form a new translation ST˚n . For example, the new
translation clause for negation would be defined as follows:
θ B @x (x _ x) ^ @x @y @z ((x _ y) ^ (y _ z) Ñ (x _ z))
ST˚n (¬ϕ)  θ ^ ¬ ST˚n (ϕ).
A more natural approach, however, would be to keep the original definition of STn
and simply relativize the notion of a translation to the reflexivity and transitivity
axioms. For notice that where θ is defined as above, we do have:
Γ (S4 ϕ ô θ, STnrΓs (FOL STn (ϕ).
This suggests the following generalization of Definition 2.1.1.
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Definition 2.4.1 (Translation with Auxiliary Assumptions). Let L1 and L2 be log-
ics and let Λ Ď L2. A map t : L1 Ñ L2 is a translation given Λ, or alterna-
tively aΛ-translation (written “t : L1⇝Λ L2”), if for all Γ Ď L1 and all ϕ P L1:
Γ $1 ϕ ô Λ, trΓs $2 t(ϕ).
Notice that a translation in the sense of Definition 2.1.1 is just a H-translation.
L1 is translatable given Λ, or Λ-translatable, into L2 (written “L1⇝Λ L2”) if
t : L1⇝Λ L2 for some t. WhereΛ Ď L2 andΛ1 Ď L1, we write “t, s : L1 ⇝Λ1⇝Λ L2”
to indicate that t : L1⇝Λ L2 and s : L2⇝Λ1 L1.
L1 is said to be interpretable in L2 (written “L1⇝i L2”) if L1⇝Λ L2 for some
Λ Ď L2. A pair of interpretations t1 : L1⇝i L2 and t2 : L2⇝i L1 is called an
interpretation scheme (written “t1, t2 : L1 ⇝⇝i L2”) between L1 and L2. We
will say L1 and L2 are mutually interpretable (written “L1 ⇝⇝i L2”) if there is
an interpretation scheme between them.
Translations with auxiliary assumptions are not uncommon. A well-known ex-
ample of such a translation is that from many-sorted logic to one-sorted logic.
Convention: Where α1, . . . , αn is some sequence of objects (variables, terms,
or whatever), we will write “α” for brevity. For example, we may write “ϕ(y)”
in place of “ϕ(y1, . . . , yn)”. In addition, given that we abbreviate “α1, . . . , αn”
as “α”, and given that f is a unary function, we may write “ f (α)” instead
of “ f (α1), . . . , f (αn)”. For example, we may write “@y ” for “@y1 ¨ ¨ ¨ @yn ”.
(Generally, it will be clear from context whether f is unary, and thus whether
“ f (α)” means “ f (α1, . . . , αn)” or “ f (α1), . . . , f (αn)”.)
We will not generally make explicit the length of a sequence α. Instead, we
let context settle these questions, though unless stated otherwise, it should
not be assumed that any sequence mentioned is the same length as any other.
For example, in the abbreviation “ϕ(y , z)”, it is not assumed that |y|  |z|.
Example 2.4.2 (Two-Sorted Languages). We will define the two-sorted language
TSL as follows. First, we define the set StVar  ts1, s2, s3, . . .u and for each




3 , . . .u. The syntax LTSL is
defined as follows:
ϕ F Pn;m (y1, . . . , yn ; t1, . . . , tm) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | @x ϕ | @s ϕ.
A two-sorted model is a tripleM  xD ,W, Iy where D and W are nonempty
disjoint sets and I(Pn;m) Ď Dn ˆWm . A variable assignment onM is a map g
that sends each member of Var to a member of D and each member of StVar
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to a member of W . We define ,TSL as follows:
M , g ,TSL Pn;m (y; t) ô xg(y), g(t)y P I(Pn;m)
M , g ,TSL ¬ϕ ô M , g .TSL ϕ
M , g ,TSL ϕ ^ ψ ô M , g ,TSL ϕ andM , g ,TSL ψ
M , g ,TSL @x ϕ ô for all a P D:M , gxa ,TSL ϕ
M , g ,TSL @s ϕ ô for all w P W :M , gsw ,TSL ϕ.
Clearly, FOL⇝TSL. On the flip side, let D B P11 and W B P
1
2 . Define
t : LTSL Ñ LFOL as follows:a
t(xi)  x2i
t(si)  x2i`1
t(Pn;mi (y; t)  P
n`m
2i3n5m (t(y), t(t))
t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(@x ϕ)  @t(x) (D(t(x)) Ñ t(ϕ))
t(@s ϕ)  @t(s) (W (t(s)) Ñ t(ϕ)) .
Also, define Λ as the following set of formulas:
@x (D(x) Ø ¬W (x))
Dx D(x) ^ Dx W (x)










Then t : TSL⇝Λ FOL. The same strategy could work in principle for logics
with n-many sorts for finite n. It will not work for infinitely-sorted logics,
since the first axiom in Λ would then need to be infinitary.
While this mapping from TSL to FOL is often presented as an interpreta-
tion in the sense of Definition 2.4.1, it is worth noting that it can be converted
into a full-blown translation as follows. First, define χn;mi as the FOL-formula:










Define also δ B @x (D(x) Ø ¬W (x)) ^ Dx D(x) ^ Dx W (x). Then we can
define a translation from TSL to FOL as follows:
t(xi)  x2i
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t(si)  x2i`1





t(¬ϕ)  δ ^
ľ
Pn;mi Pϕ
χn;mi Ñ ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(@x ϕ)  δ ^
ľ
Pn;mi Pϕ
χn;mi Ñ @t(x) (D(t(x)) Ñ t(ϕ))
t(@s ϕ)  δ ^
ľ
Pn;mi Pϕ
χn;mi Ñ @t(s) (W (t(s)) Ñ t(ϕ)) .
Again, this strategy will work for n-sorted logics for any finite n.
aNote that we want to map atomic formulas involving Pn;mi to P
n`m
2i3n5m to avoid accidentally
sending distinct predicates to the same predicate.
While the above example does not show that interpretability does not imply
translatability, it is easy to manufacture artificial examples where the two notions
come apart. In addition, there are examples “in the wild” where they come apart:
Example 2.4.3 (Interpreting Classical Logic in Kleene Logic). We saw in Exam-
ple 2.1.14 that CPL |⇝K3. But let Λ  tp _ ¬ p | p P Propu. Then Γ (CPL ϕ
iff Λ, Γ (K3 ϕ. For if v ,K3 Λ, then v(p) Ó for all p P At. And it is straightfor-
ward by induction to show that if v(p) Ó for all p P At that occur in ϕ, then
v ,K3 ϕ iff v ,CPL ϕ.
Even so, there is a sense in which interpretability reduces to translatability: inter-
pretability is translatability into a reduction.
Fact 2.4.4 (Reducing Interpretability to Translatability). Let L1 and L2 be logics
and let Λ Ď L2. Then L1⇝Λ L2 iff L1⇝(L2)Λ.
From this, the theoretic formulation of interpretability is easily derived:
Proposition 2.4.5 (Theoretic Formulation of Interpretation). Let L1 and L2 be log-
ics, let Λ Ď L2, and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1⇝Λ L2 iff tTh is an order-





tThrΣs for all Σ Ď ℘ (L1).
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We might try to formulate interpretational equivalence in a way analogous to
translational equivalence. The most natural way to do this is as follows:
Definition 2.4.6 (Interpretational Equivalence). Let L1 and L2 be some mutually
interpretable logics. Where t1 : L1⇝Λ L2 and t2 : L2⇝Λ1 L1, we say the trans-





(a) for all ϕ P L1: Λ1, t2(t1(ϕ)) %$1 Λ1, ϕ
(b) for all ψ P L2: Λ, t1(t2(ψ)) %$2 Λ, ψ.
We will say L1 and L2 are interpretationally equivalent (written “L1↭i L2”)
if there is a reversible translation scheme between them.
The thought is supposed to be that it is only relative to the background auxiliary
assumptions can we assess whether or not s(t(ϕ)) is equivalent to ϕ, since those
are the assumptions needed to interpret the other language in the first place. We
could have required the even stronger constraint that s(t(ϕ)) %$1 ϕ—but it would
not have made a difference, since already we have the following:
Proposition 2.4.7 (Interpretational Equivalence Implies Translational Equivalence).
Let L1 and L2 be logics. If L1↭i L2, then L1↭ L2.
Proof: Suppose t, s : L1↭Λ
1
Λ
L2. Then observe that by (a) of Definition 2.4.6,
Λ1 $1 srtrΛ
1ss. Hence, because s is a Λ1-interpretation, $2 trΛ1s, from which
it follows that $1 Λ1. So forΣ Ď L2 and ψ P L2,Σ $2 ψ iffΛ1, srΣs $2 s(ψ) iff
srΣs $2 s(ψ). Thus, s : L2⇝L1. Likewise, t : L1⇝L2. Moreover, since $1 Λ1,
we have s(t(ϕ)) %$1 Λ1, s(t(ϕ)) %$1 Λ1, ϕ %$1 ϕ. Hence, t, s : L1↭ L2. ∎
It seems in general difficult to formulate a notion of interpretational equivalence
that does not collapse to translational equivalence. For instance, it does not help to
replace (a) and (b) in Definition 2.4.6 with the weaker constraints:
(a’) for all ϕ P L1: Λ1, srΛs, s(t(ϕ)) %$1 Λ1, srΛs, ϕ
(b’) for all ψ P L2: Λ, trΛ1s, t(s(ψ)) %$2 Λ, trΛ1s, ψ.
It is easy to check that the same proof in Proposition 2.4.7 undermines this attempt
to define interpretational equivalence as distinct from translational equivalence. It
seems that if one can “reverse” an interpretational scheme in any reasonable sense,
then the auxiliary assumptions in the interpretations are eliminable.
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§ 2.5 Expressive Equivalence vs. Notational Variance
Intuitively, notational variants ought not to differ in their expressive power. After
all, if L1 and L2 are really notational variants, there should be no barrier in principle
to expressing everything that one language can express in the other language, just
using different notation. Much of the literature seems to implicitly assume that the
converse is also true, i.e., if two languages have the same expressive power, then
they must somehow be the same system disguised by different notation. But is that
right? Must expressively equivalent languages also be notational variants?
Given the remarks at the beginning of § 2.2, I think it is fairly clear that two lan-
guages translationally equivalence is a necessary condition for notational variance.
Several authors have claimed that translational equivalence is also a sufficient con-
dition for notational variance. We will see in § 2.6 that this cannot be right if we are
to seek a precisification of our intuitive notion of expressivity. But the amendments
that would need to be imposed on translational equivalence to yield an adequate
account of notational variance do not affect the discussion at hand. So to simplify
matters, we will set such considerations aside and just stipulate for the moment that
two languages are notational variants just in case they are translationally equiva-
lent.
Suppose expressive equivalence coincides with notational variance and hence
translational equivalence. Let us use “«” to stand for expressive equivalence. Thus,
we are assuming that L1 « L2 iff L1↭ L2. Now, intuitively, expressive equivalence
ought to coincide with expressive bi-inclusion. That is, letting “ď” stand for ex-
pressive inclusion, we want L1 « L2 just in case L1 ď L2 and L2 ď L1. Moreover,
expressive inclusion ought to coincide with expressive equivalence to some frag-
ment. Thus, we want L1 ď L2 just in case for some L12 Ď L2, we have L1 « L
1
2.
But we cannot have all of these things in general. More specifically, the following
three constraints cannot be jointly satisfied for all L1 and L2:
(I) L1 « L2 iff L1↭ L2.
(II) If L1 ď L2 and L2 ď L1, then L1 « L2.
(III) If L1 « L12 Ď L2, then L1 ď L2.
Suppose for reductio that (I)–(III) held. Let L1 ⇝⇝ L2. By Proposition 2.2.5 (from (a)
to (c)), that means that there are some L11 Ď L1 and L
1
2 Ď L2 such that L1↭ L12 and
L2↭ L11. By (I), this means that L1 « L
1
2 and L2 « L
1
1. Since L1 « L
1
2 Ď L2 and
L2 « L11 Ď L1, we have L1 ď L2 and L2 ď L1 by (III). So by (II), that means L1 « L2,
and so L1↭ L2 by (I) again. Hence, we have shown from (I)–(III) that if L1 ⇝⇝ L2,
then L1↭ L2. But as Example 2.2.8 shows, we can have L1 ⇝⇝ L2 without L1↭ L2,
☇. Therefore, one of (I)–(III) must go.
(III) seems undeniable. We only need three very weak claims to justify main-
taining it. First, if L1 « L12, then L1 ď L
1
2. This just says that expressive equivalence
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should imply expressive bi-inclusion. Second, if L12 Ď L2, then L
1
2 ď L2. Again, this
seems uncontroversial: fragments of a language are expressively included in that
language. Finally, ď is transitive. If ď were not transitive, it would be unfit to call it
a precisification of expressive inclusion.
(II) seems less like a constraint that can be denied and more like half of a def-
inition of expressive equivalence. Indeed, it seems incoherent for two languages
to each be expressively included in the other without them being considered ex-
pressively equivalent. For if they were included in each other, then everything you
could say with the one you could say in the other.
This leaves just one option: reject (I). Now, we could reject the right-to-left direc-
tion of (I). Doing so would mean that we could not equate translational equivalence
with notational variance. In particular, translational equivalence could not imply
notational variance, since notational variance implies expressive equivalence. If we
had strong reasons to think that translational equivalence does not imply notational
variance, this would be an attractive option. Indeed, we will see very compelling
reasons to think this. But in Chapter 3, we will explore a number of properties that
translations could have. And as we said above, we will see that translational sys-
tems with some of these properties are not subject to these same worries. So at the
end of the day, resolving this trilemma by rejecting the right-to-left direction of (I)
does not seem promising.
Instead, I propose we reject the left-to-right direction of (I). That is, while I agree
that notational variants ought to agree in their expressive power—that is, expres-
sive power is one of the key properties that notational variants must share to count
as notational variants—still, two languages that agree in their expressive power
may not necessarily be notational variants of one another.
Consider, again, the case of CPL and IPL from Example 2.2.8, where we ob-
served that CPL ⇝⇝ IPL but CPL |↭ IPL. Thus, CPL is translationally equivalent
to a fragment of IPL, and IPL is likewise translationally equivalent to a fragment
of CPL, but CPL and IPL are not translationally equivalent full stop. In terms of
notational variance, CPL and IPL are not notational variants of each other, as we
would expect. But surprisingly, they are notational variants of a fragment of the
other.7
Loosely, the situation is like this. Each of CPL and IPL has a sufficient amount
of structure to interpret the other within it—or, as I would prefer to put it, each
expressively includes the other in a fragment. But globally, the two languages do
not have the same outer structure and thus are not mere notational variants of one
7It should be noted that this example depends on the assumption that L1 ď L2 iff L1⇝L2, which
we will later reject. Ultimately, we will argue that L1 ď L2 iff there is a schematic t : L1⇝L2. And
indeed, there is no schematic translation from IPL to CPL. So CPL and IPL are not expressively
equivalent in this sense. Still, there are other examples of languages L1 and L2 such that schemati-
cally L1 ⇝⇝ L2 but L1 |↭ L2. So using CPL and IPL prior to introducing this constraint still illustrates
the point we are making here.
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another. This is similar to what we find in, say, order theory. It is well-known that
each of r´1, 1s and (´1, 1) can be order-embedded into the other. But r´1, 1s and
(´1, 1) are not isomorphic orders, since the former but not the latter has endpoints.
Each can embed the other, but they have different overall structures. This is par-
ticular relevant for the claim that we should separate expressive equivalence and
notational variance. We saw in Proposition 2.1.16 that translatability reduces to the
existence of a certain kind of order-embedding on the theory spaces. And in Propo-
sition 2.2.10, we saw translational equivalence reduces to the existence of a certain
kind of isomorphism on the theory spaces. Isomorphism seems more appropri-
ate as the condition corresponding to notational variance than co-embedding. But
co-embedding seems sufficient as a condition for expressive equivalence.
Thus, as a first pass, we can propose the following precisification of the concepts
of expressive power and notational variance:8
• L1 is expressively included in L2 just in case L1⇝L2.
• L1 is expressively equivalent to L2 just in case L1 ⇝⇝ L2.
• L1 is a notational variant of L2 just in case L1↭ L2.
The philosophical significance of the separation between expressive equivalence
and notational variance will be explored in Chapter 5.
§ 2.6 Triviality Results
In § 2.2, we argued that for two logics to be notational variants, they have to be
at least translationally equivalent. In other words, translational equivalence is a
necessary condition for notational variance. A number of authors in the literature
on translations have claimed that translational equivalence between two logics is
also a sufficient condition for deeming them notational variants.9
Unfortunately, even isomorphism, without further constraints, is relatively un-
informative. As we will now show, it turns out that quite a few of the most com-
mon logics can be translated into classical propositional logic.10 Perhaps the most
striking example of this is that classical first-order logic (along with a number of
nonclassical logics) is isomorphic to classical propositional logic. This may seem
8Of course, we may want to replace translatability with interpretability. While this will not affect
the account of notational variance (see Proposition 2.4.7), it will weaken the notions of expressive
inclusion.
9For claims like this, see Straßburger 2007, p. 139, Mossakowski et al. 2009, p. 7, and French
2010, p. 134. Straßburger [2007, p. 139] claims translational equivalence is necessary and suffi-
cient. Mossakowski et al. [2009, p. 7] holds that even mere intertranslatability suffices for expressive
equivalence. As we argued in § 2.5, this is compatible with the view that intertranslatability is not
sufficient for notational variance; but it is unclear whether Mossakowski et al. would agree with the
distinction.
10Pace Carnielli et al. [2009, p. 7], who say “Translations into CPL seem to be hard to obtain.”
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somewhat paradoxical, since first-order logic is obviously more expressively pow-
erful than (and thus, not a notational variant of) propositional logic. What this
result shows, then, is that translational equivalence is simply too unconstrained to
serve as an adequate precisification of the concept of notational variance.
There are two ways of going about showing that classical first-order logic FOL is
translatable into propositional logic CPL. A non-constructive algebraic approach is
given in § 2.6.1 using Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras. A more constructive approach
was given in Jeřábek [2012] and will be reviewed in § 2.6.2. The former has the
advantage of showing how FOL is isomorphic to CPL, whereas the latter has the
advantage of constructing a translation that is as computationally efficient as pos-
sible.
§ 2.6.1 Algebraic Reduction
We start by giving the algebraic proof that FOL  CPL. To begin, recall the defini-
tion of the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of a logic (Definition 1.1.38).
Proposition 2.6.1 (Translational Equivalence Implies Lindenbaum-Tarski Isomor-
phism). Let L1 and L2 be logics.
(a) If L1⇝L2, then 1 ãÑ 2.
(b) If L1↭ L2, then 1  2.
Proof:
(a) Let t : L1⇝L2. Define t : L1{%$1Ñ L2{%$2 as follows:
t(rϕs1)  rt(ϕ)s2 .
This is a well-defined injective function, since:
rϕs1  rψs1 ô ϕ %$1 ψ
ô t(ϕ) %$2 t(ψ)
ô rt(ϕ)s2  rt(ψ)s2
ô t(rϕs1)  t
(rψs1).
Moreover:
rϕs1 ď1 rψs1 ô ϕ $1 ψ
ô t(ϕ) $2 t(ψ)
ô rt(ϕ)s2 ď2 rt(ψ)s2
ô t(rϕs1) ď2 t
(rψs1).
Hence, t : 1 ãÑ 2.
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(b) Let t, s : L1↭ L2. It is a basic fact from order theory that if f : 1 ãÑ 2
and g : 2 ãÑ 1 where g( f (x))  x and f (g(y))  y for all x P P1
and all y P P2, then f : 1  2 where g  f ´1. So it suffices to show
that where t and s are defined as in (a), s(t(rϕs1))  rϕs1 and
t(s(rψs2))  rψs2 for any ϕ P L1 and ψ P L2. But this is immediate,
since s(t(rϕs1))  s(rt(ϕ)s2)  rs(t(ϕ))s1 and s(t(ϕ)) %$1 ϕ. ∎
Corollary 2.6.2 (Preserving Number of Formulas Up to Equivalence). Let L1 and
L2 be logics. If L1⇝L2, then |L1{%$1| ď |L2{%$2|, i.e., the number of L1-
formulas up to L1-equivalence is no greater than the number of L2-formulas
up to L2-equivalence.
Straßburger [2007, p. 139] proposed that we treat two logics as equivalent just
in case their Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras were isomorphic. This seems too quick,
however. A Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra only really represents the inferences in a
logic that have just one premise. In some special cases, inference can be reduced to
single-premise inference (e.g., if the logic is compact and conjunctive in the sense
of Definitions 1.2.12 and 1.2.24). But this is generally not the case.11 For instance, as
is easily verified by Fact 2.6.6, SOL and FOL have isomorphic Lindenbaum-Tarski
algebras, even though we do not even have SOL |⇝ FOL (Example 2.1.13). So iso-
morphism on Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras seems far too weak. A better criteria
would be isomorphism on theory spaces, as that is the notion that is captured by
translational equivalence (Proposition 2.2.10).
With that said, we mentioned in § 1.2.3 that sometimes a logic can be reduced
to its Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. Recall the definitions of (semi)conjunctive and
adjunctive logics from § 1.2.3 (Definitions 1.2.21 and 1.2.24).
Lemma 2.6.3 (Translations Preserve Meets). Let L1 and L2 be semiconjunctive
logics.




trΓs for any finite Γ Ď L1.
(b) If t : L1⇝L2, then L1 is adjunctive iff it is both the case that trL1s is ad-




trΓs for any finite Γ Ď L1.




trΓs for any finite Γ Ď L1.
If L1 and L2 are completely semiconjunctive, then we can drop “finite” from
(a)–(c).
11Straßburger’s claim seems especially surprising, since he explicitly states he wants a definition
of notational variance that will apply to non-compact logics as well.
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Proof: Throughout, observe that
Ź







γPΓ rγs1, it follows that t(
Ź
Γ) ď2 trΓs. Thus, we
have that rt(
Ź





γPΓ rt(γ)s2  r
Ź











L1 is adjunctive, Γ $1
Ź





trL1s is adjunctive. Moreover, since Γ $1
Ź


















immediately follows that Γ $1
Ź
Γ.




































Corollary 2.6.4 (Translatability Implies Meet-Homomorphism for Conjunctive Log-
ics). Suppose L1 and L2 are logics where L1 is conjunctive and where L1⇝L2.
Then there is a f : 1 ãÑ 2 that preserves finite meets.
Not every order-embedding preserves meets, so Corollary 2.6.4 does not simply
follow from Proposition 2.6.1(a). The point is just that under the assumption that
L1 is adjunctive, we can take the relevant order-embedding to preserve finite meets,
given that the relevant meets are defined in the target logic.
We now return to the original objective, viz., proving that FOL  CPL. To do
this, we prove a more general result—essentially the informal remark we made in
§ 1.2.3.
Theorem 2.6.5 (Algebraic Reduction of Translatability). Suppose L1 and L2 are
compact conjunctive logics.
(a) If there is a f : 1 ãÑ 2 that preserves finite meets, then L1⇝L2.
(b) If 1  2, then L1↭ L2.
(c) If f : 1  2 and |rϕs1|  | f (rϕs1)| for each ϕ P L1, then L1  L2.
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Proof:
(a) For each rϕs1 P L1{%$1, let frϕs1 : rϕs1 Ñ f (rϕs1) be an arbitrary map.
Define t(ϕ)  frϕs1 (ϕ). Since L1 is compact, Γ $1 ϕ iff for some finite
Γ1 Ď Γ, Γ1 $1 ϕ. And if Γ1 is finite, then Γ1 $1 ϕ iff
Ź
Γ1 $1 ϕ since L1
is adjunctive. Likewise, trΓs $2 t(ϕ) iff trΓ1s $2 t(ϕ) for some finite
Γ1 Ď Γ, iff
Ź
trΓ1s $2 t(ϕ). Since f preserves meets,
Ź
γPΓ1 f (rγs1) 
f (
Ź




γPΓ1 t(γ) %$2 t(
Ź
Γ1). So it suf-
fices to show that for any ϕ, ψ P L1, ϕ $1 ψ iff t(ϕ) $2 t(ψ). Indeed:
ϕ $1 ψ ô rϕs1 ď1 rψs1
ô f (rϕs1) ď2 f (rψs1)
ô t(ϕ) $2 t(ψ).
So t : L1⇝L2.
(b) Let f : 1  2. For each rϕs1 P L1{%$1, let frϕs1 : rϕs1 Ñ f (rϕs1) be
an arbitrary map. Likewise, for each rψs2 P L2{%$2, let grψs2 : rψs2 Ñ
f ´1(rψs2) be arbitrary. Define t(ϕ)  frϕs1 (ϕ) and s(ψ)  grψs2 (ψ). By
the above reasoning, t and s are translations. Now suppose ϕ P L1.
Then ϕ %$1 s(t(ϕ)) iff rϕs1  rs(t(ϕ))s1. But:
rs(t(ϕ))s1  f
´1(rt(ϕ)s2)  f
´1( f (rϕs1))  rϕs1 .
So ϕ %$1 s(t(ϕ)) for all ϕ P L1. Likewise, ψ %$1 t(s(ψ)) for all
ψ P L2.
(c) Under these conditions, we can simply take each frϕs1 from (a) to be
bijective. ∎
To complete the proof, we need some facts about Boolean algebras and some facts
about FOL and CPL:
Fact 2.6.6 (Facts about CPL and FOL).
(a) Any two countable atomless Boolean algebras are isomorphic.
(b) CPL and FOL are countable atomless Boolean algebras.
(c) For each ϕ P LPred and ψ P LProp, |rϕsFOL|  |rψsCPL|  ℵ0.
Corollary 2.6.7 (Triviality). FOL  CPL.
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What is more, where L is a normal modal logic, L is also a countable atomless
Boolean algebra, so L  CPL. Isomorphism to CPL is difficult to escape for classical
languages.
§ 2.6.2 Jeřábek’s Proof
The proof of Theorem 2.6.5 crucially depends on the adjunctivity and semilattice
constraints, as they allowed us to distill a logic down to its Lindenbaum-Tarski al-
gebra. These constraints are fairly benign, since they more-or-less amount to the
presence of conjunction introduction and elimination. But we can relax even these
constraints and still show that L⇝CPL using a technique developed by Jeřábek
[2012]. In this section, we review the proof of this result.
Theorem 2.6.8 (Jeřábek). Let L be compact where |L| ď ℵ0. Then there is a
t : L⇝CPL such that t is Turing-equivalent to (L.
Proof: Let L be compact and countable. If the logic is trivial, meaning that
( ϕ for all ϕ P L, then we can just map every formula to J. Otherwise,
list the elements of L as ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, . . .. We will define our translation t in
stages. To simplify, we will treat natural numbers as sets in the usual way
(n  t0, . . . , n ´ 1u), and where A Ď n, we will write “ϕA” for “tϕi | i P Au”.
I will use “(” for “(CPL” throughout.
Suppose t(ϕ0), . . . , t(ϕn´1) have been defined in such a way so that the
following condition holds for all A Ď n and k ă n:
ϕA (L ϕk ñ trϕAs ( trϕks.
Then define the following LProp-formulas (setting
Ž
















Finally, define t(ϕn) B αn ^ (pn _ γn).
Claim: γn ( αn .
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Subproof: Consider any disjunct from γn of the form
Ź
trϕAs where
ϕA (L ϕn , and consider any conjunct form
Ź
trϕBs Ñ t(ϕk) where
ϕB , ϕn (L ϕk . By transitivity, ϕB , ϕA (L ϕk . But then by assumption,





t(ϕk). Hence, each disjunct from γn implies each conjunct from αn ; so
γn ( αn . ∎
By truth-functional reasoning, it follows that t(ϕn) ” (αn ^ pn) _ γn .
Claim: For all A Ď n`1 and k ă n`1, if ϕA (L ϕk , then trϕAs ( trϕks.
Subproof: We only need to check implications that involve ϕn . Thus, it
suffices to check that for any A Ď n, ϕA (L ϕn implies trϕAs ( t(ϕn),
and for any A Ď n and any k ă n, ϕA , ϕn (L ϕk implies trϕAs, t(ϕn) (
ϕk .
Suppose ϕA (L ϕn . Then
Ź
trϕAs ( γn . Hence, trϕAs ( t(ϕn).
Now instead suppose ϕA , ϕn (L ϕk . Then αn (
Ź
trϕAs Ñ t(ϕk). So
t(ϕn) (
Ź
trϕAs Ñ t(ϕk). Hence, trϕAs, t(ϕn) ( t(ϕk). ∎
We will now show that Γ (L ϕ iff trΓs (CPL t(ϕ). First, suppose Γ (L ϕ.
By compactness, there’s a finite Γ1 Ď Γ such that Γ1 (L ϕ. If ϕ  ϕn occurs in
the enumeration after each element in Γ1, then γn will contain a disjunct of the
form
Ź
trΓ1s. Hence, trΓ1s ( γn , and so trΓ1s ( t(ϕ). If instead some element
in Γ occurs in the enumeration after ϕ, then where ϕn is the last element in
Γ to occur, αn will contain a conjunct of the form
Ź
trΓ ´ tϕnus Ñ t(ϕ). So
still, trΓs ( t(ϕ).
Next, suppose Γ *L ϕ. Define CnL(Γ) B tψ P L |Γ (L ψu and define:
V (pi) 
#
1 if ϕi P CnL(Γ)
0 otherwise.
Claim: V , t(ϕk) iff V (pk)  1.
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Subproof: By induction on n. It’s easy to verify for n  0. Suppose for
inductive hypothesis that the claim holds for all k ă n.
Suppose first V (pn)  1, so that ϕn P CnL(Γ). Then it suffices to
show that V , αn , i.e., that whenever A Ď n and k ă n such that
ϕA , ϕn (L ϕk , we have that V ,
Ź
trϕAs Ñ t(ϕk). So suppose
ϕA , ϕn (L ϕk . Either for some i P A we have ϕi < CnL(Γ), or else
ϕi P CnL(Γ) for each i P A (in which case Γ, ϕn ( ϕk) and ϕk , ϕ.
If the former, then by the inductive hypothesis, V . t(ϕi), in which
case V ,
Ź
trϕAs Ñ t(ϕk). If the latter, then since ϕn P CnL(Γ), that
means Γ (L ϕk , so that ϕk P CnL(Γ), i.e., V (pk)  1. So by inductive
hypothesis, V , t(ϕk), and hence, V ,
Ź




Suppose instead that V (pn)  0, so that ϕn < CnL(Γ). It suffices
to show that V . γn , i.e., for each A Ď n such that ϕA (L ϕn , V .
Ź
trϕAs. So suppose ϕA (L ϕn . Since ϕn < CnL(Γ), there must be




Since ϕ < CnL(Γ), we have that V , trΓs but V . t(ϕ). So trΓs * t(ϕ).
Hence, t is a translation. Since CPL is decidable, (L is Turing-reducible to
t. The fact that t is Turing-reducible to (L follows by the construction of t
(which appeals to (L in the definition of αn and γn). ∎
This result shows that intertranslatability is simply too weak to really distin-
guish between many of the most interesting logics. In particular, Theorem 2.6.8
suffices to show the following:
Corollary 2.6.9 (Classical and Intuitionistic Logic). IPL⇝CPL.
Of course, such a proof does not establish translational equivalence between com-
pact countable languages and CPL in general. For one thing, we already showed
that CPL |↭ IPL (Example 2.2.8). But moreover, the construction in Theorem 2.6.8
does not even produce a reversible translation scheme between CPL and itself. If,
for instance, ϕ0  K, then t(ϕ0)  J^(p0_K), and no reversible translation scheme
from CPL to itself maps K to a consistent LProp-formula.
Now, as the examples explored previously reveal, not every logic can be trans-
lated into CPL. And the notion of a translation does impose some constraints on the
relationship between other nonclassical logics. Still, on account of Theorem 2.6.8, it
is natural to inquire into stronger notions of equivalence between logics than mere
intertranslatability.
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§ 2.6.3 A Note on Computability
As we say in § 2.6.1, FOL and CPL are isomorphic (Corollary 2.6.7). But such a
translation must be quite complex. In particular:
Fact 2.6.10 (Undecidability of Translation). If t : L1⇝L2 is decidable, then $1 is
Turing-reducible to $2.
Corollary 2.6.11 (Complexity of Translation from FOL to CPL). If t : FOL⇝CPL,
then t is undecidable.
One might think that the way to define notational variance so as to avoid the prob-
lems above is to impose a computability constraint on translations. For instance,
one might demand that notational variants be translationally equivalent via some
decidable translations. Or one might instead require that the translations have to be
Turing-reducible to the target language. These constraints would, of course, block
FOL and CPL from being considered notational variants.
But this proposal is undesirable for a number of reasons. For starters, such an
approach would not allow notational variance between logics with uncountably
many formulas, since according to the standard definitions, computability implies
countability. Thus, CPL(@) from Example 2.3.4 (with uncountably many redun-
dant @r operators) would not count as equivalent to CPL, as counterintuitive as
that is. In addition, requiring the decidability (or Turing-reducibility) of transla-
tions would not block all potential counterexamples. For instance, monadic first-
order logic, being decidable, is isomorphic to propositional logic by Theorem 2.6.5.
Yet it strikes me as highly undesirable to deem monadic first-order logic a “nota-
tional variant” of propositional logic.
Finally, it does not seem to be part of the concept of a notational variant that
they have the same complexity: it seems quite intuitive that there could be more
computationally efficient versions of the same system.
Example 2.6.12 (An Undecidable Notational Variant of CPL). Throughout, let
X Ď N be some undecidable set. LetLProp(?) be the result of extendingLProp
with binary connectives ?0, ?1, ?2, . . .. Let CPL(?) be the extension of CPL
with LProp(?), where the semantic clause for ?i is given as follows:
if i P X, then v ,? ϕ ?i ψ ô v ,? ϕ and v ,? ψ
if i < X, then v ,? ϕ ?i ψ ô v ,? ϕ or v ,? ψ.
It is easy to verify that CPL(?)  CPL by Theorem 2.6.5. Moreover, CPL(?) is
undecidable. For if it were decidable, we could decide membership in X by
deciding whether p (? p ?i q.
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Intuitively, CPL(?) is a notational variant of CPL—after all, each ?i is simply de-
finable in CPL. It is just that the way CPL(?) presents CPL is not computationally
tractable. But it is not as though CPL(?) can represent more inferential connections
that CPL: CPL(?) is a mere relabelling of CPL. So one must take caution when





It is not as though anything goes when it comes to translations: not every logic is
translatable into any other, as Examples 2.1.9–2.1.14 illustrate. Even so, results such
as Theorems 2.6.5 and 2.6.8 show that translational equivalence is still fairly easy
to come by and so cannot be the correct formalization of our intuitive concept of
notational variance. We need more stringent requirements to find more adequate
formalizations.
To help visualize Theorem 2.6.5 and where we might successfully constrain the
notion of a translation, it is informative to compare very simple versions of FOL and
CPL. Figure 3.1 contains the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras for (a) the one-variable
fragment of FOL with just one unary predicate F, which we will label “FOLF”,
and (b) propositional logic with two atomics, i.e., CPLtp ,qu (Example 2.1.9). One
can readily verify visually that these two Boolean algebras are isomorphic.1 The
only difference is that the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for FOLF is equipped with
an additional operator r@x s, where:
r@x s (rϕs) 
#
rϕs if ¬ q (CPL ϕ
rϕ ^ qs otherwise.
Notice the definition of r@x s is given by cases. This feature of the definition is in-
eliminable: there is no single propositional schema Θ(π) 2 such that r@x s (rϕs) 
rΘ(ϕ)s. If there were such a Θ, then rJs  r@x s (rJs)  rΘ(J)s. So then ϕ (CPL
Θ(ϕ), even though Θ(p) ”CPL p ^ q and p *CPL p ^ q.
1Admittedly, this simple example is not representative. Though we will still have an isomor-
phism between the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of the one-variable fragment FOL with m-many
predicates and CPLtp1 ,...,p4m u, the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of monadic FOL with two or more
variables will only be embeddable in the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of some CPLtp1 ,...,pnu. Still, in
the infinite case, this difference washes out, and we obtain the isomorphism again, in accordance
with Theorem 2.6.5.




F(x) ^ Dx ¬ F(x) @x ¬ F(x)@x F(x) ¬ F(x) ^ Dx F(x)
@x F(x) _ @x ¬ F(x)F(x) Dx F(x) Ø (F(x) ^ Dx ¬ F(x)) Dx ¬ F(x) Ø (¬ F(x) ^ Dx F(x)) Dx F(x) ^ Dx ¬ F(x) ¬ F(x)
F(x) _ @x ¬ F(x) Dx F(x) ¬ F(x) _ @x F(x) Dx ¬ F(x)
J
J
p _ q p _ ¬ q ¬ p _ q ¬ p _ ¬ q
p q p Ø ¬ q p Ø q ¬ q ¬ p
p ^ q p ^ ¬ q ¬ p ^ q ¬ p ^ ¬ q
K
Figure 3.1: Monadic one-variable first-order logic vs. propositional logic.
The fact that r@x s cannot be represented as a single schema should give us a clue
as to why notions like translational equivalence fall short of notational variance. Af-
ter all, the notion of a translation as defined in Definition 2.1.1 is fairly minimal. In
theory, a translation could be quite gerrymandered and complex, mapping quan-
tified formulas of the same sort to various different places to achieve a precarious
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balance. In practice, most translations that have been studied in the literature are
fairly uniform—or, in other terms, compositional. That is, one defines the translation
of a complex formula as some fixed schema of the translation of the parts. This
ensures, amongst other things, that translations not only preserve the meanings
of whole sentences but also preserve the meanings of the operators used to form
complex formulas.
In this chapter, we will explore various ways of fleshing out this idea more pre-
cisely. A brief outline is as follows. § 3.1 discusses the simplest definition of compo-
sitionality whereby the translation of a complex formula is a function of the trans-
lation of the parts. It is shown that this constraint is rather easy to satisfy. In the
opposite direction, § 3.2 explores a very strong sense of compositionality that has
been considered in the literature. Then in § 3.3, we come to a fairly common defini-
tion of compositionality in terms of definition: a translation is compositional if each
operator of the source language is definable in the target language. This notion is
generalized in § 3.4 to cover a broader class of examples.
For this chapter, it will useful to review some of the more basic definitions of
signatures and schemas in § 1.3. From now on, when we use the term “logic” or
“language”, we will intend these definitions to be read as implicitly carrying a sig-
nature. Thus, “logic” means “Σ-logic”, where Σ is contextually supplied (and like-
wise for “language”). We will use the standard labels for the logics that have been
discussed previously to stand for the logics with the appropriate signature. For ex-
ample, we will use “CPL” to stand for the language of classical propositional logic
with signature xProp, Booly, where:
• Prop  tp1, p2, p3, . . .u
• Bool  t¬,^u.
Likewise, we will use “FOL” to stand for the language of classical first-order logic
with signature xAt, BoolY Quanty, where:
• At  tPn (y1, . . . , yn) | Pn P Predn and y1, . . . , yn P Varu
• Quant  t@x | x P Varu.
The signature will be specified explicitly if it is not clear from context.
We generalize the notion of a translation to logics and languages with signatures
as follows: a map t : L1 Ñ L2 is a translation from a Σ1-logic L1 to a Σ2-logic L2
if it is a translation from xLΣ1 ,$1y to xLΣ1 ,$2y. Similarly for the other definitions
stated in Chapter 2. It is easy to check that all of the results from Chapter 2 still
hold even when we redefine things in this way: nothing depended on the fact that
the logics were unstructured in particular.
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§ 3.1 Functionality
Plausibly, an adequate translation from one logic to another ought to at least respect
the syntactical structure of the former in the following sense:
Definition 3.1.1 (Functionality). Let L1 and L2 be logics (possibly with partial
signatures). We say t : L1 Ñ L2 is functional if for each△ P Opγ1 , there is a
function t(△) : Lγ2 Ñ L2 such that for all ρ P L
γ
1 :
(i) t(△)(t ˝ ρ) is defined iff△(ρ) is defined, and
(ii) when defined, t(△(ρ))  t(△)(t ˝ ρ).
We say that a translation scheme is functional if each translation in the pair
is functional.
Functional translations are ones we can specify by (i) stating how the translation
acts on the atomics of our source logic, and (ii) providing the “translation” of each
of the operators of the source logic in the target logic as specifying a function of the
translations of the components. In practice, this is how most translation translations
are specified, as is evident when we write:
t(χ)  ¨ ¨ ¨
t(¬ϕ)  ¬t(t(ϕ))
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  ^t(t(ϕ), t(ψ))
where χ is atomic and both ¬t and ^t are some functions. So initially, imposing
functionality on a translation does not seem to be imposing much at all. Indeed, we
can show that translatability from any logic with a simple property implies func-
tional translatability. Recall the definition of intensionality (Definition 1.3.13).
Proposition 3.1.2 (Intensional Translation Implies Functional Translation). Let L1
and L2 be logics.
(a) If L1⇝L2 and if L1 is intensional, then there is a functional t : L1⇝L2.
(b) If L1↭ L2 and if L1 and L2 are intensional, then there are some func-
tional t, s : L1↭ L2.
(c) If t : L1 Ñ L2 is injective, then t is already functional.
90
Chapter 3. Compositionality § 3.1. Functionality
Proof:
(a) Let t : L1⇝L2. Using the axiom of choice, let f : (L1{ %$1) Ñ L1 be a
choice function such that f (rϕs1) P rϕs1. Define t1(ϕ)  t( f (rϕs1)) for
all ϕ P L1. Then t1 is automatically a translation, since t is a translation
and f (rϕs1) %$1 ϕ. Notice also that t1 has the property that if ϕ %$1 ψ,
then t1(ϕ)  t1(ψ).
We just need to show it is functional. Define t1(△)(t1˝ρ)  t1(△(ρ))
(never mind what it does to the elements outside of t1rL1s). Clearly,
t1(△)(t1 ˝ρ) is defined iff△(ρ) is. Suppose t1 ˝ρ  t1 ˝ρ1. Then for each
β ă γ, t1(ρ(β))  t1(ρ1(β)), and thus ρ(β) %$1 ρ1(β). By intensionality,
that means:△(ρ) %$1 △(ρ1). Hence:
t1(△)(t1 ˝ ρ)  t1(△(ρ))  t1(△(ρ1))  t1(△)(t1 ˝ ρ1).
(b) Define t1 and s1 as in (a) using choice functions f : (L1{ %$1) Ñ L1
and g : (L2{%$2) Ñ L2 . Since ϕ %$1 f (rϕs1), t(ϕ) %$2 t( f (rϕs1)) 
t1(ϕ). Likewise, s(ψ) %$1 s1(ψ). Hence, ϕ %$1 s(t(ϕ)) %$1 s1(t1(ϕ)).
So t1, s1 : L1↭ L2.
(c) Just define t(△)(t ˝ ρ)  t(△(ρ))  t(△(t´1 ˝ t ˝ ρ)). ∎
Not every translation can be made to be functional, however. It is possible for
one logic to be translatable, but not functionally translatable, into another logic if
the underlying logics are hyperintensional.
Example 3.1.3 (Translatability Without Functional Translatability). Define the sig-
nature Σ  xtp , qu , t△uy, where△ is unary. Throughout, we define△0(ϕ) 
ϕ and△n`1(ϕ) △(△n (ϕ)). Let C  tx , yu and define , so that:
• DiagL(x)  tqu Y t△n (p) | n P Nu
• DiagL(y)  tpu Y t△n (q) | n P Nu
Set L  xΣ,C,,y. Then p ”L q (since ⟦p⟧L  ⟦q⟧L  C) but△(p) ıL △(q).
Thus, L is hyperintensional in the sense of Definition 1.3.13.
Now, define Σ˚  xtrpsLu , t△˚uy, where△˚(rϕsL)  r△(ϕ)sL, define C as
before, and for z P C, define z ,˚ rϕs iff z P ⟦ϕ⟧L. Call the resulting language
L˚. Clearly, there is a t : L⇝L˚ (for instance, t(ϕ)  rϕs1). Moreover, it must
be that t(p)  t(q)  rpsL. But t(△(p)) , t(△(q)), since△(p) ıL △(q). Yet
if twere functional, then t(△(p))  t(△)(t(p))  t(△)(t(q))  t(△(q)), ☇.
So L is not functionally translatable into L˚.
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Still, Proposition 3.1.2(c) already shows that having an injective translation suf-
fices for functionality. Many of the translations that appear in practice are injective.
In any case, these results clearly show that functionality is too weak to satisfactorily
avoid the result that FOL and CPL are isomorphic (Corollary 2.6.7), since Propo-
sition 3.1.2 implies that isomorphic logics are already functionally isomorphic.
Even so, it is worth remarking how much functionality guarantees. For example,
one might wonder whether the image of a functional translation preserves certain
nice syntactic features. The answer turns out to be mixed.
Definition 3.1.4 (Image with Signature). Let L1 be aΣ1-logic, let L2 be aΣ2-logic,
and let t : L1 Ñ L2 be functional. Define Optr1s  tt(△) |△ P Op1 u, define
Σtr1s  xtrAt1s, Optr1sy, and define Ltr1s B LΣtr1s . The image of L1 under t is
the Σtr1s-logic trL1s  xΣtr1s,$tr1sy, where $tr1s $2æLtr1s . Similarly for the
image of a language under t.
One might worry about our overloading of the notation for images of maps from
Definitions 1.1.23 and 3.1.4, since Ltr1s is not defined to be trL1s. The following
lemma alleviates such worries:
Lemma 3.1.5 (The Functional Image is the Image). Let L1 and L2 be logics, and
let t : L1 Ñ L2 be functional. Then Ltr1s  trL1s.
Proof: First, we show Ltr1s Ď trL1s. Suppose ϕ P Ltr1s. If ϕ P trAt1s, then
trivially ϕ P trL1s. Now suppose ϕ  t(△)(t ˝ ρ) for some ρ P Lγ1 . Then
ϕ  t(△)(t ˝ ρ)  t(△(ρ)) P trL1s. So Ltr1s Ď trL1s.
Conversely, suppose ϕ P trL1s. If ϕ P trAt1s, then ϕ P Ltr1s. If ϕ 
t(△(ρ)) where t ˝ ρ P Lγtr1s, then ϕ  t(△(ρ))  t(△)(t ˝ ρ) P Ltr1s. So
Ltr1s  trL1s. ∎
Thus, there is no harm in overloading the notation “trL1s”. Henceforth, we use
“trL1s” in the sense of Definition 3.1.4 unless otherwise stated.
Recall the definition of a total signature (Definition 1.3.8).
Fact 3.1.6 (Functionality Preserves Intensionality and Totality). Let t : L1⇝L2 be
functional.
(a) L1 is intensional iff trL1s is intensional.
(b) L1 is total iff trL1s is total.
So functionality does guarantee the preservation of some interesting properties.
Functionality does not immediately preserve unambiguity under images, however.
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Example 3.1.7 (Ambiguous Image of Unambiguous Language). WhereCPL is the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of CPL, define At B trϕsCPL |ϕ P LProp u, and
define Op B t„,[u, where:
„ rϕsCPL  r¬ϕsCPL
rϕsCPL [ rψsCPL  rϕ ^ ψsCPL .
Our evaluation space is just V. Define , so that v , rϕsCPL iff v ,CPL ϕ.
Call the resulting language ˚CPL. Let t : ϕ ÞÑ rϕsCPL for ϕ P LProp. Then
t : CPL⇝˚CPL. Moreover, t is functional:
t(¬)(t(ϕ))  r¬ϕsCPL
t(^)(t(ϕ), t(ψ))  rϕ ^ ψsCPL .
But trCPLs is ambiguous. For instance, rϕsCPL  r¬¬ϕsCPL  „ „ rϕsCPL.
Thus, it is important not assume trLs is automatically unambiguous just because L
is. In certain special cases, however, this assumption is justified.
Lemma 3.1.8 (Unambiguity Preserved Under Injective Image). Let L1 and L2 be
logics, and let t : L1 Ñ L2 be injective. Then L1 is unambiguous iff trL1s is
unambiguous.
Proof: Automatically, by Proposition 3.1.2(c), t is functional.
(ñ) Let χ P trAt1s. Then for no△ P Op1 and ρ P Lγ1 is χ  t(△(ρ)), and so
χ , t(△)(t˝ρ). Now suppose that t(△1)(t˝ρ1)  t(△2)(t˝ρ2). Then
t(△1(ρ1))  t(△2(ρ2)), in which case△1(ρ1)  △2(ρ2) by injectivity.
So by the unambiguity of L1, △1  △2 and ρ1  ρ2. Hence, t(△1) 
t(△2) and t ˝ ρ1  t ˝ ρ2.
(ð) The atomic case is the same. So suppose △1(ρ1)  △2(ρ2). Thus,
t(△1)(t ˝ ρ1)  t(△2)(t ˝ ρ2). By the unambiguity of trL1s, that means
t˝ρ1  t˝ρ2, which means by injectivity that ρ1  ρ2. It also means that
t(△1)  t(△2), although this does not yet guarantee that △1  △2.
Suppose for reductio that △1 , △2. Clearly they still must have the
same arity, since t(△1)  t(△2). That means that for some ρ P L
γ
1 ,
△1(ρ) ,△2(ρ). By injectivity, t(△1(ρ)) , t(△2(ρ)), and so t(△1)(t˝
ρ) , t(△2)(t ˝ ρ). But that means t(△1) , t(△2), ☇. Hence,△1 △2,
giving us the unambiguity of L1. ∎
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§ 3.2 Typography
Arguably, functional translational equivalence is at least necessary for notational
variance (at least among intensional languages), although it is clearly not sufficient.
Conversely, it is worth briefly remarking on a very strong property, proposed by
Wójcicki [1988, p. 67], which suffices for notational variance though it is clearly not
necessary, viz., typographical variance. In short, typographical variants are those
logics where one just “rewrites” the operators.
Definition 3.2.1 (Typography). Let L1 and L2 be logics, and let t : L1 Ñ L2. A
Σ2-operator △2 P Op
γ
2 is the typographical variant of △1 P Op
γ
1 via t if for
every ρ P Lγ1 , t(△1(ρ)) △2(t ˝ ρ). We will say t is typographical if every
Σ1-operator has a typographical variant in Σ2 via t.
If there is a typographical translation from L1 to L2, then L1 is in a very strict
sense a notational variant of a fragment of L2. It is easy to verify that there is no
typographical translation from FOL to CPL, or from CPL or IPL to the other. Gen-
erally speaking, however, if we have a translation that preserves the proof-theoretic
operators up to equivalence, we can find a translation that preserves them up to ty-
pographical variance. Below, we will show that there is a translational equivalence
between FOL and CPL that is typographical with respect to the boolean operators.
But first, a lemma:
Lemma 3.2.2 (Preservation of Proof-Theoretic Connectives up to Equivalence). Let
L1 and L2 be some logics and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Suppose t : L1⇝L2. Assuming
L1 and L2 have the appropriate proof-theoretic operators:
(a) t(J1) %$2 J2.
(b) t(ϕ ^1 ψ) %$2 t(ϕ) ^2 t(ψ).
Suppose in addition that t, s : L1↭ L2.
(c) t(K1) %$2 K2.
(d) t(¬1 ϕ) %$2 ¬2 t(ϕ).
(e) t(ϕ _1 ψ) %$2 t(ϕ) _2 t(ψ).
(f) t(ϕ Ñ1 ψ) %$2 t(ϕ) Ñ2 t(ψ).
(g) t(ϕ Ø1 ψ) %$2 t(ϕ) Ø2 t(ψ).
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Proof:
(a) By Fact 2.1.2(f).
(b) tϕ, ψu %$1 ϕ ^1 ψ, so:
t(ϕ ^1 ψ) %$2 tt(ϕ), t(ψ)u %$2 t(ϕ) ^2 t(ψ).
(c) K1 $1 s(K2). So:
t(K1) $2 t(s(K2)) %$2 K2.
Hence, t(K1) %$2 K2.
(d) Since ϕ,¬1 ϕ $1 L1 $1 srL2s, we have:
t(ϕ), t(¬1ϕ) $2 trsrL2ss %$2 L2.
So t(¬1 ϕ) $2 ¬2 t(ϕ). Likewise, s(¬2 ψ) $1 ¬1 s(ψ). In particular:
s(¬2t(ϕ)) $1 ¬1s(t(ϕ)) %$1 ¬1ϕ.
So we have ¬2 t(ϕ) $2 t(¬1 ϕ) as well.
(e) Since ϕ $1 ϕ _1 ψ, we have t(ϕ) $2 t(ϕ _1 ψ). Similarly, t(ψ) $2
t(ϕ _1 ψ). So t(ϕ) _2 t(ψ) $2 t(ϕ _1 ψ). Likewise, s(ϕ1) _1 s(ψ1) $1
s(ϕ1 _2 ψ1). In particular:
ϕ _1 ψ %$1 s(t(ϕ)) _1 s(t(ψ)) $1 s(t(ϕ) _2 t(ψ)).
So we have t(ϕ _1 ψ) $2 t(ϕ) _2 t(ψ) as well.
(f) Since ϕ Ñ1 ψ, ϕ $1 ψ, we have t(ϕ Ñ1 ψ), t(ϕ) $2 t(ψ). Hence, we
have t(ϕ Ñ1 ψ) $2 t(ϕ) Ñ2 t(ψ). Likewise, s(ϕ Ñ2 ψ) $1 s(ϕ) Ñ1
s(ψ). In particular:
s(t(ϕ) Ñ2 t(ψ)) $1 s(t(ϕ)) Ñ1 s(t(ψ)) %$1 ϕ Ñ1 ψ.
So we have t(ϕ) Ñ2 t(ψ) $2 t(ϕ Ñ1 ψ) as well.
(g) Since ϕ, ϕ Ø1 ψ $1 ψ and ψ, ϕ Ø1 ψ $1 ϕ, we have t(ϕ Ø1 ψ) $1
t(ϕ) Ø2 t(ψ). Likewise, s(ϕ Ø2 ψ) $1 s(ϕ) Ø1 s(ψ). In particular:
s(t(ϕ) Ø2 t(ψ)) $1 s(t(ϕ)) Ø1 s(t(ψ)) %$1 ϕ Ø1 ψ.
So we have t(ϕ) Ø2 t(ψ) $2 t(ϕ Ø1 ψ) as well. ∎
95
Chapter 3. Compositionality § 3.2. Typography
Proposition 3.2.3 (Preserving Booleans from FOL to CPL). There is a translation
scheme t, s : FOL↭CPL such that ϕ1, ϕ2 P LProp and all ψ1, ψ2 P LPred:
t(¬ϕ1)  ¬ t(ϕ1) s(¬ψ1)  ¬ s(ψ1)
t(ϕ1 ^ ϕ2)  t(ϕ1) ^ t(ϕ2) s(ψ1 ^ ψ2)  s(ψ1) ^ s(ψ2).
Proof: Let t : FOL  CPL (we know there is such a map by Corollary 2.6.7).
Define t˚ as follows:
t˚(Pn (y1, . . . , yn))  t(Pn (y1, . . . , yn))
t˚(¬ϕ)  ¬ t˚(ϕ)
t˚(ϕ ^ ψ)  t˚(ϕ) ^ t˚(ψ)
t˚(@x ϕ)  t(@x t´1(t˚(ϕ))).
Claim: For all ϕ P FOL, t˚(ϕ) ”CPL t(ϕ).
Subproof: By induction. The atomic case follows by definition. And
the booleans follow by the inductive hypothesis using Lemma 3.2.2. So
now we just need to check the quantifier case. Suppose t˚(ϕ) ”CPL
t(ϕ). Since t´1 is a translation, t´1(t˚(ϕ)) ”FOL t´1(t(ϕ))  ϕ.
Hence, @x t´1(t˚(ϕ)) ”FOL @x ϕ. And since t is a translation, t˚(@x ϕ) 
t(@x t´1(t˚(ϕ))) ”CPL t(@x ϕ), as desired. ∎
Now define s˚ as follows:
s˚(p)  t´1(p)
s˚(¬ϕ)  ¬ s˚(ϕ)
s˚(ϕ ^ ψ)  s˚(ϕ) ^ s˚(ψ).
Again, by induction, for all ϕ P LProp, s˚(ϕ) ”FOL t´1(ϕ).
Now we show that for all ϕ P FOL and all ψ P LProp:
(i) s˚(t˚(ϕ)) ”FOL ϕ
(ii) t˚(s˚(ψ)) ”CPL ψ.
For (i), s˚(t˚(ϕ)) ”FOL t´1(t˚(ϕ)) ”FOL t´1(t(ϕ))  ϕ. Likewise for (ii). ∎
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In the proof above, we used an isomorphism from FOL to CPL to construct a
reversible translation scheme t˚, s˚ that was also preserves the boolean operators
exactly. But the construction does not guarantee that s˚  (t˚)´1, and so it does not
guarantee that there is a isomorphism from FOL to CPL that preserves the boolean
operators. Can we construct such an isomorphism? The answer is negative:
Proposition 3.2.4 (No Isomorphism from FOL to CPL Preserves the Booleans).
There is no t : FOL  CPL such that t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ) and t(ϕ ^ ψ) 
t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ).
Proof: Suppose there is such a t. First, observe that:
t´1(¬ϕ)  t´1(¬ t(t´1(ϕ)))  t´1(t(¬ t´1(ϕ)))  ¬ t´1(ϕ)
t´1(ϕ ^ ψ)  t´1(t(t´1(ϕ)) ^ t(t´1(ψ)))  t´1(t(t´1(ϕ) ^ t´1(ψ))).
So we have t´1(¬ϕ)  ¬ t´1(ϕ) and t´1(ϕ ^ ψ)  t´1(ϕ) ^ t´1(ψ) as well.
Now, observe first that if ϕ P FOL is atomic, then t(ϕ) P Prop. For sup-
pose t(ϕ)  ¬ θ. Then t´1(t(ϕ))  ϕ  t´1(¬ θ)  ¬ t´1(θ). But ϕ is
atomic, and so not a negation, ☇. Similarly for ^. Next, note that the same
observation applies to ϕ  @x ψ. Hence, t(@x ϕ) P Prop. Now, t(F(x)) ,
t(@x F(x)), since otherwise F(x) ”CPL @x F(x), ☇. Hence, t(F(x))  p and
t(@x F(x))  q where p , q. Thus, t(@x F(x)) *CPL t(F(x)). But then t is
not a translation, since @x F(x) (CPL F(x), ☇. ∎
Wójcicki [1988, p. 67] defines two logics to be notational variants just in case
there is a bijective typographical translation from one to the other.3 This seems to
be too stringent, partly due to the fact that isomorphism in some cases seems to
stringent (Example 2.3.4). But even if we were to revise the proposal by replac-
ing isomorphism with translational equivalence, the proposal would still be too
strong. For instance, on this proposal, CPL_ (i.e., CPL with _ as primitive instead
of ^) would not count as a notational variant of CPL. For another illustrative ex-
ample, compare CPL(Ñ) with CPL(Ð), which are like CPL except we replace ^
with Ñ and Ð respectively, where the operators are interpreted in their respective
languages as follows:
v ,Ñ ϕ Ñ ψ ô v .Ñ ϕ or v ,Ñ ψ
v ,Ð ϕ Ð ψ ô v ,Ð ϕ or v .Ð ψ.
3To be fair, Wójcicki seems to treat this definition as a mere technical stipulation. He does not
seem to intend to interpret this definition as a philosophical thesis about what notational variance
amounts to.
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Clearly, CPL(Ñ) and CPL(Ð) are notational variants: formulas in LProp(Ð) seem
to just be the result of writing formulas in LProp(Ñ) backwards. But there is no
typographical translation t : CPL(Ñ)⇝CPL(Ð). If t is typographical, then that
means t(ϕ Ñ ψ)  t(ϕ) Ð t(ψ), since Ð is the only binary operator in CPL(Ð).
Now, since (Ñ ϕ Ñ (ψ Ñ ϕ), that means that (Ð t(ϕ) Ð (t(ψ) Ð t(ϕ)). But
t(ϕ) Ð (t(ψ) Ð t(ϕ)) ”Ð t(ϕ). So (Ð t(ϕ) for all ϕ P LProp(Ñ), ☇.
The problem is that notational variants in general can have very different ways of
representing the same information. Thus, typographical translational equivalence
seems too strict as a precisification of notational variance.
§ 3.3 Schematicity
§ 3.3.1 Definition
Part of the reason typographical equivalence seems too stringent of a criterion for
notational variance is that typographical equivalence requires translating each op-
erator as another operator. Often, when we translate an operator of one language
into another language, we translate it as a schema. In fact, most translations that
one comes across in practice are ones where the translation of an operator is de-
fined as a schema, while very few are typographical.
This suggests one natural way of strengthening the notion of translational equiv-
alence so as to count as a more adequate formalization of notational variance: re-
quire the translation to be schematic. In short, a translation is schematic just in case
the translation of a complex formula is a schema of the translation of the parts
(where each operators is assigned its own schema).4 Schematic translations respect
the underlying syntactic structure of the formulas in the language being translated
by ensuring that formulas that share their operator are translated in roughly the
same way. They thereby preserve not only the the meanings of sentences of the
source language but also the the meanings of operators.
Definition 3.3.1 (Schematicity). Let L1 and L2 be logics. A map t : L1 Ñ L2
is schematic if for each △ P Opγ1 , there is a Σ2-schema Θ△(π) with γ-many
parameters π such that for all ρ P Lγ1 :
t(△(ρ))  Θ△(t ˝ ρ).
We often write “Θ△” as “△t”. We write “t : L1⊸L2” to mean t is a schematic
4See Epstein 1990, p. 391, Pelletier and Urquhart 2003, p. 269, and Caleiro and Gonçalves 2007,
p. 108. The term “compositional” is often used in place of “schematic”. Epstein uses the term
“grammatical”. He argues that two logics should be considered notational variants only if they are
grammatically intertranslatable via model-preserving translations (in the sense of Definition 4.2.1).
Mossakowski et al. [2009, p. 4] argue that we should not require expressively equivalent logics to
be schematically intertranslatable, for reasons we will review shortly.
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translation from L1 to L2. We use “⊸” for schematic intertranslatability, “”
for schematic translational equivalence, and “ ˝=” for schematic isomorphism.
Clearly, every typographical translation is schematic, and every schematic trans-
lation is functional. The converses of these claims all fail. Example 2.1.6 is an easy
counterexample to the claim that schematic translatability implies typographical
translatability. And as we will see below (Proposition 3.3.11), FOL is not schemat-
ically translatable into CPL, although FOL is functionally translatable into CPL by
Corollary 2.6.7 and Proposition 3.1.2.
Schematic maps induce a map from schemas in the source logic to schemas in
the target logic as follows:
Lemma 3.3.2 (Induced Schema Map). Let L1 and L2 be logics, and let t : L1 Ñ










t(ϕ) if Θ  ϕ P L1
ξ if Θ  ξ P Π
△t(t˚ ˝ σ) if Θ  x△, σy.
Let Θ(π) be a Σ1-schema with a γ-sequence of distinct parameters π and let
ρ P Lγ1 . Then t(Θ(ρ))  t˚(Θ)(t ˝ ρ).
Proof: By induction. The base cases are trivial. For the inductive case, we
proceed in terms of instantiations (Definition 1.3.9). Let △ P Opγ1 and let σ
be a γ-sequence of Σ1-schemas with parameters π such that (t˚ ˝ σ)rt ˝ ιs 
t ˝ σrιs.a We want to show that t˚(x△, σy)rt ˝ ιs  t(x△, σy rιs).
First, observe that by induction that ifΘ(π) is a schema, and ifΘ(σ) is the
schema resulting from replacing each π(β) with σ(β), thenΘ(σ)rιs  Θ(σrιs)
for any instantiation ι. Thus:
t˚(x△, σy)rt ˝ ιs  △t(t˚ ˝ σ)rt ˝ ιs
 △t((t˚ ˝ σ)rt ˝ ιs)
 △t(t ˝ σrιs)
 t(△(σrιs))
 t(x△, σy rιs).
This completes the proof. ∎
aThat is: t˚(σ(β))rt ˝ ιs  t(σ(β)rιs) for all β ă γ.
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Convention: In what follows, we write “Θt” in place of “t˚(Θ)”.
Corollary 3.3.3 (Composition of Schematic Maps are Schematic). Let L1 and L2 be
logics. If t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L3 are schematic, then so is s ˝ t.
Proof: Simply define△s˝t  (△t)s and use Lemma 3.3.2. ∎
Corollary 3.3.4 (Schematic Translatability is Transitive). If L1⊸ L2 and L2⊸ L3,
then L1⊸ L3. Similarly, if L1 L2 and L2 L3, then L1 L3.
Before we state the next result, two remarks are in order. First, recall the defini-
tion of an image logic under a functional map (Definition 3.1.4). If t : L1 ⊸ L2,
note that where ρ P Lγ2 , t(△)(ρ)  △t(ρ). However, one should still distin-
guish between t(△) and △t conceptually. t(△) is a function from sequences of
formulas to the instantiation of △t with those formulas, while △t is a schema,
i.e., a sequence of parameters, formulas, and operators. Thus, t(△) lives on a
higher-level than △t, metaphorically speaking, even though applying arguments
to t(△) yields the same result as instantiating △t with those same arguments—
that is, t(△)(t ˝ ρ)  △t(t ˝ ρ). One should be careful not to blur these concepts
together, since t(△) might be an operator in trL1s even if there is no correspond-
ing schema △t. This will be relevant for the interpretation of Propositions 3.3.8
and 3.3.9 below.
In any case, we want a special term to describe when we can safely conflate t(△)
with△t.
Definition 3.3.5 (Schematic Image Operator). Let L1 and L2 be logics and let
t : L1 Ñ L2 be functional. An operator t(△) P Opγtr1s is t-schematic in L2 if
there is a Σ2-schema△t(π) such that for all ρ P Lγ1 , t(△)(t˝ ρ) △t(t˝ ρ).
trL1s as a whole is schematic in L2 if each t(△) P Optr1s is schematic in L2.
Fact 3.3.6 (Schematic Map and Schematic Image). Let L1 and L2 be logics and let
t : L1 Ñ L2 be functional. Then t is schematic iff trL1s is schematic.
Second, we still interpret extensions and fragments in terms of Definition 1.1.15.
Thus, for L1 Ď L2, we only require thatL1 Ď L2 and Γ $1 ϕ iff Γ $2 ϕ. In particular,
we do not require that everyΣ1-operator be aΣ2-operator. Otherwise, the fragment
of first-order logic picked out by the standard translation of modal logic (for in-
stance) would not be considered a fragment of first-order logic, since it is not closed
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under (unguarded) universal quantification. So while it would be interesting to
study the fragments of logics which do only contain operators from their exten-
sions, we do not build this into the definition of a fragment as such. Thus, where
t : L1 Ñ L2, we still have trL1s Ď L2, even though Optr1s Ę Op2.
Still, it would be unnatural for a fragment of a compositional language to have
operators that were not, in any sense, definable in terms of its extension. After all,
the operators of, say, the fragment of first-order logic picked out by the standard
translation are still broadly first-order schemas. So there are special reasons for
focusing on the schematic fragments of a language in particular. For that reason, we
adopt the following convention:
Convention: Let L1 and L2 be logics and let t : L1 Ñ L2 be functional. We
write “trL1s
˝
Ď L2” to mean that trL1s is a schematic fragment of L2.
Fact 3.3.7 (Schematic Images are Schematically Translatable). Let L1 and L2 be log-
ics and let t : L1 Ñ L2 be functional. If trL1s
˝
Ď L2, then id : trL1s⊸ L2.
With these qualifications in place, we can now prove the schematic counterpart
of Proposition 2.2.5.
Proposition 3.3.8 (Alternative Formulation of Schematic Translatability). Let L1
and L2 be logics. Suppose that L1 is intensional and that t : L1 Ñ L2 is func-
tional. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) t : L1⊸ L2.






Proof: It suffices to show that (a) implies (c), since the other implications are
obvious. Clearly, trL1s is schematic. Define s inductively as follows. First,
where t(χ) P trAt1s, let s(t(χ)) be an arbitrary member of rχs1. Next, where
t(△) P Optr1s, use the axiom of choice to set s(t(△)) to be an arbitrary mem-
ber of t△1 P Op1 | t(△1)  t(△) u. Finally, define:
s(t(△)(t ˝ ρ))  s(t(△))(s ˝ t ˝ ρ).
First, observe that s is a translation by Proposition 2.2.4. Next, we show
that s(t(ϕ)) ”1 ϕ for all ϕ P L1. If ϕ P At1, then this follows by definition.
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Now suppose ρ P Lγ1 is such that s ˝ t ˝ ρ ”1 ρ. Then:
s(t(△(ρ)))  s(t(△)(t ˝ ρ))
 s(t(△))(s ˝ t ˝ ρ)
”1 △(s ˝ t ˝ ρ)
”1 △(ρ).
The third step follows since if t(s(t(△)))  t(△), then s(t(△))(ρ1) ”1
△(ρ1) for all ρ1 P Lγ1 . The last step follows by intensionality. Finally, ob-
serve that automatically t(s(ψ)) ”tr1s ψ for ψ P trL1s, since we have that
t(s(t(ϕ))) ”tr1s t(ϕ). ∎
We can relax the requirement that L1 be intensional if t is injective.
Proposition 3.3.9 (Alternative Formulation of Injective Schematic Translatability).
Let L1 and L2 be logics. Suppose that t : L1 Ñ L2 is injective. Then the
following are equivalent:
(a) t : L1⊸ L2.










Proof: We just need to show (a) implies (d). First, notice that Fact 2.3.2 estab-
lishes that t, t´1 : L1  trL1s. So we just need to show that t´1 is schematic.
For each t(△) P Optr1s, define t(△)´1(π) △(π). Then:
t´1(t(△)(t ˝ ρ))  t´1(t(△(ρ)))
 △(ρ)
 △(t´1 ˝ t ˝ ρ)
 t(△)´1(t´1 ˝ t ˝ ρ).
So t´1 is schematic. ∎
We cannot in general drop both the injectivity and intensionality assumptions,
even in moving from (a) to (b). For instance, consider the logics from Example 3.1.7.
Because L1 is ambiguous, we cannot find a schematic translation from L1  trCPLs
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into CPL. If there were a s : trCPLs⊸ CPL, then where s(rϕsCPL) [s s(rψsCPL) 
s(rϕsCPL [ rψsCPL), we would have s(rpsCPL)  s(rpsCPL [ rpsCPL)  s(rpsCPL) [s
s(rpsCPL). Since s(rpsCPL) cannot be a subformula of itself, that must mean that
π1 [s π2  π1 or π1 [s π2  π2—either way, swould not be a translation.
Moreover, we cannot drop the condition that trL1s be schematic. In particular,
L1trL1s, without the assumption that trL1s
˝
Ď L2, does not imply that t : L1⊸L2.
Even if t is schematic for trL1s, whose operators are functions of the form t(△)
where△ P Op1, it does not follow that t will be schematic in L2, whose operators
are not necessarily t(△) and where t(△) may not even be a schema. One way to
bring this out is with the following observation:
Proposition 3.3.10 (From Injective Translatability to Schematic Equivalence). Let
L1 and L2 be logics, and let t : L1⇝L2 be injective. Then t, t´1 : L1 trL1s.
Proof: First, since t(△) P Optr1s, t is automatically schematic. Moreover:
t´1(t(△)(t ˝ ρ))  t´1(t(△(ρ)))
 △(ρ)
 △(t´1 ˝ t ˝ ρ).
So t´1 is also schematic. And by Fact 2.3.2, t, t´1 : L1↭ trL1s. ∎
So injective translatability already guarantees schematic equivalence with the
image logic. Thus, where t : FOL  CPL, FOL ˝= trFOLs  CPL. But we already
observed that, in the case of FOL, it does not seem as though FOL is composition-
ally translatable into CPL; and indeed, we show in a moment that it is not. While
this might seem odd, it does make sense in light of the fact the operators of trFOLs
are not really just the standard boolean operators, but also include more gerryman-
dered operators such as t(@x ).
§ 3.3.2 Applications
Schematicity seems to strike a nice balance between functionality and typographi-
cality. We illustrate this with two examples. First, we show that there is no schematic
translation from FOL into CPL. Thus, schematic translations can differentiate be-
tween FOL and CPL. Second, we show that there is no schematic translation from
IPL into CPL. This suggests that schematic equivalence is closer to notational vari-
ance than mere translational equivalence. The match is not perfect, however, as will
be illustrated by applying the notions to modal logic.
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Proposition 3.3.11 (No Schematic Translation from First-Order Logic to Proposi-
tional Logic). There is no t : FOL⊸ CPL.
Proof: Suppose there were such a t. Let Πx (ξ) be the propositional schema
such that t(@x ϕ)  Πx (t(ϕ)). Then:
J ”CPL t(J) ”CPL t(@x J)  Πx (t(J)) ”CPL Πx (J).
Thus:
t(ϕ) (CPL t(ϕ) Ø J
(CPL Πx (t(ϕ)) Ø Πx (J)
(CPL Πx (t(ϕ))  t(@x ϕ).
So t(ϕ) (CPL t(@x ϕ), contrary to the fact that generally ϕ *FOL @x ϕ, ☇. ∎
Example 2.2.8 mentions that CPL ⇝⇝ IPL, which follows from Theorem 2.6.5.
Interestingly, schematicity introduces an asymmetry. Since the double-negation
translation (Example 2.1.8) is schematic, we still have CPL⊸ IPL. And yet:
Proposition 3.3.12 (No Schematic Translation from a Non-Classical Intermediate
Logic to Classical Logic). Let L be an intermediate logic such that L⊸ CPL.
Then L  CPL.
Proof: Suppose there were a t : L ⊸ CPL. Let Θ(ξ) be the propositional
schema such that t(¬ϕ)  Θ(t(ϕ)). Then:
¬ t(ϕ) $CPL t(ϕ) Ø K
$CPL Θ(Θ(t(ϕ))) Ø Θ(Θ(K))
$CPL Θ(Θ(t(ϕ))) Ø Θ(Θ(t(K)))
$CPL t(¬¬ϕ) Ø t(¬¬K)
$CPL t(¬¬ϕ) Ø t(K).
The step from Θ(Θ(t(ϕ))) Ø Θ(Θ(K)) to Θ(Θ(t(ϕ))) Ø Θ(Θ(t(K))) fol-
lows from the fact that ¬ t(ϕ) $CPL ¬ t(K) %$CPL t(K) Ø K. Hence,
t(¬¬ϕ),¬ t(ϕ) $CPL t(K). So:
t(¬¬ϕ) $CPL t(ϕ) _ t(K)
$CPL t(ϕ _ K)
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$CPL t(ϕ).
But if ¬¬ϕ $L ϕ for all ϕ, then L  CPL. ∎
Corollary 3.3.13 (No Schematic Translation from Intuitionistic Logic to Classical
Logic). There is no t : IPL⊸ CPL.
Theorem 2.6.5 also shows that for any normal modal logic L, L  CPL. But again,
schematicity is strong enough to distinguish CPL from most normal modal logics:5
Proposition 3.3.14 (Schematic Translations from Modal Logic to Propositional Logic).
Let L be a normal modal logic. If L⊸ CPL, then ϕ $L ◻ϕ.
Proof: Let t : L⊸ CPL and let Θ(ξ) be a propositional schema such that
t(◻ϕ)  Θ(t(ϕ)). Observe that there are LProp-formulas λ and µ such that
for all ϕ P L:
Θ(t(ϕ)) %$CPL (t(ϕ) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(ϕ) ^ µ) .
Now, since $L ◻J, we have that:
$CPL t(◻J)  (t(J) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(J) ^ µ) %$CPL λ.
Hence, t(◻ϕ) %$CPL t(ϕ) _ µ. This implies that t(ϕ) $CPL t(◻ϕ), and so
ϕ $L ◻ϕ. ∎
If L is a normal modal logic such that ϕ $L ◻ϕ, then ◻ϕ %$L ◻K _ ϕ.6 Hence,
if L also extends KD, then ϕ %$L ◻ϕ, making L the trivial modal logic Id. Thus, if
t : L⇝CPL is schematic, then either L  Id or L does not satisfy the D-axiom (◇J).
This means that if L is schematically translatable into CPL, it is already a fairly un-
interesting modal logic. In particular:
Corollary 3.3.15 (No Schematic Translation from S5 to CPL). There is no t : S5⊸
CPL.
5Here, I am understanding “modal logic” in terms of local model validity, i.e., Γ $L ϕ if for every
pointed model xM , wy, ifM , w , Γ, thenM , w , ϕ. The results below apply equally to local frame
validity, but not to global (model or frame) validity.
6Proof: Clearly◻K_ϕ $L ◻ϕ. Conversely,◻ϕ,¬ϕ $L ◻¬ϕ and◻ϕ,◻¬ϕ $L ◻(ϕ^¬ϕ) $L
◻K. So ◻ϕ,¬ϕ $L ◻K.
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While schematic translatability seems to conform to our intuitive judgments in
the cases above, it unfortunately does not make all of the right predictions. In par-
ticular, notice that the standard translation STx of K into FOL (Example 2.1.7) is
not technically schematic in the sense of Definition 3.3.1. The problem is that the
◻-clause is not schematically defined:
STx (◻ϕ)  @y ((x _ y) Ñ STy (ϕ)).
Since STx (ϕ) is not a subformula of STx (◻ϕ), STx (◻ϕ) cannot be construed as a
schema Θ such that STx (◻ϕ)  Θ(STx (ϕ)). Moreover, this defect is not repairable
in general:
Proposition 3.3.16 (Schematic Translations from Modal Logic to First-Order Logic).
Let L be a normal modal logic. If t : L⊸ FOL, then ◻ϕ %$L ◻◻ϕ.
Proof: Let Θ(ξ) be the first-order schema such that t(◻ϕ)  Θ(t(ϕ)). With-
out loss of generality, we may assume Θ(ξ) is in prenex normal form, i.e.,
that:
Θ(t(ϕ))  Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(ϕ) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(ϕ) ^ µ))
where λ and µ are boolean combinations of atomic LPred-formulas. Observe
that since $log K ◻J:
$FOL t(◻J)  Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(J) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(J) ^ µ))
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn λ.
So $FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn λ.
First, we show ◻ϕ $L ◻◻ϕ. Using the fact that $FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn λ:
t(◻ϕ) $FOL t(◻ϕ) ^ Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn λ
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (t(◻ϕ) ^ λ) ,
since y1, . . . , yn are already bound in t(◻ϕ). So:
t(◻ϕ) $FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (t(◻ϕ) ^ λ)
$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(◻ϕ) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(◻ϕ) ^ µ))  t(◻◻ϕ).
Hence, t(◻ϕ) $FOL t(◻◻ϕ), and thus, ◻ϕ $L ◻◻ϕ.
Next, we show ◻◻ϕ $L ◻ϕ. Observe that:
Θ(t(ϕ)) %$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(ϕ) _ µ) ^ (¬ t(ϕ) _ λ)) .
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From this, we have the following:
t(◻◻ϕ)
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(◻ϕ) _ µ) ^ (¬ t(◻ϕ) _ λ))
$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (t(◻ϕ) _ µ)
%$FOL t(◻ϕ) _ Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn µ
%$FOL t(◻ϕ) _ (¬ t(◻ϕ) ^ Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn µ)
%$FOL
(
t(◻ϕ) ^ Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn λ
)
_
(¬ t(◻ϕ) ^ Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn µ)
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (t(◻ϕ) ^ λ) _ Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (¬ t(◻ϕ) ^ µ)
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(◻ϕ) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(◻ϕ) ^ µ))  t(◻◻ϕ).
In particular, t(◻◻ϕ) %$FOL t(◻ϕ)_Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn µ. Moreover, unpacking
t(◻(ϕ ^ ψ)) using Lemma 3.2.2:
t(◻(ϕ ^ ψ))
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(ϕ ^ ψ) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(ϕ ^ ψ) ^ µ))
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(ϕ ^ ψ) ^ λ) _ (¬ (t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)) ^ µ))
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(ϕ ^ ψ) ^ λ) _ ((¬ t(ϕ) _ ¬ t(ψ)) ^ µ))
%$FOL Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn ((t(ϕ ^ ψ) ^ λ) _ (¬ t(ϕ) ^ µ) _ (¬ t(ψ) ^ µ)) .
Now, since ◻(ϕ ^ ψ) $L ◻ϕ, and since Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (¬ t(ψ) ^ µ) $FOL
t(◻(ϕ ^ ψ), that means Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (¬ t(ψ) ^ µ) $FOL t(◻ϕ) for any ϕ
and ψ. In particular:
Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn (¬ t(◻ϕ) ^ µ) %$FOL ¬ t(◻ϕ) ^ Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn µ $FOL t(◻ϕ).
Hence, Q1 y1 . . .Qn yn µ $FOL t(◻ϕ). Thus, t(◻◻ϕ) %$FOL t(◻ϕ). ∎
Corollary 3.3.17 (No Schematic Translation from the Minimal Normal Modal Logic
to First-Order Logic). There is no t : K⊸ FOL. Similarly, for no Γ Ď LPred do
we have that K⊸ (FOL)Γ.
The proof does not carry over to every normal modal logic. It is straightforward
to show that the following schematic map is a translation from S5 to FOL:
t(pi)  Pi (x)
t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(◻ϕ)  @x t(ϕ).
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However, I have yet to find a proof that settles which logics validating◻ϕ ”L ◻◻ϕ
can be schematically translated into FOL. Still, the fact that there is no schematic
t : K⊸ FOL already seems unfortunate enough, since it is common to treat modal
logics as notational variants of fragments of first-order logic already. If we want to
do justice to this practice, it would be ill-advised to require notational variants to
be schematically intertranslatable.
§ 3.3.3 Definitional Extensions
Schematic equivalence is sometimes characterized differently as what is called “def-
initional equivalence”. Informally, two logics are definitionally equivalent if there
is an extension of each where the operators of each logic are definable as schemas
from the other.
Definition 3.3.18 (Definitional Extension). Let L1 and L2 be logics. We say that
L2 is a definitional extension of L1 (written “L1 :Ď L22) if:
• L1 Ď L2
• At1 Ď At2 and Op1 Ď Op2
• for each χ P At2 ´ At1, there is an L1-formula θχ such that χ %$2 θχ
• for each γ-ary△ P Op2 ´ Op1, there is a Σ1-schemaΘ△(π) such that for
all ρ P Lγ2 ,△(ρ) %$2 Θ△(ρ).
A definitional extension of a language is likewise defined.
The following is essentially due to Wójcicki [1988, Lemma 1.7.8, p. 62], though
the result below is significantly generalized.7
Proposition 3.3.19 (Wójcicki’s Lemma). Let L1 and L2 be intensional logics where
At1 Ď At2 and Op1 Ď Op2. The following are equivalent:
(a) L1 :Ď L2.
(b) There is a t : L2⊸ L1 such that for all ϕ P L1, t(ϕ)  ϕ.





1 to a Σ1-schema with γ-many parameters such that $2 is the
smallest consequence relation $˚ over L2 where $1 Ď $˚ and for any
7Proposition 3.3.19 encodes two generalizations of Wójcicki’s lemma. First, we do not require
that At1  At2. Second, we allow infinitary operators. This second generalization requires a substan-
tial modification to part (c). In particular, the last step of the proof of what corresponds in Wójciciki’s
version to the implication from (b) to (c) is verified “by a straightforward inductive argument”. This
step in our version is much more complicated because of this generalization, however.
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Σ2-schema Θ(π) and any ρ1, ρ2 P L|π|2 , if for each β ă |π|, one of the
following holds:
(i) ρ2(β)  ρ1(β)
(ii) ρ2(β)  α(ρ1(β)) and ρ1 P At2 ´ At1
(iii) ρ2(β)  σ(△)(ρ3) where ρ(β) △(ρ3)
then Θ(ρ) %$˚ Θ(ρ1).
Part (a) just says L2 extends L1 with some definable atomics and operators. Part
(b) says one can translate the new expressions in L2 into L1 without touching the
old expressions. Part (c) says there is a way of assigning L1-definitions to new
L2-expressions so that L2 is the smallest logic that validates replacement of an ex-
pression with its L1-definition.
Proof:















ϕ if ϕ P At1
θϕ if ϕ P At2 ´ At1
△(t ˝ ρ) if ϕ △(ρ) where△ P Op1
Θ△(t ˝ ρ) if ϕ △(ρ) where△ P Op2 ´ Op1.
We first show that ϕ %$2 t(ϕ) for all ϕ P L2. The proof is by
induction. If ϕ P At2, then clearly ϕ %$2 t(ϕ). Next, let△ P Op2
and let ρ P Lγ2 such that ρ %$2 t ˝ ρ. Since L2 is intensional,
△(ρ) %$2 △(t ˝ ρ). If △ P Op1, then △(ρ) %$2 △(t ˝ ρ) 
t(△(ρ)). Otherwise, △(t ˝ ρ) %$2 Θ△(t ˝ ρ)  t(△(ρ)). This
completes the induction.
Now, since L1 Ď L2, trΓs $2 t(ϕ) iff trΓs $1 t(ϕ). Hence,
Γ $2 ϕ iff trΓs $2 t(ϕ) iff trΓs $1 t(ϕ). So t : L2⊸ L1.
(b) ñ (c). Assume without loss of generality that t is defined as above (since
any such translation must be of this form). We let α(χ)  t(χ) and
σ(△)  Θ△. Let $˚ be the smallest consequence relation over L2
satisfying the properties in (c).a Since t(ϕ)  ϕ for ϕ P L1 and
since t : L2⇝L1, for all Γ Ď L1 and ϕ P L1:
Γ $1 ϕ ô trΓs $1 t(ϕ)
ô Γ $2 ϕ.
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Thus, $1 Ď $2. Moreover, since L2 is intensional, by induction (us-
ing Proposition 1.3.15), $2 satisfies the replacement property in
part (c). Hence, $˚ Ď $2. So we just need to show that $2 Ď $˚.
Suppose Γ $2 ϕ. Then trΓs $1 t(ϕ), and so trΓs $˚ t(ϕ) by (i).
Claim: Let Θ(π) be any Σ2-schema and let ρ1, ρ2 P L|π|2 .
Suppose that for each β ă |π|, either ρ2(β)  ρ1(β) or ρ2(β) 
t(ρ1(β)). Then Θ(ρ) %$˚ Θ(ρ1).
Assuming the claim can be shown, it follows that t(ϕ) %$˚ ϕ for
all ϕ P L2. Hence, Γ $˚ ϕ. Therefore, $2 Ď $˚. The rest of the
proof of this part is spent on proving the claim.
The claim is proved by induction on L2. First, the atomic case.
LetΘ(π) be a Σ2-schema and let ρ1, ρ2 P L|π|2 be such that for each
β ă |π|, either ρ2(β)  ρ1(β) or ρ2(β)  α(ρ1(β)) where ρ1(β) P
At2 ´ At1. Then by definition of $˚ (and t), Θ(ρ1) %$˚ Θ(ρ2).
Next, the inductive case. Suppose Φ Ď L2 is such that the fol-
lowing holds: if Θ(π) is a Σ2-schema and if ρ1, ρ2 P L|π|2 are such
that for all β ă |π|, either ρ2(β)  ρ1(β) or ρ2(β)  t(ρ1(β)) where
ρ1(β) P Φ, then Θ(ρ1) %$˚ Θ(ρ2). (The atomic case showed that
At2 was such aΦ.) We now show that this also holds forΦ`, where:
Φ` B ΦY t△(ρ) | Dγ : ρ P Φγ &△ P Opγ2 u .
Let Θ(π) be a Σ2-schema and let ρ1, ρ2 P L|π|2 be such that for all
β ă |π|, either ρ2(β)  ρ1(β) or ρ2(β)  t(ρ1(β)) where ρ1(β) P















ρ1(β) if ρ2(β)  ρ1(β)
ρ1(β) if ρ1(β) P Φ
△(ρ) if ρ1(β) < Φ & ρ1(β) △(ρ) &△ P Op1
σ(△)(ρ) if ρ1(β) < Φ & ρ1(β) △(ρ) &△ < Op1.
Then for any β ă |π|, either ρ3(β)  ρ1(β) (first three cases) or
ρ3(β)  σ(△)(ρ) where ρ1  △(ρ). So Θ(ρ1) %$˚ Θ(ρ3) by defi-
nition of $˚. Thus, it suffices to show that Θ(ρ3) %$˚ Θ(ρ2). This
will be done by reconceiving Θ(ρ3) as the instantiation of another
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schema with another sequence and then using the inductive hy-
pothesis on this new schema.
Now, we define a new Σ2-schema Θ1(π1) as follows. First, let
β ă |π|. We define the sequence π1 as follows. If for some△ P Op1,
ρ1(β)  △(ρ) and ρ1(β) < Φ (so ρ3(β)  △(ρ)), then define
π1(β)  △(πβ), where πβ are some distinct parameters not used
yet. If for some △ P Op2 ´ Op1, ρ1(β)  △(ρ) and ρ1(β) < Φ (so
ρ3(β)  σ(△)(ρ)), then define π1(β)  σ(△)(πβ), where πβ are
some distinct parameters not used yet. Otherwise, define π1(β) 
π(β). This defines π1. Now defineΘ1(π1) to be the result of replac-
ing each π(β) in Θ with π1(β).
Define the instantiation ι1 so that:
ι1(π(β))  ρ1(β)
ι1(πβ (γ))  ρ(γ) where ρ1 △(ρ) and γ ă β.
Then it is easy to check thatΘ(ρ3)  Θ1rι1s (ι1 just fills in the argu-
ment places for the△s and σ(△)s built into Θ1 that yield Θ(ρ3)).
Define also the instantiation ι2 so that:
ι2(π(β)) 
#
ρ1(β) if ρ2(β)  ρ1(β)
t(ρ1(β)) if ρ2(β) , ρ1(β)
ι2(πβ (γ))  t(ρ(γ)) where ρ1 △(ρ) and γ ă β.
Then Θ1rι2s  Θ(ρ2) by definition of t. But Θ1rι1s %$˚ Θ1rι2s by
the inductive hypothesis (ι2 is just the result of applying t to some
ι1(ξ)s that are in Φ). So Θ(ρ3) %$˚ Θ(ρ2).
(c) ñ (a). It suffices to show that L1 Ď L2 (i.e., that $1 $2æL1), since the prop-















ϕ if ϕ P At1
α(ϕ) if ϕ P At2 ´ At1
△(t ˝ ρ) if ϕ △(ρ) where△ P Op1
σ(△)(t ˝ ρ) if ϕ △(ρ) where△ P Op2 ´ Op1.
Observe that t(ϕ)  ϕ if ϕ P L1 by induction. Hence, if Γ &1 ϕ,
then trΓs &1 t(ϕ). Define:
$˚ B $2 ´ txΓ, ϕy | trΓs &1 t(ϕ) u .
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By definition, if trΓs &1 t(ϕ), then Γ &˚ ϕ. So we just need to show
that $˚ $2 (in particular, that $2 Ď $˚).
To show that $˚ $2, it suffices to show the following: To show
that $˚ $2, it suffices to show the following:
(i) $˚ is a consequence relation
(ii) $1 Ď $˚
(iii) $˚ is intensional
(iv) for all χ P At2 ´ At1: t(χ)  t(α(χ))
(v) for all△ P Op2 ´ Op1 and all ρ P Lγ2 : t(△(ρ))  t(σ(△)(ρ)).
If we show (iii)–(v), then $˚ satisfies the replacement property
from part (c). Together with (i)–(ii), this implies that $˚ Ď $2.
(i) By Proposition 1.1.9, we just need to show that $˚ is mono-
tonically reflexive and transitive. First, monotonic reflexivity.
If ϕ P Γ, then t(ϕ) P trΓs. So Γ $2 ϕ and trΓs $1 t(ϕ). Thus,
Γ $˚ ϕ.
Next, transitivity. If Γ $˚ ∆ $˚ ϕ, that means Γ $2 ∆ $2 ϕ
and trΓs $1 tr∆s $1 t(ϕ). So Γ $2 ϕ and trΓs $1 t(ϕ). Thus,
Γ $˚ ϕ.
(ii) If Γ $1 ϕ, then Γ $2 ϕ and trΓs $1 t(ϕ) (since t maps every
L1-formula to itself). Thus, Γ $˚ ϕ. Therefore, $1 Ď $˚.
(iii) Let △ P Op2. Then if ρ1 %$˚ ρ2, then by definition of $˚,
ρ1 %$2 ρ2 and t ˝ ρ1 %$1 t ˝ ρ2. Since L2 is intensional,
△(ρ1) %$2 △(ρ2). If△ P Op1, then since L1 is intensional:
t(△(ρ1)) △(t ˝ ρ1) %$1 △(t ˝ ρ2)  t(△(ρ2)).
If△ < Op1, then again since L1 is intensional:
t(△(ρ1))  σ(△)(t ˝ ρ1) %$1 σ(△)(t ˝ ρ2)  t(△(ρ2)).
Either way,△(ρ1) %$˚ △(ρ2).
(iv) By definition.
(v) By induction, since σ(△) is a Σ1-schema.
This completes the proof. ∎
aWe know there is a consequence relation with these properties since the trivial conse-
quence relation has them. The smallest such consequence relation can be taken to just be the
intersection of all such consequence relations.
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Proposition 3.3.20 (Alternative Characterization of Schematic Equivalence). Let
L1 and L2 be intensional logics. The following are equivalent:
(a) L1 L2.
(b) There are some intensional L11, L
1
2, and L3 such that L1
˝= L11 :Ď L3 and
L2










(a) ñ (b). We start by defining L11 and L
1








• At11  txψ, 1y |ψ P At1 u, and
• for each △ P Opγ1 , we define △˚ to be the function takes a
γ-sequence ρ and returns the pair xx△, 1y , ρy
• Op11  t△˚ |△ P Op1 u.
Define the map t : L1 Ñ L11 so that t(χ)  xχ, 1y if χ P At1, and
t(△(ρ))  xx△, 1y , t ˝ ρy. Clearly, t is schematic. Moreover, since
Σ1 is unambiguous, t is bijective. Now, define $1 so that trΓs $11
t(ϕ) iff Γ $1 ϕ. Let L11  xL11,$11y. Then t : L1
˝= L11 and L
1
1 is
intensional. We can also define L12 and a s in a likewise manner so
that s : L2
˝=L12 (using ‘2’, say, instead of ‘1’ to ensure thatL12 XL11 
H). Hence, L11  L
1






Let t1, s1 : L11  L
1









$3 to be the smallest consequence $˚ over L3 such that:a
(i) $˚ Ě $11 Y $
1
2
(ii) xL3,$˚y is intensional
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(iii) for all χ P At11, χ %$
˚ t1(χ)
(iv) for all ζ P At12, ζ %$
˚ s1(ζ)
(v) for all△ P (Op11)γ and all ρ P L
γ
3 ,△(ρ) %$˚ △t
1 (ρ)
(vi) for all▽ P (Op12)γ and all ρ P L
γ
3 ,▽(ρ) %$˚ ▽
s1 (ρ).















ϕ if ϕ P At11
s1(ϕ) if ϕ P At12
△(t˚ ˝ ρ) if△ P Op11
△s1 (t˚ ˝ ρ) if△ P Op12.
It is easy to check by induction that t˚(ϕ)  ϕ for all ϕ P L1. By
Proposition 3.3.19, to show that L1 :Ď L3, it suffices to show that
t˚ : L3⊸ L1.
First, note that each of the following is easily proved by induc-
tion:
• t˚(ψ) %$1 s1(ψ) for all ψ P L2
• t˚(ϕ) %$3 ϕ for all ϕ P L3.
Thus, if t˚rΓs $1 t˚(ϕ), then Γ $3 ϕ. To show the converse, define
$˚ as follows:
$˚ B $3 ´ txΓ, ϕy | t˚rΓs &1 t˚(ϕ) u .
If we show that $˚ satisfies (i)–(vi), then it follows that $˚ $3, in
which case Γ $3 ϕ implies t˚rΓs $3 t˚(ϕ) (and so t˚ : L3⊸ L1).
First, note that $˚ is a consequence relation, since it is mono-
tonically reflexive and transitive. Now for (i)–(vi):
(i) Since t˚(ϕ)  ϕ for all ϕ P L1:
Γ $1 ϕ ñ Γ $3 ϕ and t˚rΓs $1 t˚(ϕ) ñ Γ $˚ ϕ.
Similarly, since s1 is a translation and since t˚(ψ) %$1 s1(ψ)
for all ψ P L2:
Γ $2 ϕ ñ Γ $3 ϕ and s1rΓs $1 s1(ϕ)
ñ Γ $3 ϕ and t˚rΓs $1 t˚(ϕ)
ñ Γ $˚ ϕ.
So $1 Y $2 Ď $˚.
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(ii) Suppose ρ1 %$˚ ρ2. Then ρ1 %$3 ρ2 and t˚ ˝ ρ1 %$1 t˚ ˝ ρ2
by definition of $˚. If△ P Op3, then△(ρ1) %$3 △(ρ2) since
L3 is intensional. If△ P Op11, then since L1 is intensional:
t˚(△(ρ1)) △(t˚ ˝ ρ1) %$1 △(t˚ ˝ ρ2)  t˚(△(ρ2)).
If△ P Op12, then since L1 is intensional:
t˚(△(ρ1)) △s
1
(t˚ ˝ ρ1) %$1 △s
1
(t˚ ˝ ρ2)  t˚(△(ρ2)).
Hence,△(ρ1) %$˚ △(ρ2).
(iii) Let χ P At11. Since t
˚(ψ) %$1 s1(ψ) for ψ P L2:
t˚(χ)  χ %$1 s1(t1(χ)) %$1 t˚(t1(χ)).
And since χ %$3 t1(χ), χ %$˚ t1(χ).
(iv) Let ζ P At12. Then t
˚(ζ)  s1(ζ)  t˚(s(ζ)) (since t˚(ϕ)  ϕ
for ϕ P L1). And since ζ %$3 s1(ζ), ζ %$˚ s1(ζ).
(v) Let △ P (Op11)γ and let ρ P L
γ
3 . Then △(ρ) %$3 △t
1 (ρ).
Moreover:
t˚(△(ρ)) △(t˚ ˝ ρ) %$1 △s
1˝t1 (t˚ ˝ ρ)  t˚(△t1 (ρ)).
So△(ρ) %$˚ △t1 (ρ).
(vi) Let ▽ P (Op12)γ and let ρ P L
γ
3 . Then ▽(ρ) %$3 ▽
s1 (ρ).
Moreover:
t˚(▽(ρ)) ▽s1 (t˚ ˝ ρ)  t˚(▽s1 (ρ)).
So▽(ρ) %$˚ △s1 (ρ).
This completes the proof.
(b) ñ (a). It suffices to show that if L1 :Ď L3 and L2 :Ď L3, then L1 L2. We
define t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1 as follows. First, let χ P At1.
Set t(χ)  χ if χ P At2 and otherwise pick an arbitrary θχ P L2
such that χ %$3 θχ and set t(χ)  θχ. Next, let ϕ △(ρ), where
t ˝ ρ is already defined. Set t(△(ρ))  △(t ˝ ρ) if △ P Op2 and
otherwise set t(△(ρ))  Θ△(t ˝ ρ), whereΘ△(ρ1) %$3 △(ρ1) for
all ρ1 P Lγ3 . Define s : L2 Ñ L1 similarly.
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Claim: For all ϕ P L1, ϕ %$3 t(ϕ).
Subproof: By induction. The atomic case is trivial. Let△ P
Op
γ
1 , and let ρ P L
γ
1 be such that ρ(β) %$3 t(ρ(β)) for all
β ă γ. If△ P Opγ2 , then t(△(ρ)) △(t ˝ ρ) %$3 △(ρ) since
L3 is intensional. If△ < Opγ2 , then t(△(ρ))  Θ△(t ˝ ρ) %$3
△(t ˝ ρ) %$3 △(ρ). Either way,△(ρ) %$3 t(△(ρ)). ∎
Thus, Γ $1 ϕ iff Γ $3 ϕ iff trΓs $3 t(ϕ). Likewise for s. So both
t and s are schematic translations. Moreover, let ψ P L2. Since
ψ %$3 s(ψ) %$3 t(s(ψ)) and since L2 :Ď L3, ψ %$2 t(s(ψ)).
Hence, by Proposition 2.2.4, t, s : L1 L2. ∎
aAgain, there is a consequence relation with these properties, since the trivial conse-
quence relation has these properties, and the smallest can be taken to be the intersection
of all such consequence relations.
One way to think about the significance of Proposition 3.3.20 is as follows: if
two logics are schematically equivalent, one can combine them into a single logic
in a way that faithfully preserves the relationship between the two logics. Normally,
we want to say that when we have a translation from L1 into L2 that an L1-formula
and its translation are “equivalent”. But there is no easy way to state this in general,
since the notion of equivalence is always relative to a logic. The best we can say, in
general, is that anL1-formula and its translation are inferentially equivalent, in the
sense that they play the same inferential roles in their respective logics. But when
you have schematic equivalence between L1 and L2, you can find a combined logic
where you can directly state that an L1-formula and its translation are equivalent.
§ 3.4 Schematic Interdependence
Proposition 3.3.16 shows that schematic intertranslatability is, in general, too strong
of a constraint to measure the expressive power of a language if we want proposi-
tional modal logic to be expressively weaker than first-order logic. But that case
does suggest a natural modification of the notion of schematicity.
The problem with the definition of schematicity (Definition 3.3.1) is that some-
times a translation can only be defined simultaneously with other translations. This
is what the standard translation of modal logic into first-order logic illustrates. But
intuitively, that should not matter. What is important is not that the translation
of a complex formula is strictly a schema of the translation of the parts, but rather
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that the translation of a complex formula is uniform and fixed solely by its syntactic
structure. This motivates a more general notion of schematicity along the following
lines:8
Definition 3.4.1 (Interdependent Schematicity). Let L1 and L2 be logics and let
T be a class of maps t : L1 Ñ L2. Where ρ P Lγ1 and τ P Tγ, define the map
(τ ¨ ρ) : γ Ñ L2 so that:
(τ ¨ ρ)(β)  τ(β)(ρ(β)).
We say T is schematically interdependent if for each t P T and each△ P Opγ1 ,
there is a Σ2-schema Θ△(π) with γ-many parameters π and a τ P Tγ such
that t(△(ρ))  Θ△(τ ¨ ρ) for all ρ P Lγ1 . As before, we write “Θ△” as “△t”.
For convenience, we write “△tτ (ρ)” instead of “△t(τ ¨ ρ)”.
A translation t : L1⇝L2 is recursive if it is a member of a schematically
interdependent class of translations from L1 to L2. We write “t : L1  L2”
to mean t is a recursive translation. Likewise, we use “” for recursive in-
tertranslatability, “” for recursive equivalence, and “ ●=” for recursive iso-
morphism (where these notions are defined in the obvious way).
Note that as we are defining it, for a translation to count as recursive, it must be a
member of a schematically interdependent class of translations. It cannot be merely
that there are maps in terms of which it is schematically interdependently defined.
If we only required recursive translations to be members of schematically interde-
pendent classes of maps, then it would be too easy to get recursive translations in
general.
If t is schematic, then it is a member of a schematically interdependent set, but
not vice versa, as the standard translation from K into FOL shows. So the fact that
no schematic translation from FOL to CPL exists does not immediately imply that
there is no recursive translation from FOL to CPL. Similarly for IPL and CPL. For-
tunately, with a little more work, we can achieve this result as well.
Proposition 3.4.2 (No Recursive Translation from First-Order Logic into Proposi-
tional Logic). There is no t : FOL CPL.
8The definition is inspired by the definition of recursive translations from French 2010, p. 16, who
attributes the definition to Steven Kuhn. We could also require recursive translations to translate
atomic formulas schematically. Such a constraint seems well-motivated, but it was not included in
this definition for purposes of generality, as it was not necessary in the results to follow.
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Proof: Suppose there were such a t. LetΘ(π) be aΣCPL-schema with a single
parameter π and let t1 : FOL⇝CPL be such that t(Dx ϕ)  Θ(t1(ϕ)). Since
J ”CPL t(J), we have:
(CPL t(J) ”CPL t(Dx J)  Θ(t1(J)) ”CPL Θ(J).
Hence:
t1(ϕ) (CPL t1(ϕ) Ø J
(CPL Θ(t1(ϕ)) Ø Θ(J)
(CPL Θ(t1(ϕ))  t(Dx ϕ).
So t1(ϕ) (CPL t(Dx ϕ) for all ϕ P FOL. Now, Θ(t1(ϕ)),¬ t1(ϕ) (CPL Θ(K).
Moreover:
¬ t1(K) (CPL t1(K) Ø K
(CPL Θ(t1(K)) Ø Θ(K).
So we have:
t(Dx ϕ),¬ t1(ϕ),¬ t1(K) (CPL Θ(t1(K)).
But t1(K) (CPL Θ(t1(K)), too. So using proof by cases on t1(K):
t(Dx ϕ),¬ t1(ϕ) (CPL Θ(t1(K))  t(Dx K) ”CPL t(K).
Hence, t(Dx ϕ) (CPL t1(ϕ) _ t(K). Moreover, the converse holds too, since
t1(ϕ) (CPL t(Dx ϕ) (from above) and t(K) (CPL t(Dx ϕ). So for all ϕ P FOL:
t(Dx ϕ) ”CPL t1(ϕ) _ t(K).
But it is easy to check that t(ϕ ^ ψ) ”CPL t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ) for any ϕ, ψ P FOL.
Likewise for t1. Thus, we have:
t(Dx ϕ ^ Dx ¬ϕ) ”CPL t(Dx ϕ) ^ t(Dx ¬ϕ)
(CPL (t1(ϕ) ^ t1(¬ϕ)) _ t(K)





But, Dx Fx ^ Dx ¬ Fx *FOL K, ☇. ∎
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Proposition 3.4.3 (No Recursive Translation from Intuitionistic Logic into Classi-
cal Logic). There is no t : IPL CPL.
Proof: Suppose there were a such a t. Let Θ(π) be a ΣCPL-schema and let
t1 : IPL⇝CPL be such that t(¬ϕ)  Θ(t1(ϕ)). Then:
J ”CPL t(J)  t(¬K)  Θ(t1(K)).
So (CPL Θ(t1(K)). Thus:
t1(¬ϕ) (CPL t1(ϕ Ø K)
(CPL t
1(ϕ) Ø t1(K)
(CPL Θ(t1(ϕ)) Ø Θ(t1(K))
(CPL Θ(t1(ϕ)).
So t1(¬ϕ) (CPL t(¬ϕ).
Since (CPL t1(K) _ ¬ t1(K) and (CPL Θ(t1(K)), we have:
(CPL Θ(J) _Θ(K).
Now, t(K) (CPL t(¬ϕ) trivially. So:
¬ t(¬ϕ) (CPL ¬ t(K)




(The last stop holds since ¬ t(¬ϕ) (CPL ¬ t1(¬ϕ) (CPL t1(¬ϕ) Ø K.) Thus,
¬ t(¬ϕ) (CPL Θ(t1(¬ϕ))  t(¬¬ϕ). Hence:
(CPL t(¬ϕ) _ ¬ t(¬ϕ)
(CPL t(¬ϕ) _ t(¬¬ϕ)
(CPL t(¬ϕ _ ¬¬ϕ).
But *IPL ¬ p _ ¬¬ p, ☇. ∎
So far, I have not been able to find a proof that generalizes this result to intermediate
logics below CPL that satisfy weak excluded middle ($ ¬ϕ _ ¬¬ϕ).
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§ 3.5 Limitations
Propositions 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 suggest that recursive translatability is a viable candi-
date for the precisification of the intuitive notion of expressive power. And given
that it is able to capture our initial judgments about the relationship between modal
logic and first-order logic, it is arguably more suited for that role than schematicity.
Even so, there are limitations to the thesis that expressive power is to be measured
by recursive translatability, some of which we will now discuss.
First, we motivated each of the different compositionality constraints explored
in this chapter with the idea that adequate translations ought to preserve the syn-
tactic structure of the language being translated and not just the (in)validity of its
entailment relation. But throughout this chapter, we have been working with a rel-
atively coarse-grained view of syntactic structure, whereby formulas are built from
atomic formulas using some operators. More fine-grained syntaxes ought to be con-
sidered as well, however. For instance, one might impose syntactic structure on the
atomic formulas by requiring that they be freely constructed out of terms and pred-
icates. One might even isolate some atomic terms and atomic predicates as well as
term-forming and predicate-forming operators out of which more complex atomic
formulas are constructed (at which point, one might deem the term “atomic for-
mula” inaccurate). Just as one might require adequate translations to preserve the
meanings of individual operators, so too one might require adequate translations
to preserve the meanings of terms, predicates, and other syntactic categories.
Whether such requirements are generally justified is another matter. Even the
requirement that every schema be translated as a schema might seem too stringent
for some purposes. As an example, consider an alternative formulation of first-
order, which we call “FOLλ”, where quantifiers of the form @x are constructed out
of a single quantifier operator @, which maps predicates to formulas, and a variable
binding operator λx, which maps formulas to predicates.9 It is natural to view these
different versions of first-order logic as mere notational variants. Yet, since schemas
are sequences built from the atomic formulas and the operators of a language, no
schema of FOLλ adequately translates the FOL-schema @x ξ. Similarly, FOL in its
formulation here does not have any kind of predicate-to-formula or formula-to-
predicate operators that could correlate with @ or λx. At minimum, before one can
even address whether these languages are equiexpressive, one would need to de-
velop a more generalized notion of a “schema” that would allow for constructions
other than those given by Definition 1.3.9. And even then, we are left with a diffi-
cult question regarding what syntactic structures need to be preserved by adequate
translations. For instance, does the fact that FOLλ have predicate-to-formula oper-
ators (and vice versa) matter for the purposes of expressivity?
Another class of examples comes from languages with partial signatures (Def-
inition 1.3.8). A natural example comes from the study of propositional logic. It is
9I have Seth Yalcin to thank for this example.
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well-known that every CPL-formula is equivalent to a formula in disjunctive nor-
mal form, i.e., a disjunction of conjunctions of literals (atomic formulas and their
negations).10 Let CPLDNF be the restriction of CPL to formulas in disjunctive nor-
mal form and where the conjunction operator ^ is partial in that (ϕ^ψ) is defined
in CPLDNF iff ϕ and ψ are not disjunctions (_ is still total). On the one hand, there
is a temptation to say that CPL and CPLDNF are expressively equivalent. On the
other hand, there does not seem to be any way to map the operators of CPL to
schemas of CPLDNF, since it does not seem possible to define the translation of ^
and _ schematically so that the translation of (ϕ ^ (ψ _ θ)) is always in disjunc-
tive normal form. For instance, a natural suggestion is to use the following as a
translation:
t(p)  p
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  (t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)) _ (t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ))
t(ϕ _ ψ)  t(ϕ) _ t(ψ).
But then the translation of p ^ (q _ r) is (p ^ (q _ r)) _ (p ^ (q _ r)), which is not
in disjunctive normal form. Intuitively, we want the translation of p ^ (q _ r) to be
something like (p ^ q) _ (p ^ r). While this is in disjunctive normal form, it does
not contain q _ r as a subformula and it is not clear what subformula of this could
possibly act as the translation of q_r. Nor is it clear how appealing to a collection of
schematically interdependent mappings might help. A compositionality constraint
that will render CPL and CPLDNF equivalent while failing to render CPL and FOL
equivalent is still wanted.
These examples suggest that recursivity is not perfect as a measure of expres-
sive power. Perhaps there is a better measure out there waiting to be discovered. Or
perhaps there simply is no unique measure of expressive power that does justice
to all of our intuitions. Still, it is worth emphasizing that recursivity has thus far
done better than other inference-preserving notions considered so far. Such obser-
vations about its limitations ought to be viewed as a recognition that recursivity
is an idealization and as a call to investigate other measures of expressive power
further.
10For simplicity, I assume this allows for “disjunctions” and “conjunctions” of length one, so that





In the previous chapters, we explored in depth the notion of a translation, i.e., a
consequence-preserving map between the formulas of the language. The notion of
translatability is especially promising as a precisification of the notion of expressive
power (or, if you like, interpretability power) for logics. But of course, the notion
of expressive power is often thought of as a property not of logics but of languages.
And as we mentioned near the beginning of Chapter 2, translatability does not seem
sufficient as an explication of the notion of expressive power for languages. So we
return to the question with which we started: how do we precisify the expressivity
of a language?
Intuitively, the expressive power of a language is connected to a language’s abil-
ity to make distinctions between different possibilities. It is natural to think that one
language is more expressive than another just in case the former recognizes more
possibilities than the latter, i.e., just in case (a) any two possibilities that the lat-
ter language can distinguish can be distinguished by the former language, and (b)
there are some possibilities that the former language can distinguish that are indis-
tinguishable according to the latter language. Indeed, this is the most common
approach found in the literature for defining a precise measure of a language’s
expressive power. This chapter categorizes different ways of making precise this
notion of “distinguishing” among the possibilities and develops in more mathe-
matical detail the relationship between these different notions.
The guiding metaphor throughout this chapter is of carving “logical space” (or
“modal space”). Very roughly, we can think of logical space as the space of all
genuine possibilities—that is, the space of all ways the world could have been.1
Initially, this space is unstructured; there is no underlying metric, order, or anything
of the sort placed on this space. That is where the role of the language comes to the
foreground: the role of a language is to articulate structure on this space.
1The sense of “could” here should not be interpreted as metaphysical or epistemic. We should
think of it less reductively in terms of “semantic” possibilities. See Schwarz 2018.
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The simplest kind of structure a language can articulate is that of division. This
is enacted by pairing a syntax (which for now can be thought of as a class of well-
formed formulas) with a semantics (a relation between points in logical space and
formulas). When a formula is interpreted by a semantics, it can be thought of as
determining a cut in logical space between the possibilities that satisfy that formula
and the possibilities that do not. A language might impose other kinds of structure
as well, though our main focus in this chapter will be on division.
Using this guiding metaphor, then, we can think of the expressive power of a
language as being determined by the structures it can articulate. Thus, two lan-
guages have equal expressive power if they each can articulate the same structures
on logical space as the other. So for instance, if the main kind of structure we care
about is division, then two languages have equal expressive power if every division
one of the languages can make can be made by the other language. Put differently,
two languages will have equal expressive power if every formula from one lan-
guage is satisfied by the same possibilities that some other formula from the other
language is satisfied by. This idea is explored in § 4.1.
However, this notion of expressive power, though quite useful for many practi-
cal purposes, is not sufficiently general for other purposes. Often times, we want
to compare the expressive power of languages that are defined over different con-
ceptions of logical space (or are at least not assumed to defined over the same con-
ception of logical space). For instance, we might want to compare the expressive
powers of classical and nonclassical languages, or of non-modal and modal lan-
guages, where the model space is not generally the same. Arguably, this should be
achievable: expressive power is a measure of a language’s ability to articulate a cer-
tain kind of structure on a logical space. It does not crucially hinge on the contents
of that space. So in § 4.2, we explore ways that we can generalize the notions of
expressive power from § 4.1 so as to be able to compare languages with competing
conceptions of logical space. The metaphor used in this section is that of transform-
ing logical space: if two languages can articulate the same structures, one should be
able to transform the logical space of one language into the other while preserving
that structure.
§ 4.1 Carving Logical Space
The guiding idea behind the notions of expressive power developed here is that of
carving logical space: two languages should be deemed expressively equivalent if
they carve logical space in the same way.2 Each of the notions discussed below are
motivated by this intuitive idea and each attempts to make it more precise.
2This notion crucially assumes that the existence of the semantic value of a formula does not de-
pend on the point of evaluation. This might be called into question if one maintained an externalist
view of semantic values. See Stalnaker 2012. For now I will set this issue aside. Still, I wish to thank
Seth Yalcin for bringing this to my attention.
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§ 4.1.1 Expressibility
The first notion of expressive power we discuss is perhaps the simplest: two lan-
guages are expressively equivalent if there is a translation from one to the other that
preserves meaning. Here, “meaning” should be interpreted in terms of semantic
value (Definition 1.1.2). In terms of logical space, two languages are expressively
equivalent if every cut in logical space one language can make can equally be made
in the other. We now make this idea precise.
Definition 4.1.1 (C-language). Where C is a class of points, a C-language is a
language L where CL  C.
Definition 4.1.2 (Expressibility). Let L1 and L2 be C-languages. We say that
L1 is expressible in (or included in) L2 (written “L1 ď L2”) if for every L1-
formula ϕ, there is an L2-formula ψ such that ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦ψ⟧2. We say that
L1 is strictly expressible in (strictly included in) L2 (written “L1 ă L2”) if
L1 ď L2 but L2 ę L1. Finally, we say that L1 is (expressively) equivalent to L2
(written “L1 « L2”) if L1 ď L2 and L2 ď L1.
With the axiom of choice (for classes), we can restate this definition in terms of a
translation as follows:
Lemma 4.1.3 (Expressibility and Translations). Let L1 and L2 be C-languages.
(a) L1 ď L2 iff there is a function t : L1 Ñ L2 such that for all ϕ P L1:
⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2 .
(b) L1 « L2 iff there are functions t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1 such that
for all ϕ P L1 and ψ P L2:
⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2  ⟦s(t(ϕ))⟧1
⟦ψ⟧2  ⟦s(ψ)⟧1  ⟦t(s(ψ))⟧2 .
Proof: (b) immediately follows from (a), so we just prove (a). The right-to-left
direction is trivial. For the left-to-right direction, suppose L1 ď L2. Define the
set of L2-formulas |ϕ| B tψ P L2 | ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦ψ⟧2 u. By the axiom of choice,
there is a function t that maps every ϕ P L1 to a member of |ϕ|. ∎
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Notation: We write “t : L1 ď L2” to indicate that L1 is expressively included
in L2 via t, i.e., for all ϕ P L1, ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2.
Example 4.1.4 (Hybrid Logic). Where Prop  tp1, p2, p3, . . .u and where Var 
tx1, x2, x3, . . .u (as before), let LH be the following syntax:
ϕ F p | x | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | ◻ϕ | @xϕ | Óx.ϕ.
Define CH B CFOL and define ,H as follows (where _ is some designated
binary predicate and “a _ b” means “xa , by P IM (_)”):
M , g ,H pi ô g(x1) P IM (P1i )
M , g ,H x ô g(x1)  g(x)
M , g ,H ¬ϕ ô M , g .H ϕ
M , g ,H ϕ ^ ψ ô M , g ,H ϕ andM , g ,H ψ
M , g ,H ◻ϕ ô @a P DM : g(x1) _ a ñ M , gx1a ,H ϕ
M , g ,H @xϕ ô M , gx1g(x) ,H ϕ
M , g ,H Óx.ϕ ô M , gxg(x1) ,H ϕ.
Define H B xLH,CH,,Hy. That is, H is a formulation of propositional hybrid
logic. Now, let FOL_ be the fragment of FOL() where all quantifiers are
bounded by _ (i.e., of the form @y (x _ y Ñ ¨ ¨ ¨) where x , y) and where





3 , . . ., the identity predicate , or the single binary predicate _. Then
H « FOL_.
To show that H ď FOL_, define STn : LH Ñ LPred for each x P Var as
follows:
STy (pi)  P
1
i (y)
STy (x)  (y  x)
STy (¬ϕ)  ¬ STy (ϕ)
STy (ϕ ^ ψ)  (STy (ϕ) ^ STy (ψ))
STy (◻ϕ)  @z ((y _ z) Ñ STz (ϕ)) where z is not in STy (ϕ)
STy (@xϕ)  STx (ϕ)
STy (Óx.ϕ)  STy (ϕ)rx{ys,
where αrx{ys is the result of replacing each free instance of x in α with y.
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Conversely, to show that FOL_ ď H, define HT : LPred Ñ LH as follows:
HT(P1i (x))  @x pi
HT(x  y)  @x y
HT(x _ y)  @x◇y
HT(¬ϕ)  ¬ HT(ϕ)
HT(ϕ ^ ψ)  (HT(ϕ) ^ HT(ψ))
HT(@y ((x _ y) Ñ ϕ))  @x◻Óy.HT(ϕ).
Then for all α P L_Pred, ⟦α⟧FOL_  ⟦HT(α)⟧H.
We now briefly turn to observing that ď and « satisfy some natural constraints.
Fact 4.1.5 (Inclusion is a Preorder). ď is a preorder on languages.
Corollary 4.1.6 (Expressive Equivalence is a Congruence Relation). « is an equiv-
alence relation on languages. Moreover, it is a congruence relation for ď, i.e.,
if L1 « L11 and L2 « L
1





By Corollary 4.1.6, the following precisification of expressive power is well-defined:
Definition 4.1.7 (Expressive Power). The expressive power of L is the equiv-
alence class rLs« B tL1 | L « L1 u. (We drop mention of « throughout.) We
define the relation ď on expressive powers so that rL1s ď rL2s iff L1 ď L2.
Likewise for ă and «.
Fact 4.1.8 (Independence of Representative). Let L1 and L2 be C-languages. Then
rL1s ď rL2s iff for all L11 P rL1s and all L
1




2. Thus, ď on expressive
powers is independent of the representative chosen.
Fact 4.1.9 (Inclusion on Expressive Powers is a Partial Order). The relation ď on
expressive powers is a weak partial order.
Fact 4.1.10 (Fragments are Expressible in Their Extensions). For any C-languages,
L1 and L2, if L1 Ď L2, then L1 ď L2.
Hence, any language that is expressively equivalent to a fragment of L is (by
transitivity) expressively included in L. The converse also holds:
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Proposition 4.1.11 (Inclusion is Equivalence to a Fragment). Let L1 and L2 be
C-languages. The following are equivalent:
(a) L1 ď L2.
(b) There is a L12 Ď L2 such that L1 « L
1
2.
Proof: The proof from (b) to (a) is given by Fact 4.1.10. For (a) to (b), it suffices
to show that L1 « trL1s where t : L1 ď L2. Clearly, L1 ď trL1s. For the
converse, observe that while t´1 (the inverse of t) might not necessarily be
a function, we can always find a total function on trL1s contained in t´1.
Let t˚ Ď t´1 be a total function on trL1s. Since t˚ is a right inverse of t,
⟦t˚(t(ϕ))⟧1  ⟦t(t
˚(t(ϕ)))⟧2  ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2. Hence, we have that trL1s ď L1. ∎
Fact 4.1.10 does not automatically generalize to expansions of languages. For
one thing, ď is only defined for languages which share the same evaluation space.
But even setting that aside, there is still a further complication, viz., that we might
extend the content of ϕ when we extend the evaluation space to C2, and that no
sentence has a content in L2 that exactly matches ⟦ϕ⟧1. To fix this, it would be
natural to consider a more relativized version of expressibility that can allow for
fragments of this sort to be comparable.
Definition 4.1.12 (Relative Expressibility). Let L1 and L2 be languages, and let
C be a class. We say that L1 is C-expressible in L2 (written “L1 ďC L2”) if for
everyL1-formula ϕ, there is anL2-formula ψ such that ⟦ϕ⟧1 XC  ⟦ψ⟧2 XC.
Strict C-inclusion (ăC) and C-equivalence («C) are similarly defined.
Thus, ď is the special case of ďC when C  C1  C2. If C  H, then every
language is trivially expressively equivalent to every other language. As another
special case, we have the following:
Fact 4.1.13 (Restrictions are Relatively Expressible in their Expansions). For any
languages L1 and L2, if L1 Ť L2, then L1 ďC1 L2
We mostly focus on the unrelativized notions of expressibility below.
§ 4.1.2 Weak Expressibility
It is common (e.g., in the literature on the expressive power of modal languages)
to adopt a more generous notion of expressibility that is strictly weaker than the
notion of expressibility adopted here. In particular, the notion of expressibility from
Definition 4.1.2 assumes that for each formula in the source language, we need to
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find a single formula with the same semantic value in the target language for the
source language to be expressible in the target language. One might instead be
willing to allow that a formula from the source language is “expressible” in the
target language if there is some class of formulas in the latter with the same semantic
value.
Definition 4.1.14 (Weak Expressibility). Let L1 and L2 be C-languages. We say
that L1 is weakly expressible in L2 (written “L1 ĺ L2”) if for every class of
L1-formulas Γ, there is a class of L2-formulas ∆ such that ⟦Γ⟧1  ⟦∆⟧2. We
use “ă” for strict weak expressibility, and “„” for weak expressive equiva-
lence. We define the relativized versions of weak expressibility analogously
to Definition 4.1.12.
Lemma 4.1.15 (Equivalent Definition of ĺL). For any languages L1 and L2 and
any class C, we have that L1 ĺC L2 iff for every L1-formula ϕ, there is a class
of L2-formulas ∆ such that ⟦ϕ⟧1 X C  ⟦∆⟧2 X C.
Proof: Left-to-right is obvious, since we can consider singletons of the form
tϕu. For the right-to-left direction, let Γ be a set of L1-formulas. We know by
hypothesis that for each ψ P Γ, there is a class of L2-formulas ∆ψ such that




2 X C. Let ∆ B
Ť
ψPΓ ∆ψ. Then ⟦Γ⟧1 X C  ⟦∆⟧2 X C. ∎
Corollary 4.1.16 (Expressibility Implies Weak Expressibility). For any C, and any
languages L1 and L2, if L1 ďC L2, then L1 ĺC L2.
Proof: Immediate from Lemma 4.1.15. ∎
It is straightforward to check the facts above regarding ď all apply to ĺ. However,
the two notions of expressibility are not equivalent: weak expressibility is strictly
weaker than expressibility.
Example 4.1.17 (Weak Expressibility Does Not Imply Expressibility). Consider
two simple languages L1 and L2, where:
• L1  tp1, p2, p3, p4u
• L2  tq ,¬ q , r,¬ ru
• C1  C2  tx1, x2, x3, x4u
• ⟦pi⟧1  txiu
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• ⟦q⟧2  tx1, x2u, ⟦r⟧2  tx1, x3u, and ⟦¬ϕ⟧2  C2 ´ ⟦ϕ⟧2.
Now, L1 ĺ L2; for instance, ⟦p2⟧1  tx2u  ⟦q⟧2 X ⟦¬ r⟧2  ⟦tq ,¬ ru⟧2. But
L1 ę L2; in fact, none of the formulas in L1 pick out the same set of points as
any of the formulas in L2.
Example 4.1.18 (Restricted Infinite Quantification). Recall that LPred is the syn-
tax of standard first-order logic. LetLPred() be the syntax of first-order logic
with identity. Define the new syntax L8Pred() as follows:
L8Pred  LPred() Y tD8xi ϕ |ϕ P LPred() & i P Nu .
Where FOL is the usual language of first-order logic, define FOL() as the
usual language of first-order logic with identity and FOL8() as the exten-
sion of FOL() with the following semantic clause:






ˇM , gxa , ϕ
(ˇ
ˇ ě ℵ0.
Then FOL8() ĺ FOL(). In particular, let Děn x ϕ abbreviate the LPred()-
formula that says “there are at least n ϕs”. Then for any L8Pred()-formula
of the form D8x ϕ, the set tDěn x ϕ | n ě 1u picks out the same class of mod-
els. But FOL8() ę FOL(), since D8x (x  x) is already not expressible in
FOL() by compactness.
These examples, while simple, are somewhat gerrymandered. I have not yet come
up with a more natural example of some languages where one is only weakly ex-
pressible in the other.
Of course, in languages with infinitary conjunction, the differences between
these two notions of expressive power collapse, since you can simply take your
translating formula to be the conjunction of the translating class. And in fact, the
converse is true as well: weak expressibility implies expressibility only if the target
language has infinitary conjunction.
Proposition 4.1.19 (Collapsing Expressibility to Weak Expressibility). Let L2 be a
C-language. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) For any C-language L1, if L1 ĺ L2, then L1 ď L2.
(b) L2 has infinite conjunction.
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Proof: Showing (b) implies (a) is easy. To show that (a) implies (b), let Γ Ď L2.
Define the language L1  xL2,C,,1y such that for all ϕ P L2 and x P C:
x ,1 ϕ ô x ,2 Γ and x ,2 ϕ.
Then if ϕ P L2, ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦ΓY tϕu⟧2. Hence, L1 ĺ L2, and thus L1 ď L2. Now,
let ψ P Γ. Then ⟦ψ⟧1  ⟦Γ⟧2, so by expressibility, there is a
Ź
Γ P L2 such
that ⟦ψ⟧2  ⟦
Ź
Γ⟧2  ⟦Γ⟧2. ∎
The proof of Proposition 4.1.19 shows how to generate a large number of counterex-
amples to the collapse of weak and strong expressibility when infinite conjunctions
are absent. But this construction does not give us, for any L2 without infinite con-
junction, a relatively natural language L1 such that L1 ĺ L2 but L1 ę L2.
As far as I am aware, no one has seriously defended the claim that expressive
power should be measured by weak expressibility rather than expressibility. For
natural languages, it would be odd to use weak expressibility as a form of expres-
sive power since one literally could not utter an infinite number of sentences. But for
formal languages, whose purpose is more theoretical in nature, this consideration
does not apply. In practice, most expressibility results which show that L1 ĺ L2 al-
ready show that L1 ď L2; similarly, most inexpressibility results that show L1 ę L2
already show L1 ł L2. So we will not concern ourselves here with the question of
which is more fitting as a notion of genuine expressive power.
§ 4.1.3 Discernibility
The most common technique used for showing that one language is lacking in ex-
pressive power compared to another is to construct two models which are equiva-
lent relative to the former but disagree one some sentence in the latter—that is, if
the former cannot discern the difference between two possibilities discernible by
the latter. For example, to show that the standard propositional modal language
cannot express some formula in the correspondence language, one first constructs
two modally equivalent (usually, bisimilar) models, and then demonstrates that
these models disagree on the formula from the correspondence language. This
suggests an alternative form of expressive power: two languages are expressively
equivalent if the ways they carve logical space are equally fine-grained.
Definition 4.1.20 (Discernibility). Let L1 and L2 be C-languages. We say L1 is
discernible in L2 (written “L1 Ď L2”) if for all x , y P C, if Diag2(x)  Diag2(y),
then Diag1(x)  Diag1(y)—alternatively, using the “”” notation from Defi-
nition 1.1.25, if x ”2 y, then x ”1 y. We say L1 is strictly discernible in L2
(written “L1 < L2”) if L1 Ď L2 but L2 @ L1. We say that L1 is discernibly
equivalent to L2 (written “L1 ĚĎ L2”) if L1 Ď L2 and L2 Ď L1.
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Fact 4.1.21 (Discernibility is a Preorder). Ď is a preorder.
Proposition 4.1.22 (Weak Expressibility Implies Discernibility). Suppose L1 and
L2 are both C-languages. If L1 ĺ L2, then L1 Ď L2.
Proof: Suppose that Diag2(x)  Diag2(y) but Diag1(x) , Diag1(y) for some
x , y P CL. Without loss of generality, assume there is a ϕ P L1 such that
x ,1 ϕ and y .1 ϕ.a Let ∆ Ď L2. Since Diag2(x)  Diag2(y), we have
x ,2 ∆ iff y ,2 ∆. If x ,2 ∆ and y ,2 ∆, then ⟦∆⟧2 Ę ⟦ϕ⟧1 since y is
a counterexample. If x .2 ∆ and y .2 ∆, then ⟦ϕ⟧1 Ę ⟦∆⟧2 since x is a
counterexample. So either way, ⟦ϕ⟧1 , ⟦∆⟧2. But then L1 ł L2. ∎
aIt might be that Diag1(x)  H, in which case there is no such ϕ; but then there is a ϕ P L1
such that x .1 ϕ and y ,1 ϕ. The proof in this case is symmetric.
Corollary 4.1.23 (Refuting Expressibility). Let L1 and L2 be C-languages. If
there are some x , y P C such that x ”2 y but x ,1 ϕ while y .1 ϕ for
some ϕ P L1, then L1 ę L2.
In words, to show that L1 ę L2, it suffices to find two points of evaluation that
agree on L2 but disagree on L1. We briefly present an example of Corollary 4.1.23
in action.
Example 4.1.24 (Universal Modality). Let K be the minimal normal modal logic
(as before) and let K` be the extension of K with the unary operator ∎ such
that for all pointed Kripke models xM ,wy and all ϕ:
M , w ,` ∎ϕ ô @v P WM : M , v ,` ϕ.
Obviously, K ď K`. But K` ę K, since K` @ K. For letM  xtw , vu ,H,Vy
be such that V (p)  twu and letN  xtwu ,H,Vy. Then it can be shown that
M , w and N , w are bisimilar (and hence thatM , w ”K N , w), even though
M , w .` ∎p whileN , w ,` ∎p.
It should also be noted that showing this is not necessary for showing failures
of expressibility. That is, L1 might be discernible in L2 without being even weakly
expressible in L2.
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Example 4.1.25 (Discernibility Does Not Imply Weak Expressibility). Let L1 and
L2 be defined as follows:
• L1  L2  tpu
• C1  C2  txu
• x .1 p but x ,2 p.
Then vacuously, L1 Ď L2 (in fact, L1 ĚĎ L2), but L1 ł L2.
Discernibility is a rather weak notion of expressive power. To say that two lan-
guages are discernibly equivalent is just to say that each fractures logical space
with equal granularity. But it says nothing about how the two languages fracture
it. It could be that one language has a sentence for each class of equivalent points
whereas another only achieves fracturing after applying many different cuts through
logical space. Though discernibility is a way of measuring a language’s ability to
distinguish possibilities, it does not guarantee that there is a way of “preserving
meaning” of formulas from one language into another.
One way to see this is that, unlike (weak) expressibility, discernibility does not
imply discernible equivalence to a fragment:
Example 4.1.26 (Discernibility Does Not Imply Discernible Equivalence to a Frag-
ment). Let L1 and L2 be defined as follows:
• L1  tpu, L2  tq , ru
• C1  C2  tx1, x2, x3, x4u
• Diag1(x1)  Diag1(x2)  tpu, Diag1(x3)  Diag1(x4)  H
• Diag2(x1)  tqu, Diag2(x2)  tru, Diag2(x3)  tq , ru, Diag2(x4)  H
Then L1 < L2, even though there is no L12 Ď L2 such that L1 ĚĎ L
1
2.
The above example makes use of the fact that a language can discern a region of
logical space not just by what formulas the points in that region satisfy but also
by what formulas they do not satisfy. In languages with truth-functional negation,
however, there is no difference between the two. Indeed, as one would suspect,
this is essential. For we saw in Proposition 4.1.11 that expressibility is expressive
equivalence to a fragment. And indeed, there are special circumstances making use
of truth-functional negation where ĺ or ď collapse to Ď, akin to Proposition 4.1.19.
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Proposition 4.1.27 (Collapsing Expressibility to Discernibility). Let L2 be a C-
language. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) For any C-language L1, if L1 Ď L2, then L1 ď L2.
(b) L2 has infinite conjunction and truth-functional negation.
Proof:
(a) ñ (b). Suppose L1 Ď L2 implies L1 ď L2 for all C-languages L1. By
Corollary 4.1.16 and Proposition 4.1.19, L2 has infinite conjunc-
tion. Now, let ϕ P L2. Define the language L1  xtpu ,C,,1y such
that:
x ,1 p ô x .2 ϕ.
If x , y P C are such that Diag1(x) , Diag1(y), then either p P
Diag1(x) and p < Diag1(y) or vice versa. Without loss of gen-
erality, suppose it is the former. Then x .2 ϕ and y ,2 ϕ, so
Diag2(x) , Diag2(y). Hence, L1 Ď L2, and so L1 ď L2. So there is
a ¬ϕ P L2 such that ⟦p⟧1  ⟦¬ϕ⟧2  C ´ ⟦ϕ⟧2.
(b) ñ (a). Suppose L2 has infinite conjunction and negation and suppose L1 Ď
L2. Let ϕ P L1. Since infinite disjunction can be defined in terms
of infinite conjunction and negation, we can define the formula


























y P C and y .1 ϕ
+
.
We now show that ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦ϕ˚⟧2.
First, suppose x < ⟦ϕ⟧1. Then x .2 ϕ
˚
2 , so trivially x .2 ϕ
˚.
Hence, x < ⟦ϕ˚⟧2. Next, suppose x P ⟦ϕ⟧1. Clearly, x ,2 ϕ
˚
1 .
Suppose for reductio that x .2 ϕ˚2 . That means that for some y P C
such that y .1 ϕ, x ,2 Diag2(y). Since x ,1 ϕ and y .1 ϕ,
Diag1(x) , Diag1(y). So Diag2(x) , Diag2(y) by discernibility.
Hence, Diag2(y) Ă Diag2(x). But by Fact 1.3.24, any language with
negation must be opinionated, ☇. Thus, x ,2 ϕ˚2 , and so x P ⟦ϕ
˚⟧2.
Therefore, ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦ϕ˚⟧2. ∎
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In light of this result, it would be natural to ask whether one can characterize
the conditions under which weak expressibility and discernibility collapse. The
answer is affirmative, though the conditions are somewhat less natural to state. Let
us say that L has setwise negation if for any Γ Ď L, there is a ¬ Γ Ď L such that
⟦¬ Γ⟧  C ´ ⟦Γ⟧. Let us also say that L has infinite setwise disjunction if for all
Σ Ď ℘ (L), there is a
Ž





Proposition 4.1.28 (Collapsing Weak Expressibility to Discernibility). Let L2 be a
C-language. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) For any C-language L1, if L1 Ď L2, then L1 ĺ L2.
(b) L2 has infinite setwise disjunction and setwise negation.
Proof:
(a) ñ (b). Where Σ Ď ℘ (L) and ∆ Ď L, define L_1  xtpu ,C,,_1 y and L
¬
1 
xtqu ,C,,¬1 y so that:
x ,_1 p ô DΓ P Σ : x ,2 Γ
x ,¬1 q ô x .2 ∆.
Then the proof is as in Proposition 4.1.27.





tDiag2(x) | x P C and x ,1 ϕu
Φ˚2 B ¬
ł
tDiag2(y) | y P C and y .1 ϕu .
Then the proof is as in Proposition 4.1.27.a ∎
aNote that a language is opinionated if it has even setwise negation.
These results say that a language L (weakly) expressively includes every lan-
guage discernible in it just in case some truth-functional connectives are present.
One might wonder whether there is a similar result stating the conditions under
which a language L is (weakly) expressively included in every language that it is
discernible in. The answer is either negative (in the case of expressibility) or as
good as negative (in the case of weak expressibility).
First, some qualifications are needed to make the question interesting. For one
thing, observe that if L1  H, then vacuously L1 ď L2 for any C-language L2. Thus,
the question is only interesting if we restrict to nonempty languages. Moreover, if
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L1 , H but C  H, then vacuously L1 Ď L2, though L1 ď L2 iff L2 , H. So the
answer to our question is trivial if C  H. Finally, ifL2  H, then vacuously L1 Ď L2
iff Diag1(x)  Diag1(y) for all x , y P C, while L1 ď L2 iff L1  H. Hence, the inter-
esting question is when a nonempty language over a nonempty evaluation space is
expressible in every nonempty language that it is discernible in. The answer to that
question is never:
Proposition 4.1.29 (No Non-Trivial Language is Expressible in Every Non-Trivial
Language it is Discernible In). Let L1 be a C-language whereL1 ,H and C ,H.
Then there is a C-language L2 where L2 ,H such that L1 Ď L2 but L1 ę L2.
Proof: Suppose for all C-languages L2, if L1 Ď L2, then L1 ď L˚1 . Define
L˚1 B xC,C, y. Cleary, L1 Ď L
˚
1 , since Diag
˚
1 (x)  Diag
˚
1 (y) iff x  y. Hence,
for all ϕ P L1, there is an x P C such that ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦x⟧˚1  txu. That is,
|⟦ϕ⟧1|  1 for all ϕ P L1 (i.e., L1 is already maximally fine-grained).
We now distinguish three cases, showing that in either case there is a C-
language L2 (with L2 ,H) such that L1 Ď L2 and L1 ę L2, ☇.
Case 1: |C|  1. Then trivially L1 Ď L2 for any C-language L2. Define L2 B
xtpu ,C,Hy. Then L1 ę L2, since for all ϕ P L1, ⟦ϕ⟧1  C, whereas
⟦p⟧2  H , C.
Case 2: |C|  2. Let C  tx , yu. Since |⟦ϕ⟧1|  1 for all ϕ P L, it cannot be
that Diag1(x)  Diag1(y)  L1. Without loss of generality, suppose
Diag1(x) , L1. If Diag1(x)  H (and so Diag1(y)  L1), then define:
L2 B xtpu ,C, txx , pyuy .
Then L1 Ď L2, since Diag2(x) , Diag2(y). But L1 ę L2, since ⟦ϕ⟧1  tyu
for all ϕ P L1 while ⟦p⟧2  txu.
If instead Diag1(x) ,H (and so Diag1(y) , L1a), define:
L2 B xDiag1(x),C,,1æDiag1(x)y .
Then once more L1 Ď L2. But L1 ę L2, since if ϕ P Diag1(x), then
⟦ϕ⟧2 , tyu, whereas there is a ψ P L1 such that ⟦ψ⟧1  tyu.
Case 3: |C| ě 3. Define:
L2 B xttx , yu | x , y P C and x , y u ,C, Py .
Then L1 Ď L2 (since Diag2(x)  Diag2(y) iff x  y). But L1 ę L2, since
|⟦ϕ⟧2|  2 for all ϕ P L2. ∎
aMoreover, Diag1(y) ,H, since Diag1(x) , L1.
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Thus, there is no interesting collapse theorem of the form “L is expressible in any
language it is discernible in iff. . . ”. The languages that can be expressed in a lan-
guage L are much more confined than the possible languages that can express L.
Turning to weak expressibility, the situation is a little more complicated. Again,
the question is only interesting if we consider nonempty languages over a nonempty
evaluation space.3 So: when is a nonempty language over a nonempty evaluation
space weakly expressible in every nonempty language it is discernible in? The an-
swer is exactly when every formula in the language is valid:
Proposition 4.1.30 (Almost No Non-Trivial Language is Weakly Expressible in Ev-
ery Non-Trivial Language it is Discernible In). Let L1 be a C-language where
L1 ,H and C ,H. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) For all C-languages L2 such that L1 ,H, if L1 Ď L2, then L1 ĺ L2.
(b) For all ϕ P L1, ⟦ϕ⟧1  C.
Proof: The implication from (b) to (a) is trivial, since ⟦H⟧2  C for any C-
language L2. For the implication from (a) to (b), we first prove two lemmas:
(1) For all ϕ P L1, either:
(i) ⟦ϕ⟧1  H
(ii) ⟦ϕ⟧1  txu for some x P C
(iii) ⟦ϕ⟧1  C.
(2) There is a ϕ P L1 such that ⟦ϕ⟧1 ,H.
For the proof of (1), define L˚1 B xC,C, y. As before, L1 Ď L
˚
1 , so L1 ĺ L
˚
1 .
Let ϕ P L1. Then there is a Γ Ď C where ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦Γ⟧˚1 . There are three cases:
(i) |Γ| ą 1. Then ⟦Γ⟧˚1  H.
(ii) |Γ|  1. Then ⟦Γ⟧˚1  txu for some x P C.
(iii) |Γ|  0. Then ⟦Γ⟧˚1  C.
This establishes (1).
For (2), suppose for reductio that ⟦ϕ⟧1  H for all ϕ P L1. Define L2 B
xtpu ,C,C ˆ tpuy. Then L1 Ď L2, since Diag1(x)  Diag1(y)  H for all x , y P
C. But L1 ł L2, since ⟦p⟧2  C and C ,H, ☇. This establishes (2).
Now, we distinguish two cases, showing that either way, (b) holds.
3We already saw above that if L1  H, then vacuously L1 ď L2. If L1 , H but C  H, then
trivially L1 ĺ L2, since ⟦H⟧2  C  H. And if L2  H, L1 ĺ L2 iff Diag1(x)  Diag1(y) for all
x , y P C, so L1 Ď L2 iff L1 ĺ L2.
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Case 1: |C|  1. Suppose for reductio that (b) fails. Thus, for some ϕ P L1,
⟦ϕ⟧1 , C. Since |C|  1, that means ⟦ϕ⟧1  H. Now, observe that
L1 Ď L2 trivially for any C-language L2. So define:
L2 B L1 ´ tψ | ⟦ψ⟧1  Hu
L2 B xL2,C,,1æL2y .
By (2), L2 , H. But L1 ł L2, since ⟦Γ⟧2  C for all Γ Ď L2, whereas
⟦ϕ⟧1  H, ☇.
Case 2: |C| ą 1. Suppose for reductio that (b) fails. Notice first that if every
ϕ P L1 is such that either ⟦ϕ⟧1  H or ⟦ϕ⟧1  C, then defining L2 as in
Case 1, L1 ł L2, though L1 Ď L2, ☇. Hence, there is a ϕ P L1 such that
⟦ϕ⟧1 ,H and ⟦ϕ⟧1 , C, which by (1) implies that ⟦ϕ⟧1  txu for some
x P C. Fixing on such an x, define:
L˚˚1 B xC ´ txu ,C, y .
Then vacuously L1 Ď L˚˚1 . But L1 ł L
˚˚
1 , since for no Γ Ď C ´ txu is
⟦Γ⟧˚˚1  txu (either ⟦Γ⟧
˚˚
1  H, or ⟦Γ⟧
˚˚
1  tyu for some y , x, or
Γ  H, in which case ⟦Γ⟧˚˚1  C), ☇. ∎
§ 4.1.4 Strong Discernibility
Just as we can generalize expressibility from being defined in terms of formulas to
sets of formulas, so too we can generalize discernibility from being defined in terms
of points of evaluations to sets of points.
Notation: Let L be a C-language. We define the diagram of a class of points
X Ď C so that DiagL(X) B
Ş
xPX DiagL(x).
Definition 4.1.31 (Strong Discernibility). Let L1 and L2 be C-languages. We
say L1 is strongly discernible in L2 (written “L1 Ďs L2”) if for all X,Y Ď C,
if Diag2(X)  Diag2(Y), then Diag1(X)  Diag1(Y). We say L1 is strictly
strongly discernible in L2 (written “L1 <s L2”) if L1 Ďs L2 but L2 @s L1. We
say that L1 is strongly discernibly equivalent to L2 (written “L1 ĚĎs L2”) if
L1 Ďs L2 and L2 Ďs L1.
As the name suggests, strong discernibility is strictly stronger than discernibility.
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Fact 4.1.32 (Strong Discernibility Implies Discernibility). For any C-languages L1
and L2, if L1 Ďs L2, then L1 Ď L2.
Example 4.1.33 (Discernibility Does Not Imply Strong Discernibility). Consider
two languages L1 and L2, where:
• L1  tpu
• L2  tp , qu
• C1  C2  tx , yu
• x ,1 p while y .2 p
• x ,2 p and x .2 q
• y ,2 p and y ,2 q.
Clearly, L1 ĚĎ L2. But L1 @s L2. In particular, Diag2(tx , yu)  Diag2(txu) 
tpu. But Diag1(tx , yu)  H, while Diag1(txu)  tpu.
One can use Example 4.1.25 to show that strong discernibility does not imply
weak expressibility. But the converse is true (using essentially the same proof as
Proposition 4.1.22):
Fact 4.1.34 (Weak Expressibility Implies Strong Discernibility). Let L1 and L2 be
C-languages. If L1 ĺ L2, then L1 Ďs L2.
As before, we may ask when strong discernibility collapses to other forms of
expressive power.
Proposition 4.1.35 (Collapsing Strong Discernibility and Expressibility). Let L2
be a C-language. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) For any C-language L1, if L1 Ďs L2, then L1 ď L2.
(b) L2 has infinite conjunction and infinite disjunction.
Proof:
(a) ñ (b) Let Γ,∆ Ď L2. Define L^1  xtpu ,C2,,^1 y and L
_




x ,^1 p ô @ϕ P Γ : x ,2 ϕ
x ,_1 q ô Dϕ P ∆ : x ,2 ϕ.
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First, observe that L^1 Ďs L2 and L
_
1 Ďs L2. For instance, if X ”2 Y,
then X ,2 Γ iff Y ,2 Γ, in which case X ,^1 p iff Y ,
^
1 p, and
so X ”^1 Y. Likewise for L
_
1 . Hence, L
^
1 ď L2 and L
_
1 ď L2.
Thus, there are ϕ, ψ P L2 such that ⟦ϕ⟧2 
Ş
θPΓ ⟦θ⟧1 and ⟦ψ⟧2 
Ť
θP∆ ⟦θ⟧1.











x P C2 and x ,1 ϕ
+
.
Let x P C. Clearly, if x ,1 ϕ, then x ,2 ψ. Conversely, if x ,2 ψ,
then there is a y P ⟦ϕ⟧1 such that x ,2 Diag2(y). That means
tx , yu ”2 tyu. Hence, by strong discernibility, tx , yu ”1 tyu, which
means x ,1 ϕ. Thus, ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦ψ⟧2, and so L1 ď L2. ∎
This provides an interesting measure of the difference in strength between discerni-
bility and strong discernibility. To collapse strong discernibility to expressibility,
less express material needs to be present in the language (infinite conjunction and
disjunction) than to collapse discernibility to expressibility (infinite conjunction
and negation).
Likewise, to collapse strong discernibility to weak expressibility, fewer expres-
sive resources need to be present (infinite setwise disjunction) than to collapse
discernibility to weak expressibility (infinite setwise disjunction and setwise nega-
tion).4
Proposition 4.1.36 (Collapsing Strong Discernibility and Weak Expressibility). Let
L2 be a C-language. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) For any C-language L1, if L1 Ďs L2, then L1 ĺ L2.
(b) L2 has infinite setwise disjunction.
Proof:
(a) ñ (b) Let Σ Ď ℘ (L2). Define L˚1  xtpu ,C,,
˚
1y so that for all x P C:
x ,˚1 p ô D∆ P Σ : x ,2 ∆.
First, observe that L˚1 Ďs L2. For suppose Diag2(X)  Diag2(Y).
4Note that “infinite setwise conjunction” is, in a sense, present in every language: if Σ Ď ℘ (L),
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Now, since L˚1 Ďs L2, we have L
˚
1 ĺ L2. So there is a Γ Ď L2
such that ⟦p⟧˚1  ⟦Γ⟧2  tx P C | D∆ P Σ : x ,2 ∆u.
(b) ñ (a) Suppose L1 Ďs L2. Let ϕ P L1. Define:
∆ B
ł
tDiag2(y) | y P C and y ,1 ϕu .
Clearly, if x ,1 ϕ, then x ,2 ∆. Conversely, suppose x .1 ϕ. It
suffices to show that for all y P C such that y ,1 ϕ, x .2 Diag2(y).
Suppose for reductio y ,1 ϕ but x ,2 Diag2(y). Since x .1 ϕ,
it follows that Diag1(tyu) , Diag1(tx , yu). Hence, Diag2(tyu) ,
Diag2(tx , yu). Since Diag2(tyu) Ě Diag2(tx , yu), there must be a
ψ P Diag2(tyu) ´ Diag2(tx , yu). That is, y ,2 ψ and x .2 ψ. But
x ,2 Diag2(y), ☇. ∎
Given Propositions 4.1.28 and 4.1.36, one might guess that strong discernibil-
ity collapses to discernibility exactly when setwise negation is present. This would
make the circle complete, since setwise negation and infinite conjunction are suffi-
cient to express regular negation (¬ϕ B
Ź ¬ tϕu). If that were the case, then we
would have a nice hierarchy as presented below.









Certainly, we can show that if it is present, then strong discernibility collapses
into discernibility:
Proposition 4.1.37 (Setwise Negation Collapses Strong Discernibility to Discerni-
bility). Let L2 be a C-language with setwise negation. Then for any C-language
L1, if L1 Ď L2, then L1 Ďs L2.
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Proof: Suppose L1 Ď L2. Let X,Y Ď C. Suppose Diag1(X) , Diag1(Y).
Without loss of generality, let’s say that X ,1 ϕ and Y .1 ϕ. Thus, there is
a y P Y such that y .1 ϕ. But every x P X is such that x ,1 ϕ. So for every
x P X, x ı1 y. Since L1 Ď L2, x ı2 y either. Hence, for every x P X, there
is a ψx P L2 such that either (i) x ,2 ψx and y .2 ψx or (ii) x .2 ψx and
y ,2 ψx . Since we have setwise negation, it follows that for every x P X, there
is a Γx Ď L2 such that x .2 Γx and y ,2 Γx . Hence, Y ,2
Ť
tΓx | x P Xu
whereas X .2
Ť
tΓx | x P Xu. So Diag2(X) , Diag2(Y). ∎
Unfortunately, I have yet to find a proof (or refutation) of the claim that the presence
of setwise negation is necessary for strong discernibility to collapse to discernibil-
ity.5 I suspect it is possible to close this gap, but the gap will have to remain for
now.
§ 4.2 Transforming Logical Space
In the previous section, we assumed that whenever we were comparing the ex-
pressive power of some languages, the languages in question all shared the same
conception of logical space. But what about languages which do not share logical
space? Can we still settle how two languages are related in expressive power even
when we cannot directly compare models from one language with models of the
other? In this section, we look at several ways one might do this distinct from the
method developed in Chapters 2–3.
§ 4.2.1 Model-Preservation
Often, when proving that one language is translatable into another, one does not
just give a mapping from formulas to formulas. In addition, one usually specifies
something like a model transformation, saying how models from one evaluation
space generate “equivalent” models in the other model space. This suggests one
way in which expressive power might extend beyond translatability: in addition
to showing how the consequence relations of the source logic are preserved in the
target logic, one must also show how the models of the former correspond to the
models of the latter.
A standard way of making this precise was articulated by Epstein [1990]:
5In particular, the proof strategy employed in previous collapse results does not seem to work.
Let Γ Ď L2. Suppose we construct an L˚1  xtpu ,C,,
˚
1 y such that for all x P C, x ,
˚
1 p iff x .2 Γ.
Then one can show that L˚1 Ď L2, in which case L
˚
1 Ďs L2. But there does not seem to be any obvious
way (at least to me) to show from this fact that there is a ∆ Ď L2 such that ⟦∆⟧2  C ´ ⟦Γ⟧2.
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Definition 4.2.1 (Model-Preservation). Let L1 and L2 be some languages, let
t : L1 Ñ L2 and let c : C2 Ñ C1. Then t is model-preserving via c (written
“t; c : L1 9 L2”) if:
(i) for each x P C1, there is a y P C2 such that x ”1 c(y)
(ii) for each y P C2 and ϕ P L1, we have y ,2 t(ϕ) iff c(y) ,1 ϕ.
We say t is model-preserving (written “t : L1 9 L2”) if it is model-preserving
via some c : C2 Ñ C1. We call t a translation and c a correspondence map.
The correspondence map can be thought of as a “coarsening” of the states or models
in C2. Put another way, if c(y) ”1 x, we can think of y as essentially a refinement
of x into L2.
Model-preservation is the natural generalization of expressibility to languages
with distinct evaluation spaces. For one thing, observe that expressibility just is
model-preservation via identity:
Fact 4.2.2 (From Expressibility to Model-Preservation). Let L1 and L2 be some
C-languages and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1 ď L2 iff t; id : L1 9 L2.
Moreover, model-preservation induces expressibility not for the original languages
involved but for modified versions of them.
Fact 4.2.3 (From Model-Preservation to Expressibility). Let L1 and L2 be languages.
Suppose t; c : L1 9 L2. Define L˚1 B xL1,C2,,˚1y, where y ,˚1 ϕ iff c(y) ,1 ϕ
for all y P C2. Then t : L˚1 ď L2.
Example 4.2.4 (S4). Recall from Example 2.1.8 that S4 is the restriction of
K to pointed Kripke models whose accessibility relation is a preorder. We
noted that IPL⇝S4. In fact, IPL 9 S4. This can be established as follows
(see, e.g., Chagrov and Zakharyaschev 1997, pp. 96–97). Let G be the Gödel
translation from Example 2.1.8. WhereM  xW,_,Vy is an S4-model, let
M˚  xW,_,V˚y be the IPL-model such that for all p P At:
V˚(p)  tw P W | @v P W : w _ v ñ v P V (p) u .
(Note this is an IPL-model since V˚ is upward-closed, i.e., if w P V˚(p) and
w _ v, then v P V˚(p).) Define xM ,wy˚ = xM˚, wy. Then G, ˚ : IPL 9 S4.
To show (i), note that ifM is an IPL-model, then it is an S4-model. Hence,
V˚  V , and so vacuouslyM , w ”IPL M˚, w. The proof that (ii) proceeds by
induction on the complexity of formulas.
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One useful fact about model-preserving maps is that they preserve truth-functional
connectives.
Fact 4.2.5 (Model-Preservation Preserves Truth-Functional Operators). Let L1 and
L2 be languages and let t : L1 9 L2. Then assuming each language has a truth-
functional negation ¬, we have t(¬ϕ) ”2 ¬ t(ϕ). Likewise for all the other
truth-functional operators.
Observe that the correspondence map points in the opposite direction of the
translation, so to speak. We could have instead formulated model-preservation
with correspondence maps going the other way:
Fact 4.2.6 (Flipping Correspondence Maps Around). Let L1 and L2 be languages,
let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1 9 L2 iff there is a map r : C1 Ñ C2 such that:
(i) for each y P C2, there is an x P C1 such that y ”tr1s r(x)
(ii) for each x P C1 and ϕ P L1, we have x ,1 ϕ iff r(x) ,tr1s t(ϕ).
On this formulation of model-preservation, the correspondence map is thought
of as a “refinement” of the states or models in the source language. Usually, it
turns out to be slightly easier to verify L1-agreement than to verify trL1s-agreement.
So we will stick with the original formulation of model-preservation in Defini-
tion 4.2.1 for convenience.
There is a rather simple reformulation of model-preservation that does away
with the correspondence map altogether. This formulation of model-preservation
will be useful when proving abstractly the existence of model-preserving maps be-
tween languages.
Definition 4.2.7 (Correlation). Let L1 and L2 be some languages and let t : L1 Ñ
L2. The t-correlation relation from L1 to L2 is the relation 9tĎ C1 ˆ C2 such
that for all x P C1 and y P C2:
x 9t y ô for all ϕ P L1: x ,1 ϕ ô y ,2 t(ϕ).
Often, we drop mention of L1 and L2 when context makes them clear.
Definition 4.2.8 (Totality and Surjectivity). Let L1 and L2 be languages and let
t : L1 Ñ L2. We say 9t is total if for all x P C1, there is a y P C2 such that
x 9t y. We say 9t is surjective if for all y P C2, there is an x P C1 such that
x 9t y.
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Lemma 4.2.9 (Relation Between 9t and c). Let L1 and L2 be languages, and let
t; c : L1 9 L2. Then for all x P C1 and y P C2:
x 9t y ô x ”1 c(y).
Proof: Let x P C1 and y P C2. Then x 9t y just in case for all ϕ P L1: x ,1 ϕ
iff y ,2 t(ϕ). But since y ,2 t(ϕ) iff c(y) ,1 ϕ, we have x 9t y just in case
for all ϕ P L1: x ,1 ϕ iff c(y) ,1 ϕ, i.e., x ”1 c(y). ∎
Proposition 4.2.10 (Alternative Formulation of Model-Preservation). Let L1 and
L2 be some languages, and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1 9 L2 iff 9t is total and
surjective.
Proof:
(ñ) Suppose t, c : L1 9 L2. Let x P C1. Then there is a y P C2 such that x ”1
c(y), i.e., such that x 9t y by Lemma 4.2.9. So 9t is total. Moreover, if
y P C2, then c(y) 9t y. So 9t is surjective.
(ð) Suppose 9t is total and surjective. Pick any c : C2 Ñ C1 so that c(y) 9t y
for all y P C2 (we know one exists by surjectivity). We just need to verify
that c satisfies (i) and (ii) of Definition 4.2.1. First, let x P C1. By totality,
there is a y P C2 such that x 9t y. Since c(y) 9t y, we have x ”1 c(y).
Next, let y P C2 and ϕ P L1. Since c(y) 9t y, we have c(y) ,1 ϕ iff
y ,2 t(ϕ). ∎
We now turn to the relationship between translations and model-preserving
maps. Using Proposition 4.2.10, we can more simply prove an observation from
Epstein [1990, p. 391, Corollary 11] that relates model-preservation to translation:
Proposition 4.2.11 (From Model-Preservation to Translation). Let L1 and L2 be
languages and let t : L1 9 L2. Then t : L1⇝L2.
Proof: Let Γ Ď L1 and ϕ P L1. Then:
Γ (1 ϕ ô for all x P C1: x ,1 Γ ñ x ,1 ϕ
ô for all x P C1 and all y P C2: x 9t y & y ,2 trΓs ñ y ,2 t(ϕ)
ô for all y P C2: y ,2 trΓs ñ y ,2 t(ϕ)
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ô trΓs (2 t(ϕ).
For the second step, the left-to-right direction is by definition of 9t, and the
right-to-left direction follows by totality. For the third step, the left-to-right
direction follows by surjectivity, and the right-to-left direction is obvious. ∎
To say that 9t is total is to say that every counterexample to an inference in L1
can be matched with a counterexample to that inference (translated) in L2. Con-
versely, to say that 9t is surjective is to say that every counterexample in L2 to a
translated inference can be matched with a counterexample already in L1 to that
inference. Given this, one might wonder whether translatability implies 9t is total
and surjective. The answer is negative, as these next examples show:
Example 4.2.12 (Propositional Logic with an Absurd State). Let CPLK be just like
CPL except VK  V Y tKu, where K < V, and K ,K ϕ for all ϕ P LProp.
It is straightforward to check that id : CPL⇝CPLK. But clearly, 9id is not
surjective given the presence of K. Likewise, id : CPLK⇝CPL, even though
9id is not total.
One might suspect that the problem in Example 4.2.12 arises due to the presence
of the state K, which satisfies every formula. But even without such states, coun-
terexamples arise.
Example 4.2.13 (Propositional Logic Plus a Partial Valuation Function). Let vp be
a partial function that just maps p to 1, and define CPLp so that Vp  VY tvpu
and ,p works just like , for each v P V, and vp ,p ϕ iff p (CPL ϕ. Then it is
straightforward to check that there is a translation from CPL into CPLp ; but
the resulting 9 relation will not be surjective. Likewise for totality.
These examples illustrate a crucial point about the difference between trans-
latability and model-preservability. The question of whether there exists a trans-
lation between some languages can be reduced to the question of whether there
exists a translation between the logics of those languages. This is not so for model-
preserving maps. It makes no sense, without further specification, to ask whether
there exists a model-preserving map between some logics since the answer depends
on which semantics we have in mind for these logics. The languages from Examples
4.2.12–4.2.13 (CPL, CPLK, CPLp) all have the same underlying logic (CPL) but dif-
fer in their underlying semantics. This is not just a feature of these gerrymandered
semantic frameworks: it is also a feature of natural and independently motivated
semantic theories for CPL developed in the literature.
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Example 4.2.14 (Model-Preserving from Classical Logic into Intuitionistic Logic).
We noted in Example 2.2.8 that CPL⇝IPL. But it is not true that CPL 9 IPL.
For suppose t : CPL 9 IPL. LetMIPL be the canonical model for IPL and let
M`IPL be result of adding a root r toMIPL that sees every state inMIPL. It is
easy to verify thatM`IPL, r , ϕ iff (IPL ϕ. Hence, there must be a classical
valuation v such that v , ϕ iff ϕ is a classical tautology, ☇.
However, there is a natural semantics for CPL that can be mapped into
IPL in a model-preserving manner, viz., the possibility semantics developed
by Humberstone [1981] and Holliday [2018]. Let us write “ď” for the acces-
sibility relation in IPL-models. Let P be the class of pairs of the form xM , wy
whereM is an IPL-model, w P WM , andM satisfies the following “refin-
ability” constraint:
@w rw < V (p) ñ Dv ě w @u ě v (u < V (p))s
We call such models possibility models. Define P  xLProp(_,Ñ), P,,Py,
where:
M , w ,P p ô w P V (p)
M , w ,P ¬ϕ ô @v ě w : M , v .P ϕ
M , w ,P ϕ ^ ψ ô M , w ,P ϕ andM ,w ,P ψ
M , w ,P ϕ _ ψ ô @v ě w Du ě v : M , u ,P ϕ orM , u ,P ψ
M , w ,P ϕ Ñ ψ ô @v ě w : M , v ,P ϕ ñ M , v ,P ψ.
It is straightforward to show that LP  CPL.
We now show that P 9 IPL.a For instance, let N be the double-negation
translation from Example 2.1.8. Where M  xW,ď,Vy is an intuitionistic
model, letM˚  xW,ď,V˚y where:
V˚(p) B tw P W |M , w , ¬¬ p u .
If M is an intuitionistic model, then M˚ is a possibility model. For if w <
V˚(p), that meansM , w . ¬¬ p, i.e, there is a v ě w such thatM , v , ¬ p.
Thus for all u ě v, M , u , ¬ p and hence M , u . ¬¬ p, i.e., u < V˚(p).
Moreover, if M is a possibility model, then M˚  M, since in that case
M , w , ¬¬ p iffM , w , p. This means (i) of Definition 4.2.1 is automat-
ically satisfied, since every possibility model is an intuitionistic model. As
for (ii), ifM is an intuitionistic model, if w P WM , and if ϕ P LProp, then by
induction,M , w , t(ϕ) iffM˚, w , ϕ.
aI have Wes Holliday to thank for this observation.
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What these examples seem to have in common is partiality: none of the alterna-
tive versions of CPL are opinionated (in the sense of Definition 1.2.1). It turns out
that this is the only barrier to translatability implying model-preservability.
Proposition 4.2.15 (From Translation to Model-Preservation). Suppose t : L1⇝L2
and suppose L1 and trL1s are opinionated. Then t : L1 9 L2.
Proof: By Lemma 1.2.4, if C1 contains an absurd state in L1, then every point
in C1 is an absurd state in L1. Thus, (1 L1, and so (tr1s trL1s. So every point
in C2 is an absurd state in trL1s as well. So for all x P C1 and y P C2, x 9t y.
Likewise if C2 contains an absurd state in trL1s. Hence, if either L1 or trL1s
contain absurd states, 9t is trivially total and surjective. So we may assume
throughout that neither L1 nor trL1s contain absurd states.
First, totality. Let x P C1. Suppose there is no y P C2 such that x 9t y.
Claim: For no y P C2 does y ,2 trDiag1(x)s.
Subproof: Suppose for reductio that y ,2 trDiag1(x)s. If there were
no ϕ P L1 such that x .1 ϕ and y ,2 t(ϕ), then x 9t y. So we may
assume that y ,2 trDiag1(x) Y tϕus for some ϕ P L1 such that x .1 ϕ.
Since L1 is opinionated, and since (1 is explosive, Diag1(x)Ytϕu (1 L1.
Thus, trDiag1(x) Y tϕus (2 trL1s. But then y ,2 trL1s, ☇. ∎
So no y P C2 satisfies all of trDiag1(x)s. But now let ϕ P L1 be such that
x .1 ϕ. Since (2 is explosive, trDiag1(x)s (2 t(ϕ). But Diag1(x) *1 ϕ (since
x is a counterexample), contrary to t being a translation, ☇. Therefore, 9t
must be total.
Second, surjectivity. Let y P C2. Let Diag2´1(y) B tϕ P L1 | y ,2 t(ϕ) u
(so notice that trDiag2´1(y)s  Diagtr1s(y)). Suppose there is no x P C1 such
that x 9t y.
Claim: For no x P C1 does x ,1 Diag2´1(y).
Subproof: Suppose for reductio that there is such an x P C1. By the
same reasoning as above, there must be some ψ P L1 such that x ,1 ψ
but y .2 t(ψ). By totality of 9t, there is a y1 P C2 such that x 9t y1.
But then Diagtr1s(y) Ă Diagtr1s(y1), contrary to trL1s opinionation, ☇.
∎
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Thus, Diag2´1(y) (1 L1. But y ,2 trDiag2´1(y)s while y .2 trL1s, since
there are no absurd states in trL1s, ☇. Therefore, 9t is surjective. ∎
The existence of model-preserving maps is not sufficient to guarantee that both
languages are opinionated (since every non-opinionated language is trivially trans-
latable into itself via a model-preserving map). It is sufficient to guarantee, how-
ever, that either both languages are opinionated or neither is.
Proposition 4.2.16 (Opinionation Reflected and Preserved). Let t : L1⇝L2.
(a) If 9t is total and trL1s is opinionated, then L1 is opinionated.
(b) If 9t is surjective and L1 is opinionated, then trL1s is opinionated.
Proof: We just prove (a), since the proof of (b) is symmetric. Suppose 9t is
total and trL1s is opinionated but L1 is not opinionated. Let x , x1 P C1 be such
that Diag1(x) Ă Diag1(x1). Then since 9t is total, there are y , y1 P C2 such
that x 9t y and x1 9t y1. But then that Diagtr1s(y) Ă Diagtr1s(y1), ☇. ∎
Corollary 4.2.17 (Model-Preservation Preserves (Non-)Opinionation). Let L1 and
L2 be languages and let t : L1 9 L2. Then L1 is opinionated iff trL1s is.
This raises the question of whether translatability between two non-opinionated
languages is sufficient to guarantee model-preservability. The answer is negative.
In fact, CPLK from Example 4.2.12 and CPLp from Example 4.2.13 are translation-
ally isomorphic via id, but 9id is neither total nor surjective.
So translatability does not generally imply model-preservability when the lan-
guages involved are not opinionated. However, translatability does imply model-
preservability for a special class of non-opinionated languages:
Proposition 4.2.18 (Model-Preservability Collapses to Translatability for Canoni-
cal Languages). Let L1 and L2 be logics and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : Can(L1) 9
Can(L2) iff t : Can(L1)⇝Can(L2).
Proof: The left-to-right direction is already given by Proposition 4.2.11. For
the right-to-left direction, suppose t : Can(L1)⇝Can(L2). We show 9t is total
and surjective.
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First, totality. Let Γ P Th(L1). Define Γ˚ B Cn2(trΓs). Note that:
t(ϕ) P Γ˚ ô trΓs (2 t(ϕ)
ô Γ (1 ϕ
ô ϕ P Γ
ô t(ϕ) P trΓs.
The third step follows from the fact that Γ is an L1-theory. Hence:
Γ ,1 ϕ ô ϕ P Γ
ô t(ϕ) P trΓs
ô t(ϕ) P Γ˚
ô Γ˚ ,2 t(ϕ).
So Γ 9t Γ˚.
Next, surjectivity. Let ∆ P Th(L2). Define ∆˚ B tϕ P L1 | t(ϕ) P ∆u. Note
that ∆˚ P Th(L1). For suppose ∆˚ (1 ϕ. Then tr∆˚s  ∆ (2 t(ϕ). And since
∆ is an L2-theory, t(ϕ) P ∆. So by definition of ∆˚, ϕ P ∆˚. Now:
∆˚ ,1 ϕ ô ϕ P ∆
˚
ô t(ϕ) P ∆
ô ∆ ,2 t(ϕ).
So ∆˚ 9t ∆. ∎
Fact 4.2.19 (Translatability Elsewhere). Let L1 and L2 be some languages and let
t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1⇝L2 iff t : Can(L1)⇝Can(L2).
Corollary 4.2.20 (Translatibility Implies Model-Preservability Elsewhere). Let L1
and L2 be languages. Suppose t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1⇝L2 iff t : Can(L1) 9
Can(L2).
Just as we saw that expressibility, weak expressibility, and discernibility collapse
under certain circumstances, one might wonder when translatability and model-
preservability collapse. The answer is almost never: the collapse happens only for
languages with trivial logics.
150
Chapter 4. Logical Space § 4.2. Transforming Logical Space
Proposition 4.2.21 (Translatability and Model-Preservability Almost Never Col-
lapse). Let L2 be a nonempty language. Suppose that for every nonempty
language L1 and every t : L1⇝L2, we have t : L1 9 L2. Then (2 L2.
Proof: Clearly, id : Can(L2)⇝L2. Hence, id : Can(L2) 9 L2. Since Cn2(L) is an
absurd state in Can(L2), there must also be an absurd state in L2. Now, sup-
pose *2 L2. That means there are some non-absurd states in L2. By Fact 1.2.3,
removing the absurd states does not affect consequence. Thus, where L´2 is
just like L2 except C´  C´tx P C | x ,2 L u, then id : L´2⇝L2. By hypothesis,
C´ is nonempty. So id : L´2 9 L2. But id cannot be model-preserving, since
L2 has absurd states and L´2 doesn’t, so 9t cannot be surjective, ☇. ∎
In short, for any nontrivial language, we can find another language that is trans-
latable into it but not in a model-preserving way. Either our target language has
absurd states (in which case, a language removing the absurd states would work)
or else it does not (in which case the canonical language for its logic would work).
Note that Proposition 4.2.21 fails if we allow L2 to be empty (i.e., L2  H). For
then L1⇝L2 only if L1  H, so no nonempty L1 is translatable into L2. If, however,
we drop the requirement that L1 be nonempty, then the result is trivial (regardless
of whether we require L2 to be nonempty): if L2 is such that C2 , H, then where
L1  xH,H,Hy, we have H : L1⇝L2 even though H is not model-preserving here;
and if C2  H, then where L1  xL2, txu , txu ˆ Ly, we have that id : L1⇝L2 even
though id is not model-preserving here.
§ 4.2.2 Model-Coarsening
We noted that model-preservation is the natural generalization of expressibility
to languages with distinct evaluation spaces. It is easy to generalize the notion of
weak expressibility in a similar manner (if we make t : L1 Ñ ℘ (L2)), so we will not
discuss it further. Instead, we discuss the natural generalization of discernibility:
Definition 4.2.22 (Model-Coarsening). Let L1 and L2 be some languages and
let c : C2 Ñ C1. Then c is a model-coarsening of L2 to L1 if:
(i) for each x P C1, there is a y P C2 such that x ”1 c(y)
(ii) for each x , y P C2, if x ”2 y, then c(x) ”1 c(y).
Fact 4.2.23 (From Discernibility to Model-Coarsening). Let L1 and L2 be some
C-languages. Then L1 Ď L2 iff id is a model-coarsening of L2 to L1.
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Fact 4.2.24 (From Model-Coarsening to Discernibility). Let L1 and L2 be lan-
guages. Suppose c : C2 Ñ C1 is model-coarsening of L2 to L1. Define L˚1 B
xL1,C2,,˚1y, where y ,˚1 ϕ iff c(y) ,1 ϕ for all y P C2. Then L
˚
1 Ď L2.
Like in the case of model-preservation, where we could use either coarsen-
ings or refinements as the correspondence maps, we can define a notion of model-
refinement as follows:
Definition 4.2.25 (Model-Refinement). Let L1 and L2 be some languages and
let r : C1 Ñ ℘ (C2) ´ tHu. Then r is a model-refinement of L1 to L2 if:
(i) for each y P C2, there is an x P C1 such that y P r(x)
(ii) for each x , y P C1, either r(x) X r(y)  H or r(x)  r(y)
(iii) for each z P C1, r(z) is closed under ”2, i.e., for all x , y P C2, if x ”2 y
and x P r(z), then y P r(z)
(iv) for each x , y P C1, if r(x)  r(y), then x ”1 y.
Proposition 4.2.26 (Converting a Model-Coarsening into a Model-Refinement). Let
L1 and L2 be some languages. Let c : C2 Ñ C1. Define r : C1 Ñ ℘ (C2) so that:
r(x)  ty P C2 | c(y) ”1 x u .
Then c is a model-coarsening iff r is a model-refinement.
Proof:
(ñ) Observe that r(x) , H, since for each x P C1, there is a y P C2 such that
x ”1 c(y). So r is a potential candidate for being a model-refinement.
We verify that r satisfies the conditions for being a model-refinement.
First, observe that for all y P C2, y P r(c(y)), since y is trivially such
a z P C2 such that c(z) ”1 c(y). Hence, (i) is satisfied.
Second, if u P r(x) X r(y) , H, and if z P r(x), then c(z) ”1 x ”1
c(u) ”1 y. Hence, z P r(y). Via a symmetric argument, if z P r(y), then
z P r(x). So r(x)  r(y), i.e., (ii) is satisfied.
Third, suppose x ”2 y and x P r(z) for some z P C1. Then c(x) ”1
z by definition of r. But since c is a model-coarsening, c(x) ”1 c(y).
Hence, c(y) ”1 z, so by definition of r, y P r(z). Thus, (iii) is satisfied.
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Finally, suppose x , y P C1 are such that r(x)  r(y). Since r(x) , H,
letting z P r(x), y ”1 c(z) ”1 x. So (iv) is satisfied.
(ð) We verify that c satisfies the conditions for being a model-coarsening.
First, let x P C1. Since r(x) is non-empty, there is a y P C2 such that
c(y) ”1 x.
Next, let x , y P C2 be such that x ”2 y. By the closure condition on
model-refinements, and by the fact that x P r(c(x)), y P r(c(x)). Hence,
by definition of r, c(y) ”1 c(x). ∎
One might wonder what the relationship between translatability and model-
coarsening is. It turns out that one language can even be discernible in another
without being translatable into it.
Example 4.2.27 (Discernibility without Translatability). Let CPL´ be just like
CPL except for the valuation function v such that v(p)  1 for all p P At, we
set v .´ p1 (keeping the semantic clauses for ¬ and ^ the same). Clearly,
CPL´ Ď CPL. But CPL´ |⇝CPL, since CPL is compact and CPL´ is not. In
particular, At (´ K even though no finite subset of At is CPL´-inconsistent.
Of course, for opinionated languages, translatability implies model-preservation,
which in turn implies model-coarsening.
§ 4.2.3 Model-Corroboration
So model-preservation is the semantic correlate of translatability at least roughly. Is
there a semantic correlate of translational equivalence? The answer is affirmative.
Definition 4.2.28 (Model-Corroborating). Let L1 and L2 be some languages, let
t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1, and let c : C2 Ñ C1 and d : C1 Ñ C2. We say that
t and s are model-corroborating via c and d (written “t, s; c, d : L1 8 L2”) if:
(i) t; c : L1 9 L2
(ii) s; d : L2 9 L1
(iii) for all x P C1, x ”1 c(d(x))
(iv) for all y P C2, y ”2 d(c(y)).
We say t and s are model-corroborating (written “t, s : L1 8 L2”) if they are
model-corroborating via some c : C2 Ñ C1 and d : C1 Ñ C2.
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Just as with model-preservation, there is a relatively nice statement of when two
maps t and s are model-corroborating in terms of correlation relations 9t and 9s,
though it requires a couple of intermediate steps.
Lemma 4.2.29 (Model-Preservation Reflects Equivalence on States). Let L1 and L2
be languages and let t; c : L1 9 L2. Then for all y , y1 P C2, c(y) ”1 c(y1) iff
y ”tr1s y1.
Proof: For the right-to-left direction, since c(y) 9t y and c(y1) 9t y1 by
Lemma 4.2.9, and since y ,2 t(ϕ) iff y1 ,2 t(ϕ), we have c(y) ,1 ϕ iff
c(y1) ,1 ϕ. The left-to-right direction follows easily from Lemma 4.2.9 since
trL1s is restricted to trL1s. ∎
Lemma 4.2.30 (Model-Corroboration Implies Correlation Relations are Inverses).
Let L1 and L2 be languages, and let t, s : L1 8 L2. Then we have 9t 9s´1.
Proof: Suppose t, s; c, d : L1 8 L2. It suffices to show that x 9t y implies
y 9s x, since the proof of the converse is symmetric.
Let x 9t y. By Proposition 4.2.10, 9s is surjective, so there is an x1 P C1
such that y 9s x1. By Lemma 4.2.9, d(x1) ”2 y. By Lemma 4.2.29, c(d(x1)) ”1
c(y). But c(d(x1)) ”1 x1 by Definition 4.2.28, and c(y) ”1 x by Lemma 4.2.9.
So x ”1 x1, and thus, y 9s x. ∎
Proposition 4.2.31 (Alternative Formulations of Model-Corroboration). Let L1 and
L2 be languages, let t : L1 Ñ L2, and let s : L2 Ñ L1. Then the following are
equivalent:
(a) t, s : L1 8 L2
(b) t : L1 9 L2 and s : L2 9 L1 so that 9s 9t´1
(c) The following two properties hold:
(i) for all x P C1, there is a y P C2 such that x 9t y and for all x1 P C1,
if y 9s x1, then x ”1 x1
(ii) for all y P C2, there is a x P C1 such that y 9s x and for all y1 P C2,
if x 9t y1, then y ”2 y1.
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Proof:
(a) ñ (b) By Lemma 4.2.30.
(b) ñ (a) Suppose 9s 9t´1. It suffices to show Definition 4.2.28(iii), since
the proof of (iv) is symmetric. First, by Lemma 4.2.9, d(x) 9s x
since trivially d(x) ”2 d(x). But since 9s 9t´1, x 9t d(x). Again
by Lemma 4.2.9, that means x ”1 c(d(x)).
(b) ñ (c) We just prove (i), since the proof of (ii) is symmetric. Since t is
model-preserving, 9t is total by Proposition 4.2.10. So there is a
y P C2 such that x 9t y. Pick any such y. Then if y 9s x1 where
x1 P C1, then since 9s 9t´1, x1 9t y. So x ,1 ϕ iff y ,2 t(ϕ) iff
x1 ,1 ϕ, i.e., x ”1 x1.
(c) ñ (b) Suppose t and s satisfy (i) and (ii). We first need to establish that
t and s are model-preserving. By Proposition 4.2.10, it suffices to
show that 9t and 9s are total and surjective. We just show 9t is
total and surjective, noting the proof that 9s is total and surjective
is symmetric. Totality follows by (i) automatically. For surjectivity,
let y P C2. By (ii), there is an x P C1 such that y 9s x and whenever
x 9t y1, we have y ”2 y1. By the totality of 9t, there is a z P C2
such that x 9t z. Picking such a z, we have y ”2 z. That means
x ,1 ϕ iff z ,2 t(ϕ), iff y ,2 t(ϕ), i.e., x 9t y. So 9t is surjective.
Next, we need to establish that 9s 9t´1. We just show that
x 9t y implies y 9s x. Suppose x 9t y. By (ii), there is a z P C1
such that y 9s z and for all y1 P C2, if z 9t y1, then y ”2 y1. Since
9t is total, there is at least one y1 P C2 such that z 9t y1. Since
y ”2 y1, we have x 9t y1. So z ,1 ϕ iff y1 ,2 t(ϕ) iff x ,1 ϕ. Thus,
x ”1 z, and so y 9s x. ∎
Just as model-preservation implies translation but not vice versa unless the lan-
guages are both opinionated, model-corroboration implies translational equiva-
lence, though not vice versa unless the languages involved are both opinionated.
We now verify this point.
Proposition 4.2.32 (From Corroboration to Translational Equivalence). Let L1 and
L2 be languages. Suppose t, s : L1 8 L2. Then t, s : L1↭ L2.
Proof: Since t and s are model-corroborating, they are model-preserving,
which implies t, s : L1 ⇝⇝ L2 by Proposition 4.2.11. So it suffices to show that
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ϕ ”1 s(t(ϕ)) for all ϕ P L1 (the proof that ψ ”2 t(s(ψ)) for ψ P L2 is
symmetric). Let x P C1. By Proposition 4.2.10, there is a y P C2 such that
x 9t y. By Lemma 4.2.30, we also have y 9s x. Thus, x ,1 ϕ iff y ,2 t(ϕ) iff
x ,1 s(t(ϕ)). Hence, ϕ ”1 s(t(ϕ)). ∎
Lemma 4.2.33 (Translational Equivalence Preserves Opinionatedness in Images).
Let L1 and L2 be opinionated, and let t, s : L1↭ L2. Then trL1s and srL2s are
opinionated.
Proof: We will just show trL1s is opinionated. Suppose for reductio that
Diagtr1s(y) Ă Diagtr1s(y1) for some y , y1 P C2. That means there is a t(ϕ) P
Diagtr1s(y1) ´ Diagtr1s(y), and thus, t(ϕ) P Diag2(y1) ´ Diag2(y). That in
turn implies Diag2(y) , Diag2(y1). Moreover:
ψ P Diag2(y) ô t(s(ψ)) P Diag2(y)
ô t(s(ψ)) P Diagtr1s(y)
ñ t(s(ψ)) P Diagtr1s(y1)
ô t(s(ψ)) P Diag2(y1)
ô ψ P Diag2(y1).
So Diag2(y) Ă Diag2(y1), ☇. ∎
Proposition 4.2.34 (From Translational Equivalence to Corroboration). Let L1 and
L2 be languages, and let t, s : L1↭ L2. Suppose L1 and L2 are opinionated.
Then t, s : L1 8 L2.
Proof: The fact that t and s are model-preserving follows from Proposi-
tion 4.2.15 and Lemma 4.2.33. Thus, by Proposition 4.2.31, it suffices to show
the following:
(i’) for all x , x1 P C1 and all y P C2, if x 9t y 9s x1, then x ”1 x1
(ii’) for all y , y1 P C2 and all x P C1, if y 9s x 9t y1, then y ”2 y1.
For (i’), let x , x1 P C1 and y P C2 be such that x 9t y 9s x1. Then x ,1 ϕ iff
y ,2 t(ϕ) iff x1 ,1 s(t(ϕ)) iff x1 ,1 ϕ. So x ”1 x1. Similarly for (ii’). ∎
And again, just as model-preservability collapses to translatability for canonical
languages, model-corroboration collapses to translational equivalence for canoni-
cal languages.
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Proposition 4.2.35 (Model-Corroboration Collapses to Translational Equivalence for
Canonical Languages). Let L1 and L2 be logics, let t : L1 Ñ L2, and let s : L2 Ñ
L1. Then t, s : Can(L1) 8 Can(L2) iff t, s : Can(L1)↭Can(L2).
Proof: The left-to-right direction is given by Proposition 4.2.32. For the right-
to-left direction, it suffices to show by Proposition 4.2.31 that 9t 9s´1. We
just show that 9tĎ 9s´1. Suppose Γ 9t ∆. Thus, ϕ P Γ iff t(ϕ) P ∆. But then
ψ P ∆ iff t(s(ψ)) P ∆ iff s(ψ) P Γ. So ∆ 9s Γ. ∎
Fact 4.2.36 (Translational Equivalence Elsewhere). Let L1 and L2 be some lan-
guages, let t : L1 Ñ L2, and let s : L2 Ñ L1. Then we have t, s : L1↭ L2 iff
t, s : Can(L1)↭Can(L2).
Corollary 4.2.37 (Translational Equivalence Implies Model-Corroboration Elsewhere).
Let L1 and L2 be languages, let t : L1 Ñ L2, and let s : L2 Ñ L1. Then
t, s : L1↭ L2 iff t, s : Can(L1) 8 Can(L2).
§ 4.2.4 Value-Preservation
For a translation to be adequate, it should not only preserve the inferential relations
between sentences, but it should also preserve meaning. When two languages do
not share the same concept of logical space, it is difficult to determine how to com-
pare the meaning of a sentence in one language to that of a sentence in the other
language. But perhaps we could still talk about ways in which the semantic values
of the source language are mirrored in the target language.
Definition 4.2.38 (Value-Preservation). Let L1 and L2 be some languages. A
map t : L1 Ñ L2 is value-preserving if for all ϕ P L1:
(i) 9t r⟦ϕ⟧1s  ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2
(ii) 9t´1r⟦t(ϕ)⟧2s  ⟦ϕ⟧1.
Fact 4.2.39 (Maps are Always Half Value-Preserving). Let L1 and L2 be languages
and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then for all ϕ P L1:
(a) 9t r⟦ϕ⟧1s Ď ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2
(b) 9t´1r⟦t(ϕ)⟧2s Ď ⟦ϕ⟧1.
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Proposition 4.2.40 (Alternative Formulation of Value-Preservation). Let L1 and
L2 be languages and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t is value-preserving iff for all
ϕ P L1:
(i) ⟦ϕ⟧1  9t´1r9t r⟦ϕ⟧1ss.
(ii) ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2 9t r9t´1r⟦t(ϕ)⟧2ss.
Proof: The left-to-right direction is trivial. For the right-to-left direction, by




This completes the proof. ∎
Epstein [1990, pp. 390–392] argues that in order for a translation to be meaning-
preserving, it ought to be model-preserving. There is a sense in which we can verify
this conviction if we understand meaning as semantic value.
Proposition 4.2.41 (Model-Preservation Implies Value-Preservation). Let L1 and
L2 be languages, and let t : L1 9 L2. Then t is value-preserving.
Proof: If y P ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2, there is a x P C2 such that x 9t y, and thus, x ,1 ϕ.
Hence, y P 9t r⟦ϕ⟧1s. Likewise, if x P ⟦ϕ⟧1, then x P 9t´1r⟦t(ϕ)⟧2s. ∎
Thus, when t : L1⇝L2 is model-preserving, it makes sense to talk about “the”
semantic value of anL1-formula within L2. The converse holds as long as we ignore
“empty” states (Definition 1.2.5).
Fact 4.2.42 (Model-Preservation Implies Agreement on Empty States). Let L1 and
L2 be languages, and let t : L1 9 L2. Then L1 has empty states iff trL1s does
too.
Proposition 4.2.43 (Value-Preservation Almost Implies Model-Preservation). Let
L1 and L2 be languages, and let t : L1 Ñ L2.
(a) Suppose 9t r⟦ϕ⟧1s  ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2 for all ϕ P L1 and suppose that trL1s has
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an empty state only if L1 does. Then 9t is surjective.
(b) Suppose 9t´1r⟦t(ϕ)⟧2s  ⟦ϕ⟧1 for all ϕ P L1 and suppose that L1 has
an empty state only if trL1s does. Then 9t is total.
(c) Suppose t is value-preserving and L1 has empty states iff trL1s does.
Then t is model-preserving.
Proof: We simply show (a), since the proof of (b) is symmetric and (c) follows
from (a) and (b) via Proposition 4.2.10. Let y P C2. If Diagtr1s(y) is empty,
then there is an x P C1 such that Diag1(x) is empty, and so x 9t y. Otherwise,
let y ,2 t(ϕ). Then y P ⟦t(ϕ)⟧2 9t r⟦ϕ⟧1s, in which case there is a x P C1
such that x 9t y. So 9t is surjective. ∎
Corollary 4.2.44 (From Value-Preservation to Model-Preservation). Let L1 and L2
be languages, and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Suppose L1 and trL1s are opinionated.
Then if t is value-preserving, it is also model-preserving.
We cannot remove the condition that L1 and trL1s agree on there being empty
states in Proposition 4.2.43. As noted in Fact 4.2.42, a model-preserving map can
exist between L1 and L2 only if L1 and trL1s agree on whether there are empty states.
By contrast, a map can still be value-preserving without even being a translation if
the two disagree on empty states.
Example 4.2.45 (Value-Preservability without Translatability). Take any L with
some validities and add an empty state to it to obtain L0. Then the identity
map id on L is value-preserving, but not a translation.
Model-preservation requires agreement on empty states. Value-preservation
does not. However, this seems to be the only significant difference between the two
notions. This suggests that there is a more general notion that might be able to
secure the match with model-preservation. Indeed, that is the case:
Definition 4.2.46 (Strong Value-Preservation). Let L1 and L2 be some languages.
A map t : L1 Ñ L2 is strongly value-preserving if for all Γ Ď L1:
(i) 9t r⟦Γ⟧1s  ⟦trΓs⟧2
(ii) 9t´1r⟦trΓs⟧2s  ⟦Γ⟧1.
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Proposition 4.2.47 (Strong Value-Preservation is Model-Preservation). Let L1 and
L2 be languages, and let t : L1 Ñ L2. Then t : L1 9 L2 iff t is strongly value-
preserving.
Proof: The left-to-right direction is exactly analogous to Proposition 4.2.41.
For the right-to-left direction, 9t rC1s 9t r⟦H⟧1s  ⟦trHs⟧2  ⟦H⟧2  C2.
Hence, 9t is surjective. Likewise for totality. ∎
Corollary 4.2.48 (Semantic Formulations of Translatability). Let L1 and L2 be
languages, and let t : L1 Ñ L2. If L1 and trL1s are opinionated, then the
following are equivalent:
(a) t : L1⇝L2.
(b) t : L1 9 L2.
(c) t is value-preserving.
(d) t is strongly value-preserving.
§ 4.2.5 Value-Corroboration
As before, one may ask whether there is a nice semantic-value correlate of transla-
tional equivalence, given that value-preservation is the rough semantic-value cor-
relate of translation. Again, the answer is affirmative. The key essentially invokes
Lemma 4.2.30.
Definition 4.2.49 (Value-Corroboration). Let L1 and L2 be languages, and let
t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1. We say t and s are value-corroborating if for
all ϕ P L1 and ψ P L2:
(i) ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦s(t(ϕ))⟧1  9t´1r9s´1r⟦ϕ⟧1ss.
(ii) ⟦ψ⟧2  ⟦t(s(ψ))⟧2  9s´1r9t´1r⟦ψ⟧2ss.
Proposition 4.2.50 (Alternative Formulation of Value-Corroboration). Let L1 and
L2 be languages, and let t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1. Then t and s are
value-corroborating iff t and s are both value-preserving and 9s 9t´1.
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Proof:
(ñ) Suppose t and s are value-corroborating. It suffices to show that 9s
9t
´1 by Proposition 4.2.40. Suppose x 9t y. Then for all ϕ P L1,
x ,1 ϕ iff y ,2 t(ϕ). So if ψ P L2, y ,2 ψ iff y ,2 t(s(ψ)) iff x ,1 s(ψ).
Hence, y 9s x. Likewise for the converse.
(ð) Suppose t and s are both value-preserving and 9s 9t´1. It suffices to
show that ⟦ϕ⟧1  ⟦s(t(ϕ))⟧1 for all ϕ P L1 (showing (ii) is similar).
For any ϕ P L1 and any x P C1:
x ,1 ϕ ô Dy P C2 : x 9t y & y ,2 t(ϕ) (LTR: totality)
ô Dy P C2 : y 9s x & y ,2 t(ϕ)
ô x ,1 s(t(ϕ)) (RTL: surjectivity).
This completes the proof. ∎
Just as there is a “strong” version of value-preservation, there is a correspond-
ingly “strong” version of value-corroboration that behaves as one would expect by
analogy with value-preservation.
Definition 4.2.51 (Strong Value-Corroboration). Let L1 and L2 be languages,
and let t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1. We say that t and s are strongly
value-corroborating if for all Γ Ď L1 and ∆ Ď L2:
(i) ⟦Γ⟧1  ⟦srtrΓss⟧1  9t
´1r9s
´1r⟦Γ⟧1ss.
(ii) ⟦∆⟧2  ⟦trsr∆ss⟧2  9s´1r9t´1r⟦∆⟧2ss.
Proposition 4.2.52 (Alternative Formulation of Strong Value-Corroboration). Let
L1 and L2 be languages, and let t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1. Then t and s are
strongly value-corroborating iff t and s are both strongly value-preserving
and 9s 9t´1.
Proof: Same as Proposition 4.2.50. ∎
Corollary 4.2.53 (From Model-Corroboration to Value-Corroboration). Let L1 and
L2 be some languages and let t, s : L1 8 L2. Then t and s are strongly value-
corroborating.
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Proof: Immediate from Lemma 4.2.30 and Propositions 4.2.47 and 4.2.50. ∎
Proposition 4.2.54 (From Value-Corroboration to Model-Corroboration). Let L1
and L2 be languages and let t : L1 Ñ L2 and s : L2 Ñ L1.
(a) If t and s are value-corroborating and if L1 and L2 agree on there being
empty states, then t, s : L1 8 L2.
(b) If t and s are strongly value-corroborating, then t, s : L1 8 L2.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 4.2.34 (part (b) uses reason-
ing similar to Proposition 4.2.47). ∎
As one would expect, value-corroborating maps are not guaranteed to even be
translations if the two logics do not agree on empty states. In fact, the same coun-
terexample from Example 4.2.45 illustrating that value-preserving maps need not
be translations works to show that value-corroborating maps need not be transla-
tions. Still, as before, we get a nice equivalence between translational equivalence,





We have all come across disputes that seem impossible to resolve. Philosophy is
full of them. Here are some familiar examples of such disputes in several different
areas of philosophy:
• Ethics: consequentialism vs. deontology
• Decision theory: causal decision theory vs. evidential decision theory
• Language: absolutism vs. contextualism vs. relativism (about any number of
expressions)
• Logic: classical vs. non-classical logic.
At some point, these disputes became standoffs. Each side has found both plenty of
arguments in support of their position and plenty of problems for their opposition.
But neither side has found a convincing argument that uses only assumptions that
all sides of the dispute are willing to grant, and there is a sense that none will ever
be found.
There are two common attitudes to have towards apparently irresolvable dis-
putes. On the one hand, there are the realists about a dispute, who hold that there
is an objective fact of the matter as to which side of the dispute (if any) is correct.
For the realist, irresolvability arises out of no fault of ours. The question surround-
ing the dispute is legitimate; it is just really difficult (maybe even impossible) to
resolve the dispute in an objective manner. On the other hand, there are the anti-
realists about a dispute, who hold that there is no objective fact of the matter as
to which side of the dispute is correct. For the anti-realist, we are to blame for the
irresolvability. The project of answering the question being disputed is somehow
fundamentally misguided. Misguided not because the question is uninteresting or
unimportant (such as the dispute over whether the number of grains of sand in the
world is even or odd) but because both sides are making some false presupposition
about the question and its answer in carrying out their dispute.
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These opposing attitudes have lead philosophers to elevate the debate up a level:
rather than engage in the first-order dispute over which side is right, we enter a
“metadispute” over whether there is even a fact of the matter as to which side of the
first-order dispute is right. And these disputes themselves have started to become
standoffs. To be sure, each side faces its own unique challenges. In general, the
realist must defend the importance of having these debates (given we cannot know
which side is right) and explain why we can be so confident in our judgments about
which side is right. By contrast, the anti-realist has to explain why people are led
to thinking there is a debate in the first place. But these are obstacles, not barriers:
over time, each side has found responses to these challenges that have suited them.
Yet no one has found a compelling argument in favor of the realist or the anti-realist
that can be made on neutral turf.
Metadisputes of this sort generally concern whether or not the two sides of the
first-order dispute are speaking the same language. The realist insists that when
one side asserts p and the other side asserts ¬ p, the two sides of the dispute are us-
ing the same language but are asserting incompatible propositions. By contrast, the
anti-realist will reject this presupposition, arguing instead that the best account of
the dispute is one on which the two sides are merely speaking different languages.
To illustrate this point, we can imagine a first-order dispute over whether or not
Pluto is a planet. One disputant asserts “Pluto is a planet” while the other disputant
asserts “Pluto is not a planet.” A realist interpretation of this debate holds that each
disputant is using the term ‘planet’ in the same way as the other. What the two
sides are disagreeing over, then, is whether Pluto actually is a planet in the sense
the disputants agree upon. By contrast, an anti-realist interpretation of this debate
holds that each side is actually using ‘planet’ to mean different things. Even though
on the surface it looks as though the two sides are disagreeing with one another,
really the propositions they assert are compatible.
It is generally easy to figure out on a case-by-case basis whether or not a realist or
anti-realist interpretation of a dispute is appropriate. For instance, if the disputants
in the debate over Pluto’s status as planet were debating whether or not Pluto clears
its orbital neighborhood, that would suggest they are both using the term ‘planet’ as
the IAU proposes to use the term. If, instead, they were debating whether clearing
its orbital neighborhood was necessary to count as a planet, that would suggest
that they are debating how to use the term ‘planet’.
In philosophy, however, it is far from clear which interpretation is appropriate.
Recently, a whole branch of metaphysics, known as “metametaphysics”, has been
developed to try to sort out the question of whether we should be realists or anti-
realists about certain metaphysical disputes. As of now, there seems to be little
consensus as to how to adjudicate metadisputes in a satisfactory way.
A common example metametaphysicians pick on, which we will examine more
closely in § 5.1, is the dispute over mereological composition. The question is: are
there composite objects (i.e., objects with proper parts)? The common sense answer
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says that there are: objects like tables, chairs, computers, people, and so forth all
have proper parts. A radical answer says that there are not: all there are are funda-
mental particles arranged in various ways like a table, like a chair, and so on (some
prefer to say “arranged table-wise” in place of “arranged like a table”).
What are we to make of the dispute over mereological composition? Must there
be a fact of the matter as to whether the common sense answer or the radical answer
(if any) is correct? The realist about this dispute would say there is a fact of the
matter, even if there are no a priori means by which we can come to know which
answer (if any) is right. Each side uses terms like “part” and “composite” in the
same exact way, but merely disagrees over what is true of these concepts. The anti-
realist would say that there is no fact of the matter as to which side is right, as these
are just two different ways of talking. That is, the common-senser and the radical
do not use the terms “part” and “composite” in the same exact way, and so they
are disagreeing over how to use words rather than what reality is like.
I have intentionally used the word “attitude” in describing realism and anti-
realism, rather than “theory”. The reason is that it is unclear that either side must
be objectively right or wrong in their characterization of the first-order dispute.
Must there be a fact of the matter as to whether we are using words in the same
exact way as another? Could one not be an anti-realist about this metaquestion?
After all, it seems like these metadisputes are just as irresolvable as the first-order
disputes they are meta-ing. One might not unreasonably conclude, then, that the
choice between the realist and anti-realist is a theoretical one: we can choose to
be realists or anti-realists about any of these sorts of disputes. The question is not
which attitude is correct, but rather which attitude we should take.
It is commonly thought that anti-realism entails an end to a dispute. Anti-
realists about a dispute, it is thought, will hold that there simply is no point in
having the dispute in the first place. You can choose to talk however you like. If
you want to talk like a common-senser about composition, you may do so. If you
want to talk like a radical, you may do so. In choosing a language to speak, you are
not thereby misdescribing the world. It is only once you choose a language and start
attempting to describe the world that you can be subject to a charge of inaccuracy.
Much of the chapter that follows is inspired by the following, arguably obvious,
thought: that the language we choose to speak does matter. The choice between
speaking a particular language does have bearing on our abilities to describe the
world. You may not be speaking inaccurately solely in virtue of speaking the lan-
guage you speak; but speaking the language you speak can harbor tangible con-
sequences on your ability to thereafter describe the world. Thus, even if you have
an anti-realist attitude towards a first-order dispute, it need not follow that that
dispute is pointless. A theoretical dispute over which language to speak can be as
important as a theoretical dispute over what the world is like.
Considerations of expressive power make this point quite salient. You can choose
to speak a propositional language with just conjunction and disjunction, or a propo-
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sitional language with just conjunction and negation. You are not thereby getting
things wrong in choosing to speak the former language, but your ability to describe
the world will be significantly hindered by that choice.
This chapter goes beyond this simple point, however. For one thing, in the case
of choosing between speaking a propositional language with just conjunction and
disjunction or one with just conjunction and negation, it is fairly obvious that (all
else being equal) you should choose the latter. The additional expressive power
allows you to make genuine distinctions that would otherwise be ineffable in the
weaker language. But sometimes, it can be a substantive question whether the ad-
dition of expressive power is one that marks a genuine distinction. In § 5.1, we will
see that even though some theories about mereological composition are more ex-
pressive than others, the increase in expressive power afforded by these theories
need not be recognized as legitimate by the others. Thus, an anti-realist can view
such a dispute over mereological composition as a dispute over which possibilities
one ought to recognize.
What’s more, even if two languages each have a sufficient amount of expressive
power to interpret one another charitably, it need not follow that the choice between
which language to speak is unimportant. We saw in § 2.5 that there is an important
difference between expressive equivalence and notational variance. There may be
plenty of reasons to argue over which notational variant of a language we should
speak (perhaps one is simpler or easier to use, for instance). But even if we assume
that disputes over which notational variant to use are uninteresting in the relevant
sense, it need not be that disputes over which of several expressively equivalent
languages to speak is uninteresting. The fact that two languages might differ in
their global structure even if they have the same expressive capacities gives the
anti-realist sufficient grounds for carrying out a dispute over which language we
ought to speak, as differences in global structure can affect one’s ability to extend
the language in various ways. We will see in § 5.2 that this is precisely the situation
characterizing disputes over persistence.
§ 5.1 Mereology
Mereology is the study of parthood. A central question in mereology concerns
the existence of composite objects. Say an object is an atom or a simple if it has
no proper parts (I will use the terms interchangeably throughout). Say an object
is composite if it is not an atom. Are there any composite objects? According to
mereological nihilism, the answer is negative: no object has proper parts. The only
things that exist, according to the nihilist, are simples. According to mereological
universalism, the answer is affirmative to an extreme: every collection of objects
has a “mereological fusion”, i.e., an object such that anything that overlaps with it
overlaps with some object in the collection. So unless there is only one atom, there
will in general be lots of composite objects.
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Sometimes, philosophers get the sense that there is not really a substantive de-
bate between these different positions. Whenever the universalist, for instance,
talks about a composite object (say, a table), the nihilist talks about some simples
arranged in a certain way (say, some simples arranged table-wise). These two ways
of talking seem completely interchangeable, and the difference, therefore, does not
seem very important. Thus, to understand the sense in which this debate is or is not
substantive, it is important to explore the translational and interpretational connec-
tions between them. But even setting that aside, such an investigation could prove
beneficial for getting a clearer picture of the structure of these mereological theo-
ries, just as the standard translation from modal logic into first-order logic can help
us see more clearly the structure of modal logic. In this section, we will make some
first steps towards that investigation.
§ 5.1.1 Defining the Views
Throughout this section, let L1Pred(ď) be the following simple first-order syntax:
ϕ F Pn (y1, . . . , yn) | (x  y) | (x ď y) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | @x ϕ,
where Pn is an n-place predicate and x , y , y1, . . . , yn are variables. As usual, we
may drop parentheses for readability. Here, ‘ď’ stands for the parthood relation.
We use the standard abbreviations for classical first-order logic, including those
for restricted quantification (e.g., @x ď y ϕ  @x (x ď y Ñ ϕ)). We also use the
following abbreviations throughout:
(x ă y) B (x ď y ^ ¬(y ď x)) (“x is a proper part of y”)
Atom(x) B @y (y ď x Ñ x ď y) (“x is an atom”)
(x ˝ y) B Dz (z ď x ^ z ď y) (“x overlaps with y”)
(x K y) B ¬(x ˝ y) (“x is disjoint from y”).
Moreover, we useL1ď for the restriction ofL1Pred(ď) that removes all non-mereological
non-logical predicates, i.e., the first-order syntax defined as follows:
ϕ F (x  y) | (x ď y) | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | @x ϕ.
Before defining nihilism and universalism explicitly, we need some mereolog-
ical principles that both sides can agree to. Everyone in this debate agrees on the
following mereological principles:
Reflexivity. @x (x ď x).
Antisymmetry. @x @y (x ď y ^ y ď x Ñ x  y).
Transitivity. @x @y @z (x ď y ^ y ď z Ñ x ď z).
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In the next section, we may have to drop antisymmetry to accommodate certain
views of persistence. But for now, we simply assume parthood is antisymmetric
without further question.
Let M be the class of pairs xM , gy such thatM  xD , Iy is a first-order model
where I(ď) is a partial order and g is a variable assignment onM. Let , be the
usual satisfaction relation for first-order logic. Then we define M  xL1Pred(ď),M,,y
to be the language of core mereology. We likewise define Mď  xL1ď,C,,y to be the
language of pure core mereology. In either case, if Ax is a set of axioms, we will use
“M `Ax” for the language obtained by restricting to the class of model-assignment
pairs satisfying those axioms. If we define L B M ` Ax, then Lď B Mď ` Ax.
Universalism and nihilism can essentially be formulated in terms of an axiom
(schema) as follows:
Universalism. @u (Dx ϕ(x , u) Ñ Dy @z (y ˝ z Ø Dx (ϕ(x , u) ^ x ˝ z))).
Nihilism. @x Atom(x).
In words, Universalism says that whenever some things satisfy ϕ, there is an object
that consists of all the ϕs and “nothing more”. And of course, Nihilism says that
nothing is composite: the world is full of simples. We will define the languages of
nihilism and universalism accordingly:
• N  M + Nihilism
• U  M + Universalism.
For brevity, we will let U be the class of first-order model-assignment pairs sat-
isfying Universalism and let N be the class of first-order model-assignment pairs
satisfying Nihilism. Observe that U and N are not completely disjoint. Universal-
ism and Nihilism can both be true if there is exactly one object. But U and N are
otherwise disjoint: xM , gy P U X N if and only if |DM |  1.
Here is another way to write Universalism that will be helpful. Define the fol-
lowing abbreviation (where ‘ ι’ is the definite description operator):
σx ϕ(x) B ιx@y (y ˝ x Ø Dz (ϕ(z) ^ y ˝ z)) .
σx ϕ(x) denotes the “fusion” of all the ϕ(x)s. Then Universalism is equivalent to
the following schema:
@u (Dx ϕ(x , u) Ñ Dy (y  σx ϕ(x , u))) .
There are other extensions of M worth mentioning. Consider the following po-
tential axioms:
Atomicity. @x Dy (Atom(y) ^ y ď x).
Atomlessness. @x Dy (y ă x).
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Supplementation. @x @y (¬(y ď x) Ñ Dz (z ď y ^ z K x)).1
Let A be the class of model-assignment pairs satisfying Atomicity, Ã the class of
model-assignment pairs satisfying Atomlessness, and S the class of model-assignment
pairs satisfying Supplementation. We define the following mereological theories as
restrictions of ones previously defined:2
• EM = M + Supplementation (“extensional mereology”)
• GEM = U + Supplementation (“general extensional mereology”)
• AGEM = GEM + Atomicity (“atomic general extensional mereology”)
• ÃGEM = GEM + Atomlessness (“atomless general extensional mereology”)
§ 5.1.2 Trivial Translation
Given Theorem 2.6.5, there is a (nearly trivial) sense in which universalism and
nihilism are equivalent:
Proposition 5.1.1 (Translational Equivalence Between Mereological Theories). N 
U (and also Nď  Uď).
Proof (Sketch): The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of N and U are isomorphic,
and each only has countably many formulas. So by Theorem 2.6.5, N  U.
A similar proof works to show that Nď  Uď.a ∎
aThe Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras of Nď and Uď are not atomless. In fact, each has ex-
actly one atom, which has as a member the formula @x @ y (x  y). But the proof that any
two countable atomless Boolean algebras are isomorphic can be extended relatively easily to
show that the Lindenbaum-Tarksi algebras of these languages are isomorphic.
There are a number of reasons why the existence of such a translation is unsat-
isfying, however. For one thing, N and U are equivalent only in the same sense that
first-order logic and propositional logic are equivalent. Thus, the sense of equiva-
lence here is arguably too weak to be of interest for metaphysical endeavors. More
to the point, this translation scheme is not guaranteed to be schematic in general. In
this sense, it does not seem to really be a usable translation scheme. Finally, what-
ever this translation looks like, it arguably will not capture important features of
the debate between universalism and nihilism.
1This is essentially what Jech [2003, p. 204] calls “separativity”. There are at least two versions
of supplementation discussed in mereology, viz., a strong version and a weak version. This is the
strong version. The weak version is as follows:
Weak Supplementation. @x @ y (x ă y Ñ Dz (z ď y ^ z K x)).
Adding Weak Supplementation to M yields what is known as “minimal mereology”.
2These conventions follow those from Varzi 2016.
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Thus, we assume throughout that for universalism and nihilism to be deemed
equivalent, there must be at least a schematic equivalence between them. But what
kind of equivalence? For now, I leave this question open. Arguably, to show that the
two sides are equivalent, we need to at the very least establish that they are schemat-
ically mutually interpretable. Moreover, if we establish that they are schematically
translationally equivalent, that is as close as we can get to showing that they are
equivalent. But I do not want to take a stand on what is both necessary and suffi-
cient to establish equivalence. Rather, I just want to explore the more concrete/pre-
cise questions about what senses of equivalence hold between these theories. As
we will see, the answer seems to be very few.
§ 5.1.3 The “Barthood” Strategy
For reasons I will return to in a moment, I will start by making a fairly obvious
point. There is a very cheap way to interpret U in N and vice versa: take the other
side as not talking about the parthood relation but rather some other relation—call
it “barthood”. Essentially, one can do this by simply reinterpreting the other predi-
cates of the language systematically so that we free up a predicate to be interpreted
exactly as the other side would have parthood be interpreted. This is proven more
precisely below (I skip the inductive steps for brevity).3
Proposition 5.1.2 (The Barthood Interpretation from Nihilism into Universalism).
There is a schematic t : N 9i U.
Proof: Define t as follows:
t(Pn (y1, . . . , yn))  Pn (y1, . . . , yn) for n , 2
t(P2i (x , y))  P
2
i`1(x , y)
t(x  y)  x  y
t(x ď y)  P20 (x , y)
t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(@x ϕ)  @x (Atom(x) Ñ t(ϕ)) .
We define the following abbreviations for convenience:
B(x , y) B P20 (x , y)
AtomB (x) B @y (B(y , x) Ñ B(x , y)) .
3The results below hold even if we replace U with AGEM. The proofs can also be modified to
replace U with ÃGEM.
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Define Γ to consist of the following formulas:
Atom(x), where x is any variable
@x (Atom(x) Ñ B(x , x))
@x @y (Atom(x) ^ Atom(y) ^ B(x , y) ^ B(y , x) Ñ x  y)
@x @y @z (Atom(x) ^ Atom(y) ^ Atom(z) ^ B(x , y) ^ B(y , z) Ñ B(x , z))
@x
(
Atom(x) Ñ AtomB (x)
)
.
We will show 9t is total and surjective with respect to ⟦Γ⟧U .
First, let xN , hy P N. Define hU(x)  th(x)u and define NU  xDU, IUy,
where:
DU  ℘ (D) ´ tHu





IU(Pn)  I(Pn) for n , 2.
Then by induction,N , h ,N ϕ iffNU, hU ,U t(ϕ). Moreover,NU, hU ,U Γ.
Next, let xM , gy P ⟦Γ⟧U . DefineMN  xDN, INy, where:
DN  ta P D |M , gxa ,U Atom(x) u
IN(ď)  I(B)
IN(P2i )  I(P
2
i`1) X (D
N)2 for i ą 0
IN(Pn)  I(Pn) X (DN)n for n , 2.
Then by induction, ifM , g ,U Γ, thenM , g ,U t(ϕ) iffMN, g ,N ϕ. ∎
Proposition 5.1.3 (The Barthood Interpretation from Universalism into Nihilism).
There is a schematic t : U 9i N.
Proof: Define s as follows:
s(Pn (y1, . . . , yn))  Pn (y1, . . . , yn) for n , 2
s(P2i (x , y))  P
2
i`1(x , y)
s(x  y)  x  y
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s(x ď y)  P20 (x , y)
s(¬ϕ)  ¬ s(ϕ)
s(ϕ ^ ψ)  s(ϕ) ^ s(ψ)
s(@x ϕ)  @x s(ϕ).
We define the following abbreviations for convenience:
B(x , y) B P20 (x , y)
AtomB (x) B @y (B(y , x) Ñ B(x , y))
x ˝B y B Dz (B(z , x) ^ B(z , y)) .
Define ∆ to consist of the following formulas:
@x B(x , x)
@x @y (B(x , y) ^ B(y , x) Ñ x  y)
@x @y @z (B(x , y) ^ B(y , z) Ñ B(x , z))
@u (Dx s(ϕ(x , u)) Ñ Dy @z
(
y ˝B z Ø Dx
(
s(ϕ(x , u)) ^ x ˝B z
))
).
We now show s is total and surjective with respect to ⟦∆⟧N .
First, totality. Let xM , gy P U. DefineMN  xDN, INy, where:
DN  D





IN(Pn)  I(Pn) for n , 2.
By induction,M , g ,U ϕ iffMN, g ,N s(ϕ). Moreover,MN, g ,N ∆.
Next, surjectivity. Let xN , hy P N. DefineNU  xDU, IUy, where:
DU  D
IU(ď)  I(B)
IU(P2i )  I(P
2
i`1)
IU(Pn)  I(Pn) for n , 2.
Then by induction, ifN , h ,N ∆, thenN , h ,N s(ϕ) iffNU, h ,U ϕ. ∎
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The situation, then, is that each side can, in principle, interpret the other side
completely as talking about a relation other than the parthood relation. Insofar as
an interpretation exists in both directions, this is worth noting. However, I do not
think this really shows very much.
For one thing, this seems to be a completely general sort of strategy for rein-
terpreting any philosophical debate. If whenever someone has a debate over the
rules governing, say, some property P, one can (mis)interpret them as really talking
about a different property P1. So if this was enough to show that the universalism-
nihilism debate was merely verbal, it would prove too much.
Moreover, this kind of interpretation does not really seem to respect either side
of the debate. It is not just that the universalist and nihilist take themselves to be
talking about the same kind of relation—they could, after all, be mistaken about
this. It is that it does not really respect how, for instance, nihilists in practice try to
reinterpret claims apparently involving composite objects. They do not say, “Oh,
when you say there are composite objects, you must mean there are combosite ob-
jects instead (i.e., objects with proper barts).” Rather, they try to reinterpret these
claims in terms of collections of objects arranged composite-wise. Similarly, uni-
versalists do not simply say “Oh, when you say there are only simples, you must
mean there are only simple simbles (i.e., objects with no proper barts).” Rather,
they interpret the nihilist as having restricted quantification.
There is another odd feature of these interpretations. Suppose we fix on a model
whose domain partly consisting of what the universalist would call composite ob-
jects (i.e., a member of U). According to the barthood interpretation above, the cor-
responding nihilist model is one whose domain is the same. But the nihilist only
admits of simples according to their preferred relation of parthood. So according
to this interpretation, the nihilist would deem as simples all the objects such as ta-
bles, planets, etc. that are ordinarily thought of as composite. While this view is
compatible with nihilism, it does not seem to be the one nihilists themselves adopt.
It is not that they deny that tables and chairs have no parts; it is that they deny that
there are any tables to begin with.
§ 5.1.4 Restricted Quantification
Given how unsatisfying the barthood strategy is, it is natural to ask whether there
are other interpretational strategies available to either side. To answer this question,
it helps to shift the discussion from N and U to Nď and Uď, which do not have
access to non-logical predicates other than ‘ď’ to reinterpret the parthood relation
of the other side.4
In the case of universalism, there is a very natural way to interpret the nihilist
in terms of restricted quantification:
4The translations below can all be easily modified to allow non-logical predicates back in.
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Proposition 5.1.4 (Pure Interpretation of Nihilism into Universalism). There is a
schematic t : Nď 9i Uď.
Proof: Define t as follows:
t(x  y)  x  y
t(x ď y)  x  y
t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(@x ϕ)  @x (Atom(x) Ñ t(ϕ)) .
Define Γ B tAtom(x) | x is a variableu. Then the proof is almost exactly as
before. ∎
In other words, the universalist is free to interpret the nihilist as employing a re-
strictive way of speaking. Even when the nihilist bangs their fist on the table, say-
ing “No, when I say ‘everything’ to range over everything”, the universalist can still
interpret ‘everything’ as ranging only over atoms. Then the universalist can point
out that their theory is more general, since they can (a) allow names (here, free
variables) to range over composite objects and (b) talk about objects that are not
composed entirely (or even partly) of atoms (assuming the universalist rejects full
atomicity).
§ 5.1.5 Limitations on Nihilist Expressivity
On the other hand, it is less than clear that nihilism can do the same. For one thing,
we will definitely not find a s that produces a coherent translation scheme with t:
Proposition 5.1.5 (The Irreversibility of the Pure Interpretation of Nihilism into
Universalism). Define t and Γ as in Proposition 5.1.4. Then there is no∆ Ď L1ď
and s : L1ď Ñ L1ď such that t, s : Nď↭Γ,∆Uď.
Proof: If there were such a s, then (Uď Γ, since:
(Uď Γ ô ∆ (Nď srΓs
ô Γ, tr∆s (Uď trsrΓss
ô Γ, tr∆s (Uď Γ.
But clearly *Uď Atom(x). ∎
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But there is a deeper concern regarding the prospects of adequately interpret-
ing universalism into nihilism. The following observation follows from a basic fact
from model theory:
Fact 5.1.6 (Nihilistic Equivalence). For all xN1, h1y , xN2, h2y P N:
N1 ”Nď N2 ô either |D1|  |D2| ă ℵ0 or both |D1| ě ℵ0 and |D2| ě ℵ0.
Moreover:
N1, h1 ”Nď N2, h2 ô N1 ”Nď N2 and for all x and y:
h1(x)  h1(y) iff h2(x)  h2(y).
That is, the pure nihilist language cannot say anything other than how many objects
there are. This is not so for the pure universalist language. For one thing, because
universalism does not require atomicity or atomlessness, infinite models can have
very different structures depending on how many atoms there are. This leads to a
fairly strong limitative result:
Proposition 5.1.7 (No Reasonable Pure Interpretation from Universalism into Ni-
hilism). There is no s : Uď⇝∆ Nď such that for all closed ϕ P L1ď:
(i) s(¬ϕ) ”Nď ¬ s(ϕ), and
(ii) s(ϕ) is equivalent to a closed L1ď-formula.
Proof: Suppose there were such an s and ∆. Let Ln be the formula stating that
there are at least n-many things and let En be the formula stating that there
are exactly n-many things. Define α̃ B Atomlessness.
We start with some simple observations that are easy to verify. First, α̃ (Uď
¬En—that is, α̃ is Uď-inconsistent with finite models. Hence, ∆, s(α̃) (Nď
s(¬En). Second, by (i) and Fact 1.3.24, srUďs is opinionated, and thus smust
be model-preserving. Third, let ∆1 B tψ P L |∆ (Nď ψ and ψ is closedu,
and let ψ be a closed formula. Then ∆ (Nď ψ iff ∆1 (Nď ψ.
The proof strategy is as follows. First, we show that ∆1 Y t¬ s(α̃)u has
an infinite model in N. So by Fact 5.1.6, every infinite model in N satisfies
∆1 Y t¬ s(α̃)u. Hence, ∆1, L2, L3, L4, . . . (Nď ¬ s(α̃). By compactness, there
is an n such that ∆1, Ln (Nď ¬ s(α̃). So, up to elementary equivalence, there
are only finitely many models of ∆1 Y ts(α̃)u in N. However, we then show
that there are infinitely many non-equivalent models of α̃ in U. Thus, s is not
model-preserving, contrary to what was verified above, ☇.
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We first show that ∆1 Y t¬ s(α̃)u has arbitrarily large finite models in Nď.
Suppose ∆1, Lk (Nď s(α̃). Then ∆1, Lk (Nď s(¬En) for all n ě 1. Clearly,
∆1 *Nď s(¬En) for all n ě 1, since *Uď ¬En . Moreover, up to elementary
equivalence, Lk only rules out finitely many models of ∆1. But since each
s(¬En) is equivalent to a closed formula, by the pigeon-hole principle, there
must be some model of ∆1 satisfying ¬ s(¬En) and ¬ s(¬Em) for n , m.
Thus, ∆1 *Nď ¬(¬ s(¬En) ^ ¬ s(¬Em)) ”Nď s(¬(En ^ Em)). And yet (Uď
¬(En ^Em), ☇. Hence, for no k does ∆, Lk (Nď s(α̃). That is, ∆1 Yt¬ s(α̃)u has
arbitrarily large finite models. By compactness, ∆1 Y t¬ s(α̃)u has an infinite
model.
Next, we show that α̃ has infinitely many models in U. Let θn be defined
to be the following formula (we explain what it means intuitively below):
@x D!y (y ă x ^ @z (z ă x Ñ z ď y)) ^
Dx1 ¨ ¨ ¨ Dx2n *,
ľ
i, j




@z (z ă x2i´1 Ø z ă x2i ) ^




((x  x2i´1 ^ y  x2i ) _ (x  x2i ^ y  x2i´1))+-^




((x  x2i´1 ^ y  x2i ) _ (x  x2i ^ y  x2i´1)) Ñ (x ď y _ y ď x)+-+- .
In the case where n  0, we define θ0 to be the following formula:
@x D!y (y ă x ^ @z (z ă x Ñ z ď y)) ^ @x @y (x ď y _ y ď x) .
Intuitively, here is what θn says. It says there are exactly n distinct pairs of
composite objects x and y such that x and y share all their proper parts, and
apart from these pairs, the parthood relation is total. Each θn is incompatible
with any other θm where m , n. Moreover, each θn is compatible with α̃,
since we can just take our parthood relation to be an infinite discrete linear
order with a top end point but replacing n-many elements (not including the
top element) with a pair of incomparable elements sharing the same proper
parts. So α̃ has infinitely many models up to elementary equivalence. ∎
The proof made use of Atomlessness; but this was not essential.
Proposition 5.1.8 (No Reasonable Pure Interpretation from Enhanced Universal-
ism into Nihilism). Let L be one of the following languages:
(a) Uď ` Atomlessness
(b) Uď ` ¬Atomlessness
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(c) Uď ` Atomicity
(d) Uď ` ¬Atomicity.
Then there is no s : Uď⇝∆ Nď such that for all closed ϕ P L1ď:
(i) s(¬ϕ) ”Nď ¬ s(ϕ), and
(ii) s(ϕ) is equivalent to a closed L1ď-formula.
Proof: For (a) and (d), the proof is exactly as in Proposition 5.1.7. For (b) and
(c), replace α̃ and θn with the following formulas:
α̃1 B Dx (Dy (σu Atom(u) ă y ă x) ^
@y (σu Atom(u) ă y ă x) Ñ Dz (y ă z ă x))
θ1n B Dn x Atom(x).
Then as before, α̃1 ( ¬En for each n and the formulas θ1n are able to distin-
guish infinitely many models of α̃1. ∎
The proof of Proposition 5.1.7 also relied on the fact that we did not require
supplementation (since θn is incompatible with it). This assumption is more essen-
tial. To illustrate, it is well-known that the models of GEMď are all Boolean alge-
bras with the bottom element removed. In particular, the models of ÃGEMď are
all atomless Boolean algebras minus the bottom element. Incidentally, ÃGEMď is
model-complete, which implies by Vaught’s test that ÃGEMď is complete—meaning
that if ϕ is closed, then either (ÃGEMď ϕ or (ÃGEMď ¬ϕ. So the proof above will
not work when we replace Uď with ÃGEMď. Moreover, it will not work if we re-
place Uď with AGEMď, since the infinite models of AGEMď are also elementarily
equivalent. Still, we do get a closely related limitative result from all this:
Proposition 5.1.9 (No Reasonable Pure Interpretation from Supplemented Univer-
salism into Nihilism). There is no s : GEMď⇝∆ Nď such that for all closed
ϕ P L1ď:
(i) s(¬ϕ) ”Nď ¬ s(ϕ),
(ii) s(ϕ) is equivalent to a closed L1ď-formula, and
(iii) s(Ln) (Nď Ln for all n ě 1.
Likewise if we replace GEMď with AGEMď, ÃGEMď, GEMď `¬Atomicity,
or GEMď ` ¬Atomlessness.
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As for the requirement that (a) holds (i.e., that s(¬ϕ) ”Nď ¬ s(ϕ)), dropping
this constraint is not entirely unreasonable. After all, it might be that the nihilist
will want to embed negated formulas under some more complicated construction
in defining their translation. I have not yet found a proof that allows me to drop
(a). (Both directions are needed in the proof above.) Still, if one were looking for an
equivalence between universalism and nihilism, it does seem troubling that there
is no way to translate universalism into nihilism so as to preserve the boolean op-
erations and so as to map closed formulas to (essentially) closed formulas. For that
would mean that the universalist could say something general about the universe
as a whole that the nihilist would interpret as being about some particular atoms.
There are other limitative results of this sort worth mentioning. One natural
constraint one might want to impose on an adequate interpretation of universalism
within nihilism is the constraint that the nihilist and the universalist must “agree”
on whatever is said about just the atoms. So for instance, if the universalist says
“There are two atoms”, the nihilist better also say (something equivalent to) “There
are two atoms”. But achieving this is quite difficult.
Proposition 5.1.10 (More Expressive Limitations on Nihilism).
(a) There is no s : Uď⇝∆ Nď such that for any closed formula ϕ P L1ď:
∆, ϕ ”Nď ∆, s(ϕ
Atom),
where ϕAtom is the result of restricting every quantifier in ϕ with Atom.
(b) Let Uaď B Uď ` Dx Atom(x). Then there is no s : Uaď⇝∆ Nď such that
ϕ P L1ď is closed iff s(ϕ) is closed and for any closed formula ϕ P L1ď:
∆, ϕ ”Nď ∆, s(ϕ
Atom).
(c) Let UAď  Uď ` Atomicity. Then there is no s : UAď⇝∆ Nď such that for
all ϕ(y1, . . . , yn) P L1ď:
∆, ϕ(y1, . . . , yn) ”Nď ∆, s(
ľ
1ďiďn
Atom(yi) ^ ϕAtom(y1, . . . , yn)).
Proof:
(a) If there were such a s, then:
∆ ”Nď ∆, Dx (x  x)
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”Nď ∆, s(Dx (Atom(x) ^ x  x))
”Nď ∆, s(Dx Atom(x)).
So ∆ (Nď s(Dx Atom(x)). But then (Uď Dx Atom(x), ☇.
(b) Because we are restricting ourselves to Uaď, the proof above will not
work, since (Uaď Dx Atom(x). But we will show that the existence of
such a s still leads to a contradiction in this case.
First, we observe the following: if ϕ P L1ď is closed, then ϕ ”Uaď
s(ϕ)Atom. For since ϕ is closed, s(ϕ) is closed too. So ∆, s(ϕ) ”Nď
∆, s(s(ϕ)Atom). Hence, by interpretability, ϕ ”Uaď s(ϕ)
Atom.
But observe that there is no closed ψ P L1ď where Dx ¬Atom(x) ”Uaď
ψAtom. For letM be a universalist model with at least one atom, and let





ˇM , gxa ,Uaď Dy (Atom(y) ^ y ď x)
(
IA(ď)  I(ď) X (DA)2.
Then by induction, for all closed ψ P L1ď, M ,Uaď ψ
Atom iffMA ,Uaď
ψAtom. But then whereM ,Uaď Dx ¬Atom(x),M
Atom .Uaď Dx ¬Atom(x).
So Dx ¬Atom(x) ıUaď s(Dx ¬Atom(x))
Atom, ☇.
(c) If there were such an s, then we would have:
∆, s(¬Atom(x)) ”Nď ∆, s(Atom(x) ^ s(¬Atom(x))Atom)
(Nď s(Atom(x)).
Hence, we would have ¬Atom(x) (UAď Atom(x), ☇. ∎
In other words, we cannot find a way of interpreting Uď inside Nď so that the ni-
hilist can agree that they can say whatever the universalist says solely about atoms.5
Of course, there could well be some other way of schematically interpreting Uď
within Nď. But since such an interpretation will necessarily lack the properties
from the result above, one can easily question whether such an interpretation does
justice to the debate between the universalist and the nihilist, just as one may ques-
tion whether the barthood interpretations do. So if we restrict to Uď and Nď, it
does seem at least that Uď is more powerful in a number of different (but relevant)
senses.
5Turner [2011a] proves a related result.
179
Chapter 5. Metametaphysics § 5.1. Mereology
None of this constitutes a proof that there is no s : Uď⊸Nď. In general, show-
ing that there is no schematic translation from one language to another is very chal-
lenging when non-schematic translations exist. Even in very simple cases, such as
showing there is no schematic translation from intuitionistic logic to classical logic,
the proofs are rather syntactic. Still, the limitative results show that even if there is
a schematic translation from Uď to Nď, its existence will not be terribly convincing
evidence that universalism and nihilism are on a par.
§ 5.1.6 Second-Order Mereology
A common way that nihilists interpret the univeralist’s language is via plural quan-
tification. So it makes sense to look at how the picture changes, if at all, when we
move to higher-order mereology. Let L2Pred(ď) be the second-order language de-
fined as follows:
ϕ F Pn (y1, . . . , yn) | X(y) | x  y | x ď y | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | @x ϕ | @X ϕ.
For brevity, we will use the following abbreviations throughout:
X Ď Y B @z (X(z) Ñ Y(z))
X  Y B X Ď Y ^ Y Ď X.
As before, we will let L2ď denote the restriction of L2Pred(ď) to the purely mereo-
logical vocabulary.
We will use the standard (full) semantics for second-order logic with the ex-
ception that we will not include the empty set in the domain of quantification.6
Thus, let M2 be the class of pairs xM , gy whereM  xD , Iy is a first-order model,
where I(ď) is a partial order, and where g is a second-order variable assignment
on M (meaning g also maps second-order variables to nonempty subsets of D).
Let , be the standard (i.e., full) second-order satisfaction relation except we dis-
allow second-order quantification to include the empty set. Then we define M2 
xL2Pred(ď),M2,,y to be the language of second-order core mereology. As before,
M2ď will be the pure version of M2.
As before, we can define N2  M2` Nihilism. We define U2 analogously, except
we interpret Universalism so that ϕ can be a second-order formula as well. Given
that we are working in the standard semantics, such a second-order schema turns
out to be equivalent to the second-order formula:
Universalism Simplified. @X Dy @z (y ˝ z Ø Dx (X(x) ^ x ˝ z)).
6The reason for this restriction is that the higher-order quantification is meant to be interpreted
as “plural quantification”, and there is reluctance in calling the empty set a “plurality”. It turns out
that this restriction of the second-order quantifier to nonempty subsets of the domain is nontrivial.
If we allowed quantification over every subset of the domain, then some of the proofs that follow
would break down.
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Now, by going higher-order, nothing changes in terms of the barthood strategy:
we still have N2 ⊸ U2. (Of course, the universalist will interpret the second-order
nihilist quantifier as a restricted second-order quantifier, viz., a second-order quan-
tifier restricted to sets of atoms.) So the interesting question is whether the relation-
ship between the pure versions of the nihilist and universalist language changes
when going second-order. The answer is mixed.
First, we observe that first-order universalism is already strong enough to inter-
pret second-order nihilism.7
Proposition 5.1.11 (Pure Interpretation of Second-Order Nihilism into Universal-
ism). There is a schematic t : N2ď 9i Uď.
7The translation in Proposition 5.1.11 was essentially proposed by Warren [2015], though the
translation he actually proposed contains a slight error. The translation he gives is presented below
(in our notation):
t(x ď y)  Atom(x) ^ Atom(y) ^ x  y
t(x  y)  Atom(x) ^ Atom(y) ^ x  y
t(X(y))  y ď x
t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(@x ϕ)  @x (Atom(x) Ñ t(ϕ))
t(@X ϕ)  @x t(ϕ).
Warren claims this t is what we call a quasitranslation—that is, if ϕ is valid in N2, then t(ϕ) is
valid in U. The claim is not quite correct, however. The problem is that because both X and x get
mapped to the same first-order variable (viz., x), we can get unwanted conflicts. Here is an example.
Consider the formula:
@x @ y (x , y Ñ DY (Y(x) ^ ¬Y(y))) .
This is valid in N2, since if g(x) , g(y), we can assign Y to tg(x)u. But its translation is not valid in
U:
t(@x @ y (x , y Ñ DY (Y(x) ^ ¬Y(y))))
 @x (Atom(x) Ñ @ y (Atom(y) Ñ
(¬(Atom(x) ^ Atom(y) ^ x  y) Ñ D y (x ď y ^ ¬(y ď y)))))
”U @x @ y (Atom(x) ^ Atom(y) Ñ (x , y Ñ D y (x ď y ^ K)))
”U @x @ y (Atom(x) ^ Atom(y) Ñ x  y) .
So Warren’s translation is incorrect. Nevertheless, it is easily modified to form a schematic interpre-
tation of N2 into U.
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t(X(y))  t(y) ď t(X)
t(x  y)  t(x)  t(y)
t(x ď y)  t(x)  t(y)
t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(@x ϕ)  @t(x) (Atom(t(x)) Ñ t(ϕ))
t(@X ϕ)  @t(X) t(ϕ).
Define Γ B tAtom(t(x)) | x is a variableu. Then the proof is as before. ∎
This result might make it seem as though Uď is quite a powerful theory. Actu-
ally, the result is not surprising, given that everyL2ď-formula (without free second-
order variables) is Nď-equivalent to some L1ď-formula.8 This means we get the
following result for free:
Corollary 5.1.12 (No Reasonable Pure Interpretation from Universalism into Second-
Order Nihilism). There is no s : Uď⇝∆ N2ď such that for all closed ϕ P L1ď:
(i) s(¬ϕ) ”N2ď ¬ s(ϕ), and
(ii) s(ϕ) is equivalent to a closed L2ď-formula.
Likewise for the other languages (without supplementation).
Warren [2015] proposed the following quasitranslation from AGEMď into N2ď
(again in our notation):
s(xi)  Xi
s(x  y)  s(x)  s(y)
s(x ď y)  s(x) Ď s(y)
s(¬ϕ)  ¬ s(ϕ)
s(ϕ ^ ψ)  s(ϕ) ^ s(ψ)
s(@x ϕ)  @s(x) s(ϕ).
8This follows from a result due to Ackermann [1954] that every monadic second-order language
with no non-logical predicates is equivalent to a first-order formula with identity.
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As noted previously, proving the existence of a quasitranslation is not very informa-
tive. So it is natural to ask whether s is a full translation. The answer is affirmative
if we continue to assume full AGEMď, but negative if we drop either Atomicity or
Supplementation.
Proposition 5.1.13 (Warren’s Translation of Atomic Universalism into Nihilism).
Let s be defined as follows:
s(xi)  Xi
s(x  y)  s(x)  s(y)
s(x ď y)  s(x) Ď s(y)
s(¬ϕ)  ¬ s(ϕ)
s(ϕ ^ ψ)  s(ϕ) ^ s(ψ)
s(@x ϕ)  @s(x) s(ϕ).
Then s : AGEMď 9 Nď.
Proof: The proof that 9s is surjective goes through as before (just drop men-
tion of ∆), so it suffices to show totality. Let xM , gy P A X S. DefineMN 
xDN, INy, where:
DN  ta P D |M , gxa , Atom(x) u
IN(ď)  txa , ay | a P DN u .
Define gN(Xi)  ta P DN | xa , g(xi)y P I(ď) u. Then by induction,M , g ,AGEMď
ϕ iffMN, gN ,N2ď s(ϕ). Hence, s is model-preserving. ∎
The translation cannot be extended to GEMď or to Uď` Atomicity. For GEMď,
consider an equivalent formulation of Atomlessness:
@x Dy (y ă x) .
This is GEMď-consistent. But its s-translation is N2ď-inconsistent:
@X DY (Y Ă X) .
So s : GEMď |⇝N2ď. For Uď` Atomicity, Consider the Uď-formula:
Dx Dy (x , y) ^ @x @y (x ď y _ y ď x) .
This formula is UAď-consistent. But its s-translation is N2ď-inconsistent:
DX DY (X , Y) ^ @X @Y (X Ď Y _ Y Ď X) .
So s : UAď |⇝N2ď.
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§ 5.1.7 The Possibility of Gunk
The results of the previous section strongly suggest that universalism, in its most
general form, is strictly more expressive than nihilism. For while nihilism can be
easily compositionally interpreted into universalism, the converse is not true. We
have not proven, beyond a doubt, that there is no compositional interpretation of
universalism into nihilism; but if there is one, it will need to be so unnatural that
one might question whether the interpretation can be said to be at all charitable.
Part of the reason the universalist enjoys this additional expressive power is that
the universalist recognizes the possibility of gunk, i.e., the possibility that some
object might not ultimately decompose into atoms. For the nihilist, there could not
be such an object. So there are possibilities that the universalist recognizes that the
nihilist cannot recognize.
Sider [1993] pointed out a version of this problem for nihilism. For nihilism en-
tails that it is metaphysically impossible for there to be gunky objects. But these
objects seem intuitively possible. As Schaffer [2003, p. 501] puts it, gunky objects
have many of the telltale signs of metaphysical possibility: “infinite division passes
excellent tests for being possible: (a) conceivable, (b) logically consistent, and (c) phys-
ically serious.” Thus, one might think this difference in expressive power is enough
to tip the scales in favor of universalism. If there is a seemingly genuine possibility
that the universalist can recognize that the nihilist cannot, that suggests the latter
is too weak for a base theory of parthood.
But the nihilist need not concede that gunky objects are genuinely possible.
There are, of course, well known arguments from the history of philosophy against
the possibility of infinite divisibility (e.g., Kant’s antinomies). And one might rea-
sonably be skeptical of the idea that an object could be decomposable “without
end”. One may ask: if the limit of decomposition was nothing, how could there
be anything to compose the object to begin with. And there are other defenses of
nihilism against the alleged possibility of gunk.9
This is not to say that the nihilist is correct that gunky objects are impossible
(indeed, I am inclined to think otherwise). But what this illustrates is that even if
we grant that universalism has more expressive power than nihilism, we can still
maintain that a genuine dispute can be had between the universalist and the ni-
hilist. The universalist will maintain that their theory is to be preferred since they
have greater expressive power. The nihilist will deny that the additional expres-
sive power afforded by the universalist carves out a genuine distinction. Thus, the
debate can be said to be genuine insofar as the theories disagree over what possi-
bilities ought to be recognized.
9Williams [2006] defends a version of nihilism called emergence nihilism, according to which the
world contains macroscopic simples that can be (partially) colocated. Williams claims that it is this
possibility that seems to give rise to the illusion that gunky objects are possible.
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§ 5.2 Persistence
One of the most central questions in metaphysics concerns the identity of persons
over time: what makes one person at one time the same person as a person at a
different time? Or, more importantly, how do people survive through time? This
question can be generalized from persons to any kind of object: what makes one
material object at one time the same as a material object at a different time? How
do material objects persist through time?
There have been two influential answers to this question in contemporary meta-
physics. One theory of persistence is four-dimensionalism, or perdurantism, ac-
cording to which objects persist by having temporal parts located at different times.
An alternative theory is three-dimensionalism, or endurantism, according to which
objects persist by being “wholly present” at different times. We can put the differ-
ence between the two views as follows. Let us say that an object persists through
time if it exists at multiple times. Let us say an object perdures across time if it
has parts at multiple times. Let us say an object endures across time if it is wholly
present at multiple times. Thus, perdurantism and endurantism propose differ-
ent accounts of how objects persist through time: perdurantism says persistence is
perdurance, while endurantism says persistence in endurance.
This characterization of the debate is notoriously fraught with difficulties. Many
ways of formulating the debate trivialize it. In particular, it is not really clear how
to spell out what it means to be “wholly present” at multiple times in such a way
that endurantism does not become trivialized or absurd. If being “wholly present”
means that every part of them at every time at which they exist also exists at that
time, then the perdurantist does not deny this. If it means that all of the object’s
parts across all time exist at every time at which the object exists, then enduran-
tism seems plainly false (or else implies some kind of mereological essentialism,
according to which objects cannot survive change of their parts). Thus, unlike the
mereological debate, it becomes tricky to use the method of translations to assess
the status of this debate.
In this section, we will understand the debate between perdurantism and en-
durantism as one over whether to admit certain first-order models of persistence.
Perdurantism, on this picture, corresponds to the addition of a certain constraint
on temporal existence, viz., an object exists at a time only if it has a temporal part
at that time. Any model violating this constraint is ruled out by the perdurantist as
an unrealistic model of persistence. Endurantism, by contrast, corresponds to the
lack of this constraint. That is, the endurantist will hold that models violating this
constraint can be accurate representations of persistence.10
10It might be tempting to seek a formulation of endurantism that imposes an opposing constraint
on the class of models that can accurately represent persistence. But this is difficult to do without
leaning on differences in commitments to certain temporal mereological principles. For example,
one might think that endurantism should be formulated as the view that no object has a proper tem-
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An alternative approach to characterizing the debate between perdurantism and
endurantism utilizes locational locutions to distinguish the two views. This ap-
proach is a more recent development due primarily to Parsons [2007]. The idea is
to understand perdurantism as the view that objects persist by having exact tempo-
ral locations that contain the time through which they persist. Endurantism, then,
is the view that objects persist by having all of their parts’ exact locations overlap
with every region of time through which they persist. While this approach is worth
pursuing further, I do not take up the project of investigating the relative expressive
power of endurantism and perdurantism in the locational framework here.
Throughout, we will work within the following two-sorted first-order syntax:
α F Pn;m (x; t) | E(x; t) | (x  y) | (s  t) | (x ďt y) | (s Ď t)
ϕ F α | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ^ ϕ) | @x ϕ | @t ϕ.
Here, variables x, y, etc. stand for objects, while s, t, etc. stand for intervals of time.
Intervals, as we are defining things here, need not be connected. Nor need they be
defined in terms of collections of points of time. Nothing we say here will assume
anything about the structure of intervals of time except that they satisfy the axioms
of GEM. The interpretation of the special predicates of this language are given as
follows:
E(x; t) (“x exists throughout t”)
x ďt y (“x is a part of y throughout t”)
s Ď t (“s is a subinterval of t”).
Object quantifiers range over all objects across all times. The following abbrevia-
tions will be used throughout:
@t x ϕ B @x (E(x; t) Ñ ϕ) (“for all x that exist throughout t,. . . ”)
(x ”t y) B (x ďt y) ^ (y ďt x) (“x perfectly overlaps with y throughout t”)
(x ď y) B @t (E(x; t) Ñ (x ďt y)) (“x is a part of y”)
λ(x) B σ t E(x; t) (“the lifespan of x”).
Models are of the formM  xD , T, Iy, where D and T are disjoint nonempty sets
and I is an interpretation function, so that:
poral part. The problem with this formulation is that it rules out the possibility of distinct objects
that have all the same parts at some time (which might be motivated as a response to, e.g., the para-
dox of material constitution). Endurantism, as a view about persistence, ought not take a stand on
whether multiple distinct objects can be exactly co-located, or have exactly the same parts, at some
time. (At the very least, we wish to remain neutral on this issue in our formulation of endurantism
for the sake of generality.) If the endurantist is willing to rule out this possibility, it will turn out
that their view will automatically be incompatible with perdurantism (unless objects only exist at a
single time), and so no additional constraint is needed to characterize endurantism in any case.
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• I(Pn;m) Ď Dn ˆ Tm
• I(E) Ď D ˆ T
• I(ď) Ď D2 ˆ T
• I(Ď) Ď T2.
We will use the following abbreviations throughout (where t P T):
Dt B ta P D | xa; ty P I(E) u
I(ď)t B txa , by P D2 | xa , b; ty P I(ď) u .
Variable assignments are defined as usual. The satisfaction relation for model-
assignment pairs and formulas in this syntax is defined as the standard one.
A persistence model is a first-order model satisfying the following axioms:
@x Dt E(x; t)
@t Ds Ď t Dx E(x; s)
@t @t x @s Ď t E(x; s)
@t @s Ď t @x @y (x ďt y Ñ x ďs y)
@t @x @y (x ďt y Ñ E(x; t) ^ E(y; t))
@t @t x (x ďt x)
@t @t x @t y @t z (x ďt y ^ y ďt z Ñ x ďt z)
@t (t Ď t)
@s @t (s Ď t ^ t Ď s Ñ s  t)
@s @t @r (r Ď s ^ s Ď t Ñ r Ď t)
@s @t (¬(s Ď t) Ñ Dr (r Ď s ^ r K t))
@u (Dt ϕ(t , u) Ñ Ds @r (s ˝ r Ø Dt (ϕ(t , u) ^ t ˝ r))) ,
where u can be any sequence of variables not including t, s, or r. Here is a brief
explanation of the axioms. The first two axioms state that everything must exist
at some time, and no time can be completely unpopulated. The next two axioms
ensures that existence and parthood is inherited by subintervals, i.e., that E(x; t)
means that x exists throughout t and that (x ďt y) means that x is a part of y through-
out t. The next axiom ensures that parts exist at the times at which they are parts.
The next two axioms say that ďt is reflexive and transitive. The rest of the axioms
state that Ď obey GEM. Note that ď is automatically a preorder, in that:
@x (x ď x)
@x @y @z (x ď y ^ y ď z Ñ x ď z) .
A perdurance model is a persistence model satisfying the additional axiom:
@t @t x Dt y (y ”t x ^ @s (E(y; s) Ñ s Ď t)) .
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This axiom states that for an object to exist throughout some interval, there must
be an object that exactly overlaps with it throughout the interval and only exists at
that interval.
Fact 5.2.1 (Alternative Formulation of Perdurance). A persistence model is a per-
durance model iff it satisfies the axiom:
@t @t x Dt y (y ”t x ^ λ(y)  t) .
Let 3D be the language consisting of this syntax, the class of persistence model-
assignment pairs, and the standard first-order satisfaction relation. Let 4D be the
restriction of 3D to perdurance models. Clearly, we have:
Proposition 5.2.2 (Schematic Translation from Perdurantism into Endurantism).
4D⊸ 3D.
Proof: Let θ be the formula:
@t @t x Dt y (y ”t x ^ @s (E(y; s) Ñ s Ď t)) .
Let t be defined as follows (where α is any atomic formula):
s(α)  θ Ñ α
s(¬ϕ)  θ Ñ ¬ s(ϕ)
s(ϕ ^ ψ)  θ Ñ (s(ϕ) ^ s(ψ))
s(@x ϕ)  θ Ñ @x s(ϕ)
s(@t ϕ)  θ Ñ @t s(ϕ).
It is straightforward to verify that t : 4D⊸ 3D. ∎
The question now arises whether 4D can interpret 3D. It turns out the answer
is affirmative if we are allowed to appeal to an additional predicate. Let R be some
arbitrarily chosen unary predicate (for the “real” objects).
Proposition 5.2.3 (Schematic Interpretation of Endurantism into Perdurantism).
3D⊸Γ 4D, where Γ is defined as follows:
Γ B tR(x) | x is a variableu Y t@t Ds Ď t Dx (R(x) ^ E(x; s))u .
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Proof: Define the translation t as follows:
t(α)  α for atomic α
t(¬ϕ)  ¬ t(ϕ)
t(ϕ ^ ψ)  t(ϕ) ^ t(ψ)
t(@x ϕ)  @x (R(x) Ñ t(ϕ))
t(@t ϕ)  @t t(ϕ).
We will now show that t is model-preserving relative to Γ.
First, we show totality. LetM  xD , T, Iy be a persistence model. Define
MPerd  xDPerd, T, IPerdy as follows:





ˇ xa; ty P I(Pn;m)
(
IPerd(E)  txxa; sy ; ty | a P Dt and t Ď s u
IPerd(ď)t  txxa; sy , xb; ryy | xa , by P I(ď)t and t Ď s , r u
IPerd(Ď)  I(Ď)
IPerd(R)  txa; λ(a)y | a P D u .
Where g P VA(M), let gPerd(x)  xg(x), λ(g(x))y. It is tedious but straight-
forward to show by induction thatMPerd is a perdurance model satisfying Γ
and for all ϕ,M , g ,3D ϕ iffMPerd, gPerd ,4D t(ϕ).
Next, surjectivity. Let N  xD , T, Iy be a perdurance model and let g P
VA(N ) be such that N , g ,4D Γ. Define NEnd  xDEnd, T, IEndy as follows
(where α is an arbitrary predicate):
DEnd  I(R)
IEnd(α)  I(α) æDEnd .
Again, it is straightforward to check thatNEnd is a persistence model and that
for all ϕ,N , g ,4D t(ϕ) iffNEnd, g ,3D ϕ. ∎
Corollary 5.2.4 (Generalizing the Mutual Interpretation Between Perdurantism and
Endurantism). Let Λ be a set of formulas. Let ΛR be the set of formulas ob-
tained from Λ by replacing all quantifiers with quantifiers bounded by R.
(a) Where s is defined as before, s : 4D `Λ⊸ 3D `Λ.
(b) Where t and Γ are defined as before, t : 3D `Λ⊸ΓYΛR 4D `Λ.
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Schematic interpretability is not preserved through all modifications of these
languages, however. So far, we have worked with fairly minimal articulations of
these two theories of persistence that do not take a stand on any controversial prin-
ciple of temporal mereology. But as it so happens, the two theories are typically
associated with different principles of temporal mereology, and one might suspect
that the disagreements arising from the dispute over persistence stem from a more
basic disagreement over these principles. That is what we will now illustrate.
When one imports a principle of mereology into temporal mereology, there are
two versions one can consider, which (very roughly) might be characterized as a
version that applies primarily to three-dimensional objects and a version that ap-
plies to four-dimensional objects. More neutrally, we may say there are synchronic
and diachronic versions of any given mereological principle. The synchronic version
of the principle requires all the quantifiers to be restricted to objects that exist at a
particular time, whereas the diachronic version concerns objects across time. For
instance, consider Antisymmetry:
@x @y (x ď y ^ y ď x Ñ x  y) .
The synchronic version of this principle would be:
@t @t x @t y (x ďt y ^ y ďt x Ñ x  y) .
That is, if some three-dimensional objects exactly overlap at any time, then they are
identical. The diachronic version of this principle would leave the original formula
untouched, but could be equivalently stated as follows:
@x @y (@t (E(x; t) Ñ x ďt y) ^ @t (E(y; t) Ñ y ďt x) Ñ x  y) .
That is, if some four-dimensional objects exactly overlap at every time at which they
exist, then they are identical.
The reflexivity and transitivity axioms (both in their synchronic and diachronic
versions) are generally accepted by both endurantists and perdurantists. But they
will diverge on most of the other mereological principles of interest. Thus, it makes
sense to ask how endurantism, with its preferred mereological principles, compares
with perdurantism, with its preferred mereological principles.
Below are some synchronic principles we may consider adding to endurantism:
Synchronic Antisymmetry. @t @t x @t y (x ďt y ^ y ďt x Ñ x  y).
Synchronic Supplementation. @t @t x @t y
(
y ăt x Ñ Dt z (z ďt x ^ z Kt y)
)
.
Synchronic Universalism. @t @u
(
Dx ϕ(x , t , u) Ñ Dx
(
x  σt y ϕ(y , t , u)
))
.
Synchronic Atomicity. @t @t x Dt y (y ďt x ^ Atomt (y)).
Synchronic Atomlessness. @t @t x Dt y (y ăt x).
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Below are some diachronic principles we may consider adding to perdurantism:
Diachronic Antisymmetry. @x @y (x ď y ^ y ď x Ñ x  y).
Diachronic Supplementation. @x @y (y ă x Ñ Dz (z ď x ^ z K y)).
Diachronic Universalism. @u (Dx ϕ(x , u) Ñ Dx (x  σ y ϕ(y , u))).
Diachronic Atomicity. @x Dy (y ď x ^ Atom(y)).
Diachronic Atomlessness. @x Dy (y ă x).
It is an interesting question to what extent perdurantism and endurantism still
remain schematically interpretable in one another when each side is equipped with
its preferred set of mereological principles. As an illustration, when we add syn-
chronic antisymmetry to endurantism and diachronic antisymmetry to perduran-
tism, we still have a schematic interpretation from the former to the latter.
Proposition 5.2.5 (Interpreting an Antisymmetric Endurantism into an Antisym-
metric Perdurantism). Define:
θ  @x (R(x) Ø ¬ Dy (Dt (x ”t y) ^ Dt (E(y; t) ^ ¬(x ”t y)))) .
Then 3D`Synchronic Antisymmetry⊸ΓYtθu4D`Diachronic Antisymmetry.
Proof: It suffices to show that the t defined earlier is still model-preserving
relative to Γ Y tθu. Surjectivity is trivial. For totality, let xa , λ(a)y , xb , λ(b)y P
IPerd(R) and suppose xa , λ(a)y ”t xb , λ(b)y for some t. Then by definition,
a ”t b, so by Synchronic Antisymmetry, a  b. Hence, xa , λ(a)y  xb , λ(b)y.
Conversely, suppose xa , ty < IPerd(R). Thus, t Ă λ(a), so xa , ty ”t xa , λ(a)y. ∎
Thus, 4D with Diachronic Antisymmetry can interpret 3D with Synchronic An-
tisymmetry. But the converse does not seem to hold (though I have not yet found a
proof that this is the case). Recall that in their more lax formulations, endurantism
was a generalization of perdurantism, since it simply refused to impose the perdu-
rantist temporal parts constraint. Thus, every perdurance model was automatically
a persistence model. But it is not the case that every perdurance model satisfying
Diachronic Antisymmetry is a persistence model satisfying Synchronic Antisym-
metry. In a sense, we would need to squeeze the persistence models into a tighter
space to interpret 4D with Diachronic Antisymmetry in 3D with Synchronic Anti-
symmetry. But this does not generally seem possible when some four-dimensional
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objects exactly overlap at one time but not another (as is possible according to per-
durantism).11 So while the two theories seem expressively on a par in the general
case, it does not seem they are expressively equivalent when each is equipped with
their preferred version of antisymmetry.
A similar kind of argument to the one above can also be used to show that for
each of the principles above, when one adds the diachronic version to 4D and the
synchronic version to 3D, the latter is interpretable in the former. This suggests an
alternative characterization of the perdurantism-endurantism debate: the debate
is not necessarily one about the different ways objects can persist through time,
but is really a debate over the axioms governing temporal mereology (in particular,
whether they should be construed synchronically or diachronically).
For example, perdurantists are often universalists about four-dimensional ob-
jects. That means that composition is completely unrestricted across both space
and time: any collection four-dimensional objects, however far apart and discon-
nected in space and time, can be fused into a composite object. The perdurantist
could, of course, hold that composition is only unrestricted across space (i.e., they
could maintain Synchronic Universalism instead of Diachronic Universalism). It
is just that, given the picture of persistence they endorse where space and time are
treated on a par, it would be unnatural for the perdurantist to restrict composition
across time. By contrast, endurantists who also want to be universalists will often
only hold that composition is unrestricted at any give moment. They will deny
that, for example, Cleopatra and I compose a single object, for there is no single
time at which all of the parts of this so-called object are present. Of course, there
is no contradiction in adding Diachronic Universalism to endurantism. It is just
not the most natural way for an endurantist to maintain unrestricted composition
given the picture of persistence they endorse. Thus, whether or not the enduran-
tist and perdurantist languages are expressively equivalent will depend on further
commitments to principles that themselves might be disputed by each side.
Of course, the comparison does not stop there. To get a full picture of the rela-
tionship between perdurantism and endurantism, we would need to see how things
change when we add further synchronic principles to endurantism and their di-
achronic counterparts to perdurantism. I leave such a comparative project to fu-
ture work. But this does at least illustrate that the debate between perdurantism
and endurantism is not solely over how objects persist. Rather, they are, at least in
part, debates over whether temporal mereology should be done synchronically or
diachronically. So even an anti-realist about the debate should concede that some-
thing still hangs on the debate, albeit indirectly. Even if we can choose which way
to talk, these different ways of talking have very different structures that have an
effect on our ability to adequately describe the world.
11We can generally restore interpretation if we replace the time-insensitive notion of identity in
3D with a time-sensitive notion. For example, if we removed  from 3D, we could interpret 4D `
Diachronic Antisymmetry in 3D ` Synchronic Antisymmetry by translating x  y as x ” y.
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At atomic formulas in a signature, 27
Ø biconditional, 34
Can canonical language (of a logic), 18
C class (usually an evaluation space), 3
Ñ conditional, 34
^ conjunction (finite), 34
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conjunction (infinitary), 34
CnL consequence operator for L, 6
Con consistent theories (of a language/logic), 21
r¨s context change potential, 38
Diag diagram (in a language/logic), 12
_ disjunction (finite), 34
Ž
disjunction (infinitary), 34
|⇛ dynamic entailment, 39
( entailment (for languages), 4
r¨s equivalence class, 17
” equivalence (entailment), 4
” equivalence (satisfaction), 12
Ť expansion (restriction), 8F preservative expansion (conservative restriction), 8
K falsum, 34




greatest lower bound (in a theory space), 14
trLs image of L under t, 12
Θrιs instantiation of Θ with ι, 30
|ñ kinematic entailment, 40
L language, 3
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least upper bound (in a theory space), 14
 Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra, 17
L{%$ equivalence classes under %$, 17
ď ordering in Lindenbaum-Tarksi algebra, 17
L logic, 5
Max maximal theories (of a language/logic), 21
MaxCon maximally consistent theories (of a language/logic), 21
¬ negation, 34
Op operators in a signature, 27
PTh principal theories (of a language/logic), 18
$ provability, logical consequence, 5
%$ provable equivalence, 5
LΓ the Γ-reduction of L, 13
æ restricted to, 8
, satisfaction, 3
, satisfaction (for dynamic languages), 39
Sch schemas (in a signature, with parameters), 30
⟦¨⟧ semantic value, 4
( static entailment (for dynamic languages), 39
Ď sublogic, 9
L syntax, 3
Th theories (in a language/logic), 13





_ accessibility relation (modal logic), 56
CPL language of classical propositional logic, 55
CPL classical propositional logic, 55
FOL language of first-order logic, 56
FOL first-order logic, 56
id identity translation, 53
IPL language of intuitionistic propositional logic, 57
IPL intuitionistic propositional logic, 57
K3 Kleene’s strong 3-valued logic, 60
◻ necessity operator, 56
LP logic of paradox, 58
Prop proposition letters (p1, p2, p3, . . .), 55
LProp propositional formulas, 55
SOL second-order logic, 59
α sequence notation, 70
Ò Sheffer stroke, 55
ST standard translation from modal logic into first-order logic, 56
tTh translation t lifted to theory spaces, 60
t, s translations, 53
⇝ translation, translatable, 52
⇝⇝ translation scheme, intertranslatable, 52
↭ reversible translation scheme, translational equivalence, 63
 translational isomorphism, 68
⇝Λ translation with auxiliary assumptions Λ, 70
V propositional valuations, 55
Chapter 3
:Ď definitional extension, 108
 recursive translation, recursive translatability, 117
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 recursive translation scheme, recursive intertranslatability, 117
 recursive translational equivalence, 117
●= recursive isomorphism, 117
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Ď schematic fragment, 101
⊸ schematic translation, schematic translatability, 98
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 schematic translational equivalence, 99
˝= schematic isomorphism, 99
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100
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9t correlation relation for t, 144
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ĚĎ discernibly equivalent, 131
< strictly discernible, 131
Ďs strongly discernible, 138
ĚĎs strongly discernibly equivalent, 138
<s strictly strongly discernible, 138
ď expressible, 125
ďC expressible relative to C, 128
ă strictly expressible, 125





¬ setwise negation, 135
ĺ weakly expressible, 129
„ weakly expressibly equivalent, 129




M language of mereology, 168
AGEM language of atomic general extensional mereology, GEM + Atom-
icity, 169
ÃGEM language of atomless general extensional mereology, GEM + Atom-
lessness, 169
EM language of extensional mereology, M + Supplementation, 169
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